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Abstract: In this dissertation I explore Frege’s conception of truth. In particular I
defend the thesis that Frege in his mature career takes truth to be an object, i.e., the True
qua the reference of true sentences. In the literature on truth Frege has been usually
taken to be a truth deflationist or a truth primitivist. Indeed Frege leaves a number
of comments that sound like typical deflationist claims and his famous indefinability
argument is the most discussed argument for primitivism. However, Frege is neither a
deflationist nor a primitivist. His deflationist remarks and the indefinability argument
are rather his arguments that truth is an object.
For Frege judging—and its verbal counterpart asserting—is always acknowledging
the truth of a truth-bearer. Thus, if truth is an object for him, his conception of judgment
ought to also be adjusted accordingly. Indeed Frege shows how we can understand
judgment qua acknowledgment of truth if truth is an object. Specifically, judging that p
is identifying the True with the reference of ‘p’ non-judgmentally, i.e., without judging
that p is identical with the reference of ‘p’. Frege’s conception of judgment impacts his
conception of knowledge because the act of judging is that of producing knowledge.
In a nutshell our act of judging and the knowledge we produce by it are epistemically
grounded in our objectual knowledge of the True. If we take this point into account,
we can develop a new reading of Frege’s claim that logic is the science of truth.
The suggested reading of Frege’s conception of truth and related notions can make
a contribution to contemporary philosophical problems. First, Frege’s conception
of judgment can cope with Peter Hanks’s recent criticisms of the Fregean picture of
judgment in general. Secondly, his conception of assertion can explain the connection
between truth and assertion in a novel way. Lastly, Frege’s conception of knowledge
can be developed into a new theory of knowledge where objectual knowledge is more
fundamental than propositional knowledge.
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Frege’s Conception of Truth as an Object
Gottlob Frege’s insight into the nature of truth is almost entirely forgotten in the current
literature on truth. Someone might immediately object to this claim by saying that he
is well known as a philosopher who inspires truth deflationism—the claim that truth
is not a substantive notion—or truth primitivism.1, 2 Indeed, Frege is well known as
such. But that fact is rather the evidence that his insight is forgotten. This is because
he is neither a deflationist nor a primitivist. Or so I argue in this dissertation.
1For instance, Dummett (1978) takes Frege to be the origin of truth deflationism. Also, see Stoljar and
Damnjanovic 2014. Asay (2013) describes Frege as a primitivist.
2I am not suggesting that truth deflationism is a single philosophical position about truth. Truth
deflationism is rather a category under which a number of different theories—e.g., disquotationalism
(Field 1994, 2001; Quine 1986), minimalism (Horwich 1998), the redundancy theory (Ramsey 1927),
etc.—fall under. Also, as Bar-On and Simmons (2007) point out, there are different aspects of truth one
can be a deflationist about, i.e., the truth-predicate ‘true’, the concept of truth, and the property of
truth. Hence, one can be a deflationist about some aspects and anti-deflationist about others. I am just
suggesting a characterization of the basic spirit that underlies different truth deflationist positions.
1
2 Chapter 1. Frege’s Conception of Truth as an Object
I am not denying that Frege inspires truth deflationism or primitivism. In fact he
does. In a number of places Frege puts forward claims that could be the main theses of
deflationist theories. Furthermore his famous argument for the indefinability of truth
(1897, 1918a) is perhaps one of the most discussed arguments for truth primitivism.
What I attempt to establish is that all these different aspects of Frege’s conception of
truth are tied back to his more fundamental claim, i.e., the claim that truth is an object.
Frege considers truth to be an object and his deflationist- or primitivist-like claims are
his arguments that truth is an object. He is not a deflationist because the object of truth
is a substantive entity. Frege is not a primitivist because logic is the science of truth
as such. My aim is to construct an exegesis that captures Frege’s conception of truth
as an object in his mature career and explains how this conception is connected to his
conception of other notions such as judgment, assertion, and knowledge.
In Frege scholarship it is widely agreed that there are some initial reasons to suspect
that truth is an object for Frege. Nevertheless, most commentators eventually do not
take those reasons seriously. Previous readings mostly reject—or ignore—that truth
is an object for Frege. My dissertation is hence a resistance against this interpretative
trend. §1.1 introduces what scholars consider to be the initial reasons to suspect that
truth is an object for Frege. §1.2 reviews previous readings that reject—or ignore—that
truth is an object for him. In addition to engaging with these previous readings, an
exegesis that accepts that truth is an object for Frege ought to meet other challenges.
§1.3 introduces these challenges and explains how the dissertation is organized.
1.1. The Truth-Value True as a Reference of Sentences
In his mature career Frege makes the famous distinction between the sense and the
reference of an expression (1891, 1892c, 1892a, 1893, etc.). The content of every mean-
1.1. The Truth-Value True as a Reference of Sentences 3
ingful expression of a language is divided into the level of sense and that of reference.
The reference of an expression is an entity referred to by the expression. The sense
of an expression contains a ‘mode of presentation’ (Frege 1892c: 57) of its reference.
Frege does not further explain what he means by ‘mode of presentation’. Even though
the nature of sense is an important subject in Frege scholarship and I deal with it a
little bit in due course, our discussion does not heavily depend on it.
What is important to us is the reference of a term. In a language terms are divided
into two categories: saturated and unsaturated terms. Unsaturated terms have empty
places for argument terms, e.g., ‘the author of · · · ’, ‘· · · is a prime number’, etc. These
unsaturated terms refer to functions, i.e., unsaturated entities that have empty places
for arguments. If a function is saturated with arguments, it yields an object as its value.
Saturated terms such as ‘the author of Grundgesetze’ or ‘Gottlob Frege’ refer to objects,
i.e., saturated entities that do not have empty places for arguments. For Frege things
that exist are either objects or functions. Therefore, in Frege’s mature framework, the
semantic categories go hand in hand with the ontological categories. Saturated terms
refer to saturated entities, i.e., objects while unsaturated terms refer to unsaturated
entities, i.e., functions.
A sentence can also have a reference. When a sentence has a reference, its reference
is a truth-value—the True or the False. The True is the truth-value of true sentences
and the False is that of false sentences. The question is whether truth-values are objects
or functions. Frege writes:
A sentence contains no empty place, and therefore we must regard what it stands
for as an object. But what a sentence stands for is a truth-value. Thus the two
truth-values are objects. (1891: 32)3
3For the translation of Frege’s published or unpublished articles, I mostly depend on Frege 1970, 1979,
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Note that the True is a ‘truth-item’ and that it is an object. This is the initial reason to
think that truth is an object for Frege. The claim that truth is an object is the claim that
truth is the True.
Indeed Frege is switching back and forth between truth and the True. In ‘On Sense
and Reference’ Frege argues that a sentence must have a reference and its reference is
a truth-value. Suppose that we encounter the sentence ‘Odysseus was set ashore at
Ithaca while sound asleep’ (Frege 1892c: 62). Its sense is a thought, i.e., the thought
that Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca while sound asleep. Frege first points out that
if the thought is all there is about this sentence, then we do not need to bother to figure
out whether its part, e.g., ‘Odysseus’, has a reference. This is because whether or not
the proper name has a reference the thought still remains the same because the name
still has a sense whether or not it has a reference. However, we do often attempt to
figure out whether a name involved in a sentence has a reference. Why? We ought to
notice the compositionality of reference: the reference of a complex expression like a
sentence is determined by that of its parts (1892c: 62).4 Therefore, if the reference of a
part is missing, the whole complex expression does not have a reference. Then the fact
that we are concerned about the reference of ‘Odysseus’ qua the part of the sentence
shows that we are concerned about whether the sentence has a reference. Hence, we
are committed to the existence of a sentential reference. Then, what is the reference of
a sentence? Frege writes:
But now why do we want every proper name to have not only a sentence, but also
a reference? Why is the thought not enough for us? Because, and to the extent
1984, 1997. I specify the year of publication of the work if it is published or the conjectured year of
completion if it is originally unpublished. The year of the cited work is followed by the page number
of its translation.
4A thought does not satisfy this condition. Thus it is not the reference of a sentence but its sense (Frege
1892c: 62).
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that, we are concerned with its truth value. · · · It is the striving of truth that drives
us always to advance from the sense to the reference.
We have seen that the reference of a sentence may always be sought, whenever
the reference of its components is involved; and that this is when and only when
we are inquiring after the truth value. (Frege 1892c: 63; italics mine)
Therefore, the reference of a sentence is a truth-value. What is noteworthy is that Frege
is switching back and forth between the notion of truth-value and that of truth. This
suggests that truth is the True for him.
We can see similar switching back and forth elsewhere. In ‘Logic in Mathematics’
Frege comments:
Showing · · · that truth is not a property of sentences or thoughts, as language
might lead one to suppose, this consideration confirms that a thought is related to
its truth-value as the sense of a sign is to its reference. (1914: 234; itallics mine)5
I explain ‘this consideration’, which is one of Frege’s arguments that truth is an object,
in Chapter 2. It appears that Frege is saying that truth is not a property of truth-bearers
and thus that the relation of a thought to a truth-value is that of sense to reference. This
inference seems to work if the True is truth.
1.2. Previous Readings of Frege on Truth
Hence, we have initial reasons to think that truth is an object for Frege. However, as I
have said, most previous readings reject that truth is an object, i.e., the True, for Frege.
There are several different reasons why they deny it.
One reason why they deny that truth is an object for Frege is that he seems to use
something like a truth predicate. Because sentences are names, they can feature on the
sides of the identity sign. For instance, informally, we can say something such as this:
5Also see ‘Introduction to Logic’ (Frege 1906a: 194).
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‘(2+2 is equal to 4) = (3+3 is equal to 4)’. Now consider the predicate ‘· · · is (identical
with) the True’. It seems to function like the truth predicate ‘· · · is true’ in the following
sense: when and only when we substitute ‘· · · ’ with the names of the True—including
all true sentences—the result refers to the True. Frege indeed uses the predicate ‘· · · is
the True’ in his works. For instance, Frege’s formal language Begriffsschrift has a formal
analogue of ‘· · · is the True’. In Begriffsschrift all well-formed sentences are prefixed
by ‘ ’. The short horizontal line is called ‘the horizontal’ in the mature version of
Begriffsschrift. Frege writes:
I regard [the horizontal] a function-name such that
∆
is the True when ∆ is the True, and is the False when ∆ is not the True. (Frege 1893:
§5)6
So the function referred to by the horizontal is what ‘· · · is the True’ refers to. Moreover,






would be the False only if Γ and ∆ were the True while Γ was not the True. This is




6For the translation of Grundgesetze, I depend on Ebert and Rossberg’s (Frege 2013).
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(Frege 1893: §18)
Frege is explaining the Law I of Begriffsschrift. Notice that Frege’s explanation looks
like a meta-linguistic justification of an axiom of a logical system. Also, note that the
predicate ‘· · · is the True’ looks like a truth-predicate in such a meta-linguistic justifica-
tion. We can find similar passages for other laws and inference rules of Begriffsschrift,
and can also find the same predicate in those passages. If ‘· · · is the True’ is indeed
a truth predicate for Frege, he accepts that truth is something that can be referred to
by such a predicate, i.e., a function. Scholars like Greimann (2008), Künne (2008), and
Taschek (2008) take this observation seriously and claim that truth is not an object for
Frege.7
The second argument that truth is a property for Frege is that by making the True
the reference of truth sentences, he is committed to the view that truth is a property.
For instance, Künne writes:
· · · The sense of the truth-value name is a mode of presentation of a truth-value.
So Frege cannot reasonably deny that all true thoughts can be subsumed under
the concept x is a mode of presentation of the True. So, by the end of the day, a
subsumption view is rehabilitated by his own lights. (Künne 2008: 35)
Here ‘concept’ can be taken as meaning ‘property’; and ‘the subsumption view’ refers
to the view that takes truth to be a property of thoughts. Künne’s point is that although
Frege certainly resists the subsumption view, he eventually comes to accept it. Richard
7Greimann has a particular argument for the claim that ‘· · · is the True’ is Frege’s metalinguistic truth-
predicate. This argument is based on a reading of Frege’s conception of sentence shared by Klement
(2001), Landini (1996), and Pedriali (2017). When Greimann argues that truth is not an object for Frege,
however, his point is different from the other two scholars’ point. This is because he also denies that
truth is a property for Frege. For him, truth is neither an object nor a property (Greimann 2004, 2007). I
will deal with Greimann’s reading later.
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Kimberly Heck (2012: 48) provides a similar argument although his point is slightly
different.8 Mark Textor makes a similar point through a different argument:
To say that logic is not concerned with the concept ξ is true is not to deny that
there is such a concept. Indeed, Frege has good reason to think that there is such
a property. If ‘ξ is true’ did not refer to a concept, sentences containing it (‘(the
thought) that seawater is salty is true’) would be neither true nor false. However,
this is clearly not the case. Therefore, ‘ξ is true’ must have sense and reference,
and there must be a concept ξ is true. (Textor 2010: 648)9
Another argument that truth is still a property for Frege is that it is solely for some
technical reasons that he maintains that the True is an object referred to by a sentence.
For instance, Gabriel claims that
[Why does Frege argue that the True is an object?] The answer seems to be that it
is Frege’s theory of identity which forced him to do so. (1984: 375)
Gabriel’s point is that it is only because Begriffsschrift needs to allow an identity sign to
appear between sentences that Frege takes the True qua a sentential reference to be an
object. To support this claim Gabriel points to the following passage in Frege’s letter
to Russell:
If the sign of identity is used between sentences, the truth-value must be recognized
as the [reference] of [the sentence]. (Frege 1980: 152–3)
According to Gabriel, Frege admits that ‘in fact taking truth-values as objects is not an
advantage for semantics in general, but only for semantics of a special formal language
like [Begriffsschrift]’ (1984: 376). Gabriel points to Frege’s comment in ‘On Sense and
Reference’:
8Heck claims that although it is not incorrect to say that truth is an object for Frege, to argue so is ‘to
miss what is really at issue’ (Heck 2012: 48) in Frege. However, throughout this dissertation, I argue
that what is at issue in Frege can only be solved by appealing to the point that truth is an object.
9Textor is appealing to Frege’s short, but seminal, manuscript ‘My Basic Logical Insights’ (Frege 1915). I
will analyze this manuscript in the next chapter. This analysis shows that Textor’s argument is unsound.
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The designation of truth-values as objects may appear to be an arbitrary fancy or
perhaps a mere play upon words, from which no profound consequences could
be drawn. (Frege 1892c: 63–64)
The truth-value True, Gabriel claims, is still a property in Frege’s philosophical—non-
technical—framework. Specifically it is a value property like goodness or beauty.
We have reviewed readings that deny that truth is an object for Frege. One might
think that in the end not many commentators deny it. However, there is only a short
list of commentators who reject that truth is an object for Frege, not because everyone
else accepts it, but because everybody else is silent about it. In particular there are only
a few works that address whether truth is the True for Frege. Ignorance is the default
attitude of the literature on Frege toward the question as to whether truth is an object
for him. But this ignorance does not seem to be grounded in the implicit agreement
that truth is an object for Frege. It rather seems to be grounded in the consensus that
whether truth is the True for Frege is unimportant to understanding his philosophical
framework.10
1.3. The Challenges for Taking Truth to be an Object
Again my aim in this dissertation is to build up an interpretation according to which
truth is the True and hence an object for Frege. Such a reading ought to respond to the
points made by the previous readings we’ve just seen. Specifically, first, my reading
10For instance, see Pedriali 2017 or Schaar 2018. Both commentators talk about both truth and the
True; but they are not dealing with what kind of relationship obtains between them. Moreover, Reck
(2007) almost never mentions truth-values when he deals with truth in Frege. Why is that so? It is not
my intention to track down such a historical cause. My rough conjecture is that the reason consists in
the criticism of Michael Dummett—the most influential scholar and one of the philosophical giants in
the history of analytic philosophy—about Frege’s move to turn sentences into proper names of truth-
values. Dummett even considers this move to be a ‘disaster’ (Dummett 1993: 644). His criticism is
not concerned with Frege’s identification of truth with the True. However, still Frege’s conception of
sentences as proper names is the most critical step toward Frege’s conception of truth as an object.
Therefore, Dummett’s criticism can eventually work as a criticism against the latter.
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ought to establish that Frege’s use of ‘· · · is the True’ or the horizontal does not imply
that truth is a property referred to by such a predicate. Secondly, my reading ought
to establish that there is no gap between what Frege says on the surface and what he
has deep down in his mind; that the former is what he has in his mind. Thirdly, my
reading ought to show that accepting that truth is the True for Frege is important to
understanding his philosophical framework.
In addition to these, there are further challenges which my reading must meet. One
of them concerns Frege’s conception of judgment. Throughout his entire career, Frege
takes it for granted that the act of judging is constituted by that of acknowledging the
truth of a truth candidate. In his mature career, truth candidates are thoughts. Thus,
judging is acknowledging the truth of a thought for the mature Frege.11 As we will
see later, judging as such is actively applying the notion of truth to a thought. But how
can Frege take the act of judgment to be that of active application of truth to a thought
if truth is an object? Don’t we acknowledge the truth of a thought by ascribing the
property truth to a thought? In short a reading that accepts that truth is an object for
Frege must be able to explain in what sense judgment is acknowledgment of truth.
The second challenge concerns Frege’s conception of logic and science in general.
In ‘Thought’ he comments:
Just as ‘beautiful’ points the way for aesthetics and ‘good’ for ethics, so does ‘true’
for logic. All sciences have truth as their goal; but logic is also concerned with it in
a special way: logic has much the same relation to truth as physics has to weight
or heat. To discover truths is the task of all sciences; it falls to logic to discern the
laws of truth. (Frege 1918a: 342)
All sciences aim at truth. Among these sciences logic takes truth to be its main subject.
11See Frege 1892c, 1897, 1893, 1906b, 1906a, 1915, 1918a, etc.
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In this sense it is the science of truth. If truth is an object, then implausible implications
seem to follow from those claims. Surely, we are happy to say that all the sciences
aim at truth. However, what would it mean that all those different sciences aim at
one object? Different sciences rather seems to aim at explaining different objects and
properties. Moreover, logic comes to be the science that deals with a single object, the
True. But how can there be a science of an object? Furthermore, if all the other sciences
aim at the True anyway, in what sense is logic the only science of the True? A reading
that accepts that truth is an object for Frege must be able to answer these questions.
The third challenge concerns the theoretical significance of taking truth to be an
object. Say truth is indeed an object for Frege. Then his conception of truth is radically
different from that of contemporary philosophy. In contemporary philosophy truth is
widely regarded as a (sort of) property. Or, at least, no one works with a framework
that considers truth to be a single object. Accordingly, our conception of notions related
to truth—e.g., knowledge, assertion, judgment, belief, etc.—is based on a conception
of truth radically different from Frege’s. Then the following question seems to follow:
is there anything we can theoretically learn from Frege’s conception of truth? If one’s
interest is just in retrieving Frege’s own view, then one does not need to be interested
in this question. But my aim in this dissertation is to defend Frege’s insights into the
nature of truth as theoretically fruitful and valuable. Then I have to provide a positive
answer to the above question.
My dissertation is thus an attempt to meet the above challenges. In Chapters 2 and
3 I provide my arguments that truth is an object for Frege in his mature career. Chapter
2 addresses the tension between his deflationist-like claims and his other claims that
regard truth as substantive. I argue that we can reconcile Frege’s conflicting comments
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only when we take it into account that truth is an object for him. Chapter 3 deals with
Frege’s indefinability argument. I show by a line-by-line analysis that this argument is
not an argument that truth is indefinable, but an argument that truth cannot be defined
qua a property because it is not a property.
In these chapters, I provide my responses to most of the previous readings that
deny that truth is an object for Frege. Chapter 4 addresses two commentators that are
not addressed in Chapters 2 and 3: Greimann—his ‘No-Entity’ theory reading of truth
in Frege—and Gabriel.
Chapter 5 is concerned with Frege’s conception of judgment (and its verbal coun-
terpart assertion), i.e., what acknowledging the truth of a thought amounts to if truth
is an object. We seek an answer to this question by way of dealing with the tensions
related to the sign ‘ ’—the sign for making a judgment (or assertion). I will argue that
these apparent tensions can be explained away. While explaining these tensions away,
we come to see how Frege elucidates judgment as acknowledgment of truth under his
conception of truth qua an object. Under this elucidation acknowledgment of truth is
not truth predication but non-judgmental—Millikanian—identification of the True.
Chapter 6 explains in what sense all sciences aim at the True and logic is the science
of the True. The answers are found in Frege’s conception of propositional knowledge.
Taking truth to be an object, Frege’s conception of propositional knowledge, which is
tied to truth, differs from traditional conceptions. Specifically Frege takes propositional
knowledge to be grounded in our objectual knowledge of the True. If we take this
point into account, we can explain why the True is the aim of all sciences and the
subject matter of logic.
Chapter 7 deepens and improves Frege’s insights revealed in the previous chapters.
1.3. The Challenges for Taking Truth to be an Object 13
In addition to his conception of truth as an object, Frege also provides a new concep-
tion of judgment as non-judgmental identification and of propositional knowledge as
grounded in objectual knowledge. In this chapter, I first show how Frege’s conception
of judgment can respond to Peter Hanks (2007, 2011, 2015, 2018)’s recent criticisms
against the Fregean conception of judgment in general. Secondly, I show how Frege’s
conception of assertion can contribute to the issue with the relationship between truth
and assertion. Finally, I further develop Frege’s conception of knowledge into what
I call ‘Frege-Millikanian theory of knowledge’ by combining Frege’s conception with
Millikan’s theory of objectual knowledge.
Chapter 2
Argument 1: Frege is Not a Deflationist
There is a tension concerning Frege’s comments on the relationship between logic and
truth. On the relationship Frege writes:
Decisive for the treatment of this science is how the logical laws are conceived,
and this in turn connects with how one understands the word ‘true’. (Frege 1893:
XIV–XV)1
Frege is asserting that the notion of logical law is central to the science of logic and is
somehow related to how we understand the word ‘true’. He holds this idea throughout
his career:
· · · In the field [psychology] investigates it does not study the property ‘true’ as, in
its field, physics focuses on the properties ‘heavy’, ‘warm’, etc. This is what logic
does. It would not perhaps be beside the mark to say that the laws of logic are
1The roman numbers are the page numbers of the Foreword of Grundgesetze.
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nothing but an unfolding of the content of the word ‘true’. Anyone who has failed
to grasp the meaning of this word —what marks it from others— cannot attain to
any clear idea of what the task of logic is. (Frege 1879b: 3)
Frege regards Logic as the science whose subject matter is the property truth just as the
property heaviness, for instance, is one of the subject matters of physics. Assuming that
‘true’ refers to the property truth, establishing the laws of logic is understanding truth.
Hence, one cannot get a grip on the task of logic without understanding the meaning
of the word. Frege retains this idea throughout his entire career. In ‘Thought’ written
much later in his career, Frege comments:
Just as ‘beautiful’ points the way for aesthetics and ‘good’ for ethics, so does ‘true’
for logic. · · · Logic has much the same relation to truth as physics has to weight
or heat. To discover truths is the task of all sciences; it falls to logic to discern the
laws of truth. (1918a: 342)
Logic aims to discover the laws of truth. Thus there seems to be a substantive sense in
which for Frege
(LogT) logic is the science of truth.
As we’ve said, however, Frege in his mature career puts forward claims that could
easily be main theses of truth deflationism. These deflationist comments do not really
sit well with (LogT). In ‘On Sense and Reference’ where the distinction between sense
and reference is specified, he claims:
· · · Even the sentence ‘The thought that 5 is a prime number is true’ contains only a
thought, and indeed the same thought as the simple ‘5 is a prime number.’ (1892c:
64)2
Frege is putting forward the following claim:
2We can find similar claims in a number of Frege’s mature works such as 1906a, 1914, 1915, 1918a, etc.
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(Iden) The thought that p is identical with the thought that the thought
that p is true.
(Iden) seems to imply that the predicate ‘· · · is true’ does not have a substantive sense.
Indeed, that appears to be the idea Frege has in mind. In ‘My Basic Logical Insights’,
Frege remarks: ‘“True” has a sense that contributes nothing to the sense of the whole
sentence in which it occurs as a predicate [i.e., the sentence of the form “The thought
that p is true”]’ (1915: 251). Let ‘〈p〉’ mean ‘the thought that p’. Frege accepts that
(Defl) The sense of ‘true’ makes no contribution to 〈〈p〉 is true〉 so that
〈〈p〉 is true〉 is identical to 〈p〉.
He is hence a deflationist about the meaning of the truth-predicate, which is shared by
almost all truth deflationists.3 In the same paper, Frege also writes:
[...] ‘True’ only makes an abortive attempt to indicate the essence of logic, since
what logic is really concerned with is not contained in the word ‘true’ at all · · ·
[but] in the assertoric force with which a sentence is uttered. (1915: 252)
Frege thus accepts that
(Assert) What logic concerns is contained not in the truth-predicate but
in the assertoric force.
Given that predicates such as ‘x is true’ are unsaturated, and predicates as such refer
to properties in Frege’s mature framework, it is puzzling that he accepts (Defl) and
(Assert) while he also accepts (LogT). If logic is the science of truth, it seems, it should
be the science of the property truth referred to by the truth-predicate. If so, what logic
concerns appears to be in the truth-predicate in a significant sense. But it appears that
Frege denies this by putting forward (Assert). Moreover, if truth is such a substantive
3Commentators such as Künne (2008) read (Iden) in a different way. According to them, Frege’s point
is rather that the sense of ‘true’ is already involved in the sense of every sentence. As we will see later,
however, this omnipresence reading of (Iden) is not entirely plausible.
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property and is referred to by the truth predicate, it is not clear why Frege puts forward
(Defl). It even seems paradoxical because, as we will see later, Frege does accept that, if
‘true’ in ‘〈p〉 is true’ refers to a property, then 〈〈p〉 is true〉 differs from 〈p〉.4 If Frege were
a deflationist who accepts that truth qua the property referred to by the truth predicate
does not exist, we could easily understand why he argues for (Defl). However, (LogT)
certainly does not look like a claim such a deflationist can embrace. (LogT), (Defl),
and (Assert) do not square well with each other. Frege even makes these conflicting
remarks in a single article (1897). This is the tension we encounter in his conception of
the relationship between logic and truth.5
This tension can be explained away if we take it into consideration that truth is an
object for Frege. In particular (Iden), (Defl), and (Assert) constitute Frege’s arguments
that truth is an object. In §2.1 I develop a through analysis of Frege’s ‘My Basic Logical
Insights’ where we can find all those three claims together. Analyzing this article helps
us to understand the real issue behind this tension. §2.2 suggests my interpretation
according to which the tension in question is only apparent. §2.3 addresses a crucial
objection to my reading, i.e., the objection that Frege has a substantive truth predicate.
4As we will see, Frege makes this point in, for instance, ‘On Sense and Reference’ (Frege 1892c), ‘Logic’
(1897), ‘Introduction to logic’ (1906a), and ‘Logic in Mathematics’ (1914).
5Taschek (2008) and Greimann (2014) deal with this tension. Taschek takes this tension as genuine and
attempts to explain why Frege has this tension. Greimann criticizes Taschek’s reading and maintains
that the tension is only apparent. I do not visit these commentators in this paper. First, Greimann’s
criticism of Taschek seems quite decisive. Secondly, both commentators do not deal with (Defl). More
importantly, neither Greimann nor Taschek takes it into account that the mature Frege identifies truth
with the True. Only if we take it into account, however, we can satisfactorily explain away the tension.
Pedriali (2017) also deals with this issue.
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2.1. ‘My Basic Logical Insights’
Frege takes judging as acknowledging or recognizing a thought to be true.6 In ‘My
Basic Logical Insights (MBLI)’, he writes:
Making a judgment does not alter the thought that is recognized to be true. · · ·
We can always cull out the thought that is recognized as true; the act of judgment
forms no part of this. (1915: 251)
This is related to Frege’s elucidation of judgment in terms of the distinction between
sense and reference. In ‘On Sense and Reference’, he writes:
But so much should already be clear, that in every judgment, no matter how
trivial, the step from the level of thoughts to the level of reference (the objective)
has already been taken. (Frege 1892c: 64)
Judgments can be regarded as advances from a thought to [its] truth value. (65) 7
A sentence has a thought as its sense and a truth-value as its reference. To judge that p is
not to add something to 〈p〉, but to take a step from 〈p〉 to its truth-value.8 As Greimann
(2014) says, the step toward a truth-value is crucial in Frege’s logic. Criticizing what
he dubs ‘the intentionalist logic’, Frege writes:
The intensionalist logicians are only too happy not to go beyond the sense; for what
they call the intension · · · is · · · the sense. They forget that logic is not concerned
with how thoughts · · · follow from thoughts, that the step from thought to truth-
value —more generally, the step from sense to reference— has to be taken. They
forget that the laws of logic are first and foremost laws in the realm of [references]
and only relate indirectly to sense. (1892a: 122)
6Frege characterizes judgment as recognition of truth in his entire career. But Richard Kimberly Heck
(2012: §2.3) claims that Frege’s understanding of this characterization has changed. Our discussion in
Section 4 shows how the mature Frege understands this characterization.
7Frege 1970 uses ‘a’ for the translation instead of ‘its’. However, the original German word is ‘seinem’,
which means ‘its’.
8All these are metaphorical elucidations; but what Frege is trying to establish seems to be clear. We
will talk about these metaphorical elucidations more and more as our discussion proceeds.
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The so-called intensionalist about logic takes it that logic only concerns how thoughts
follow from thoughts. However, logic aims to discern the laws that concern the realm
of reference. Therefore, the step from sense to reference should be taken for the sake of
logic. This would be why all the well-formed sentences in Frege’s logic, Begriffsschrift,
have the device for making a judgment, i.e., ‘ ’. In Frege’s conception, logic is only
concerned with judgments. Now, assertion ‘manifests’ (1918a), ‘communicates’ (1897),
or ‘gives an expression to’ (1906a), a judgment. In other words, assertion is manifested,
communicated, and expressed judgment. Therefore the act of assertion does not form
a part of the asserted thought, either.
After pointing out the nature of judgment and assertion, Frege all of sudden turns
to his points about the truth predicate ‘true’:
The word ‘true’ is not an adjective in the ordinary sense. (1915: 251)
For the sake of contrast, Frege first describes how a normal predicate ‘salty’ works.
If I attach the word ‘salty’ to the word ‘sea-water’ as a predicate, I form a sentence
that expresses a thought. To make it clearer that we have only the expression
of a thought, but that nothing is meant to be asserted, I put the sentence in the
dependent form ‘that sea-water is salty’. · · · I could have it spoken by an actor on
the stage as part of his role, for we know that in playing a part an actor only seems
to speak with the assertoric force. Knowledge of the sense of ‘salty’ is required for
an understanding of the sentence, since it makes an essential contribution to the
thought · · · . (1915: 251)
Then, he proceeds to the truth-predicate.
If I attach [‘true’] to the words ‘that sea-water is salty’ as a predicate, I likewise
form a sentence that expresses a thought. For the same reason as before I put this
also in the dependent form ‘that it is true that sea-water is salty’. The thought
expressed in these words coincides with the sense of the sentence ‘that sea-water
is salty’. So the sense of the word ‘true’ is such that it does not make any essential
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contribution to the thought. If I assert ‘It is true that sea-water is salt’, then I assert
the same thing as if I assert ‘Sea-water is salt’.(1915: 251)
Frege puts forward (Iden) and (Defl). So the truth-predicate differs from other predi-
cates in that it does not make any contribution to the thought expressed by a sentence
that includes the predicate. Frege concludes:
This enables us to recognize that the assertion is not to be found in the word ‘true’,
but in the assertoric force with which the sentence is asserted. (1915: 251)
Given the flow of the text, Frege seems to be responding to an objection to his claim that
assertion does not constitute a part of the asserted thought. The objection appears to
be something like the following: the predicate ‘true’ in ‘〈p〉 is true’ stands for assertoric
force and forms a part of 〈〈p〉 is true〉. If this objection is true, assertoric force can be
a part of the asserted thought and, in that sense, assertion can constitute a part of the
asserted thought. Frege’s response is that assertoric force cannot constitute a part of
the asserted thought by way of ‘true’ because ‘true’ cannot make any contribution to
a thought due to its semantic inertness.
In fact there is no predicate—whether or not a predicate has a substantive sense to
contribute to a thought—by way of which assertoric force can constitute a part of the
asserted thought. Look at the following passage from ‘Logic in Mathematics’:
· · · What we mean by · · · ‘The thought that 3 > 2 is true’ can be more simply said
by · · · ‘3 is greater than 2’. Thus we do not need the word ‘true’ at all to say this.
And we can see that really nothing at all is added to the sense by this predicate.
In order to put something forward as true, we do not need a special predicate: we
only need the assertoric force with which the sentence is uttered. (Frege 1914: 233)
After making the same point about ‘true’, Frege quickly puts forward a general claim:
there is no predicate such that assertoric force is fixedly attached to it and so we need
it whenever we make an assertion. In ‘On Schoenflies · · · ’ Frege writes:
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[In the sentence ‘Two is prime’], we count the copula ‘is’ as belonging to this part
of the sentence. But there is usually something combined with it which here must
be disregarded: assertoric force. We can of course express a thought, without
stating it to be true. The thought is strictly the same whether we merely express
it or whether we also put it forward as true. Thus assertoric force, which is often
connected with the copula or else with the grammatical predicate, does not belong
to the expressions of the thought · · · . (1906c: 177)9
So assertoric force does not form a part of the asserted thought. In that sense assertion
does not form a part of the asserted thought, either.
In addition to the general fact that no expression can make assertoric force a part of
the asserted thought, there is something special about the case of ‘true’ because ‘true’
unlike other expressions cannot constitute a part of a thought, i.e., because it does not
have a substantive sense to contribute to a thought. Frege speculates about this point
in the remainder of MBLI:
The word ‘true’ has a sense that contributes nothing to the sense of the whole
sentence in which it occurs as a predicate.
But it is precisely for this reason that this word seems fitted to indicate the
essence of logic. · · · ‘True’ seems to make the impossible possible: it allows what
corresponds to the assertoric force to assume the form of a contribution to the
thought. And although this attempt miscarries, or rather through the very fact
that it miscarries, it indicates what is characteristic of logic. And this, from what
we have said, seems something essentially different from what is characteristic of
aesthetics and ethics. For there is no doubt that the word ‘beautiful’ actually does
indicate the essence of aesthetics, as does ‘good’ that of ethics, whereas ‘true’ only
makes an abortive attempt to indicate the essence of logic, since what logic is really
concerned with is not contained in the word ‘true’ at all but in the assertoric force
with which a sentence is uttered. (1915: 251–2)
9Pedriali (2017) does not read this passage literally; he thinks that the assertoric force is still attached
to a copula in a sentence for Frege. However, his reading is not fully satisfactory as we will see in §4.
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This passage would perhaps be the most puzzling part of MBLI. Commentators nav-
igate this puzzling passage by developing all kinds of interpretations of what Frege
means by ‘the essence of logic’ here (cf. Greimann 2014, Pedriali 2017, Taschek 2008).
However, I believe, these attempts are misleading. There is nothing mysterious about
what Frege means by ‘the essence of logic’. Note that he says that ‘beautiful’ indicates
the essence of aesthetics and ‘goodness’ indicates that of ethics. ‘Beautiful’ refers to
the property beauty with which aesthetics is really concerned; and ‘good’ refers to the
property goodness with which ethics is really concerned. ‘The essence of logic’ is ‘what
logic is really concerned with’. The essence of logic is just truth. Fiddling with what
‘the essence of logic’ means would not help us to understand this passage any further.
So I develop a reading of the passage that does not assign any special meaning to
‘the essence of logic’ except for that of ‘what logic is really concerned with’. First, let
us analyze what Frege says at the end of the passage:
The word ‘beautiful’ actually does indicate the essence of aesthetics · · · whereas
‘true’ only makes an abortive attempt to indicate the essence of logic, since what
logic is really concerned with is not contained in the word ‘true’ at all but in the
assertoric force with which a sentence is uttered. (1915: 252)
Frege claims that ‘true’ makes an abortive attempt to indicate truth. But a word does
not make an attempt to indicate anything; it is a speaker who uses an expression that
attempts to indicate anything by it. Frege’s point is then that we fail to indicate truth
by ‘true’ in the sense that we indicate the property beauty by ‘beautiful’. This is because
truth is not contained in ‘true’ but in assertoric force. This reversely appears to imply
that the property beauty is indeed contained in ‘beautiful’ and thus that we can indicate
the property by the predicate.
Now, when we assert ‘That painting is beautiful’, we indeed successfully talk about
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the property beauty by virtue of our making ‘beautiful’ a part of the asserted sentence.
This is because ‘beautiful’ has a substantive sense by virtue of which it refers to the
property beauty, i.e., because ‘beautiful’ contains the property beauty. Then it appears
to be tempting to say the following: Frege’s point is that even when we assert ‘〈p〉 is
true’, we do not talk about truth by virtue of our making ‘true’ a part of the asserted
sentence. That is because ‘true’ does not have any substantive sense that would let
it refer to truth, i.e., because ‘true’ does not contain truth. Instead we can talk about
truth only by virtue of assertoric force or assertion. If this is along the right lines, then
we can explain what Frege means by the following:
And this, from what we have said, seems something essentially different from
what is characteristic of aesthetics and ethics. For there is no doubt that the word
‘beautiful’ actually does indicate the essence of aesthetics, as does ‘good’ that of
ethics, whereas ‘true’ only makes an abortive attempt to indicate the essence of
logic (1915: 252)
What is characteristic of aesthetics and ethics is that we can talk about the essence of
aesthetics and ethics by virtue of the relevant predicates, i.e., ‘beautiful’ and ‘good’.
But what is characteristic of logic is different: we cannot talk about the essence of logic
by virtue of the relevant predicate ‘true’. We can do that solely by virtue of assertoric
force. Assertoric force is essentially different from the predicates like ‘beautiful’. The
latter has a sense that can constitute a part of a thought. But the former does not form
a part of a thought at all because it does not belong to any expression of a thought:
· · · Assertoric force, which is often connected with the copula or else with the
grammatical predicate, does not belong to the expressions of the thought · · · .
(1906c: 177)
We can also make sense of the beginning of the passage:
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· · · The word ‘true’ has a sense that contributes nothing to the sense of the whole
sentence in which it occurs as a predicate.
But it is precisely for this reason that this word seems fitted to indicate the
essence of logic. · · · ‘True’ seems to make the impossible possible: it allows what
corresponds to the assertoric force to assume the form of a contribution to the
thought. And although this attempt miscarries, or rather through the very fact
that it miscarries, it indicates what is characteristic of logic. (1915: 251–2)
What is characteristic of logic consists in the point that we can talk about the essence
of logic, i.e., truth, only by virtue of assertion. As we’ve just said, assertion does not
form a part of a thought. Now ‘true’ gives an expression to this distinctive feature of
assertion: just like assertion does not form a part of a thought, the sense of ‘true’ fails
to form a part of a thought. Frege’s point is then not that ‘true’ can indicate truth or
it is a device for assertion. ‘True’ does not indicate truth; its ‘attempt’ to do so is only
abortive. Nor is it a device for assertion; there cannot be such a device. ‘True’ merely
reminds us, through its semantic inertness, of the fact that we can only talk about truth
by virtue of assertion that does not constitute a part of a thought.
Recall:
(Assert) What logic concerns is contained not in the truth-predicate but
in the assertoric force.
In the suggested reading of MBLI, it means that we can talk about truth not by virtue
of the truth-predicate but by virtue of assertoric force. The suggested reading of MBLI
also shows that (Iden) and (Defl):
(Iden) The thought that p is identical with the thought that the thought
that p is true
(Defl) The sense of ‘true’ makes no contribution to 〈〈p〉 is true〉 so that
〈〈p〉 is true〉 is identical to 〈p〉
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put forward the semantic inertness of ‘true’, which is just a reminder of (Assert). (Iden),
(Defl), and (Assert) understood as such do not go against (LogT):
(LogT) logic is the science of truth.
For those claims do not imply that truth is not a substantive property. Frege’s point is
just that we can only talk about truth by virtue of assertion.
However, in what sense can we talk about truth only by virtue of assertion? Without
providing a proper answer to the question, the tension under consideration is not yet
completely explained away. We already appear to have an hint to this answer. Recall
assertion is manifested, communicated, and expressed judgment. Also recall we can
take a step from a thought to a truth-value only in our judgment. Then, it is tempting
to say the following: we can talk about or indicate truth just in case we take a step
from a thought to a truth-value—specifically the True in this case. But then what is the
relationship between truth and the True?
2.2. Truth and the Truth-Value True
Some terminology. Frege often uses the locution ‘The object O falls under the concept
C’.10 A concept is a function such that its value is always a truth-value. For instance,
the predicate ‘· · · is prime’ refers to the concept that yields the True given a prime
number and the False otherwise. 2 falls under the concept prime because the value of
the concept is the True when 2 saturates it.
There seems to be an obvious way to connect truth to the truth-value True. Saying
that a thought is true is equivalent to saying that the sentence that has the thought as
its sense refers to the True. In other words, 〈p〉 is true just in case ‘p’ refers to the True,
i.e., p is the True. This leads to the following idea:
10For instance, see Frege (1892a).
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(TP) Truth is a concept under which 〈p〉 falls when p is the True.
Certainly, if Frege accepts that all true sentences refer to the True, he must also accept
that there is a concept (or even concepts) under which all true thoughts fall. We can
easily identify such a concept as Künne nicely shows:
The sense of a singular term, Frege famously said, [contains] ‘a mode of presenta-
tion · · · ’ of the object it designates · · · . · · · So Frege cannot reasonably deny that
all true thoughts can [fall under] the concept x is a mode of presentation of the True.
(Künne 2008: 35)11
Künne concludes:
So, by the end of the day, a subsumption view is rehabilitated by his own lights.
(Künne 2008: 35)
However, that there is a concept under which every true thought falls does not imply
that the concept constitutes truth. The identification of truth with one of such concepts
obtains only if (TP) is true. Frege denies (TP).
In ‘On Sense and Reference’, Frege writes
[1] One might be tempted to regard the relation of the thought to the True not as
that of sense to reference, but rather as that of subject to predicate. [2] One can,
indeed, say: ‘The thought, that 5 is a prime number, is true.’ But [3] · · · nothing
more has been said than in the simple sentence ‘5 is a prime number.’ [4] The truth
claim arises in each case from the form of the declarative sentence, and [5] when
the latter lacks its usual force, e.g., in the mouth of an actor upon the stage, even
the sentence ‘The thought that 5 is a prime number is true’ contains only a thought,
and indeed the same thought as the simple ‘5 is a prime number.’ It follows that
[6] the relationship of the thought to the True may not be compared with that of
subject to predicate.
11Künne uses ‘is’ instead of ‘contain’. But Frege does not say that the sense of an object is a mode of
presentation of the object. The former contains the latter. See Frege (1892c: 57).
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For Frege, ‘the relation of subject to predicate’ is ambiguous. It can denote two different
relations: the relation of an object to a concept (an object falls under a concept) and
that of a concept to another concept (a concept is subordinate to the other concept)
(1892a). Because a thought is an object—it is referred to by a saturated expression ‘the
thought that p’—what it denotes in [1] must be the relation of an object to a concept.
By [1], Frege is taking into consideration theorists who regard the True as a concept
under which a thought can fall. The rest of the passage is an argument against these
theorists. The conclusion we have in [6] is that the True is not a concept under which
〈5 is prime〉 falls. But the argument shows that truth is not a concept, too. Here is how
the argument runs:
(P1) If the True is a concept, then ‘· · · is true’ denotes the concept.
(P2) If ‘· · · is true’ denotes a concept, 〈p〉 is different from 〈〈p〉 is true〉.
(P3) 〈p〉 is identical with 〈〈p〉 is true〉.
(C1) ∴ ‘· · · is true’ does not denote a concept.
(C2) ∴ The True is not a concept.
(P3) can be read off from [3]–[5]. [3] is just (P3). [4] and the first half of [5] are dealing
with our misconception of ‘true’ such that, in ‘〈p〉 is true’, ‘true’ adds to 〈p〉 the assertoric
force as a sense added to 〈p〉. This misconception can hinder people from realizing that
〈p〉 is identical with 〈〈p〉 is true〉. Establishing that the assertoric force is not attached
to ‘true’ at all, Frege repeats (P3) in the second half of [5]. Then, he directly proceeds to
the conclusion in [6]. This shows that Frege is committed to (P2), which is also strongly
suggested by ‘but’ between [2] and [3]. Without (P1), Frege cannot proceed from (C1)
to (C2). Also, (P1) seems to explain Frege’s move from [1] to [2].
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The above analysis of the argument shows that Textor’s argument that ‘· · · is true’
refers to a concept is misleading:
To say that logic is not concerned with the concept ξ is true is not to deny that
there is such a concept. Indeed, Frege has good reason to think that there is such
a property. If ‘ξ is true’ did not refer to a concept, sentences containing it (‘(the
thought) that seawater is salty is true’) would be neither true nor false. However,
this is clearly not the case. Therefore, ‘ξ is true’ must have sense and reference,
and there must be a concept ξ is true. (Textor 2010: 648)12
Frege’s whole point is that ‘· · · is true’ must not refer to a concept. If it did, 〈p〉 would
differ from 〈〈p〉 is true〉. Textor is appealing to the compositionality of the reference of
a complex term: if ‘〈p〉 is true’ has a reference, ‘· · · is true’ should have a reference. On
top of this, one can further argue that ‘· · · is true’ is an unsaturated term and thus it
must refer to a concept. However, ‘· · · is true’ is an exception—presumably the only
exception—to these rules. That is the whole point of Frege’s above argument.
When we take truth to be a concept or a property, we take it to be the denotation of
‘· · · is true’. The above argument says that truth as such is not a concept. Frege writes
in ‘Logic in Mathematics’:
So to say of a sentence, or thought, that it is true is really quite different from
saying of seawater, for example, that it is salt. In the former case we add something
essential by the predicate, in the former we do not.
Showing · · · that truth is not a property of sentences or thoughts, as language
might lead one to suppose, this consideration confirms that a thought is related to
its truth-value as the sense of a sign is to its reference. (1914: 234)
Therefore, (TP) is false. Truth is not a concept.
12Textor is appealing to Frege’s short, but seminal, manuscript ‘My Basic Logical Insights’ (Frege 1915). I
will analyze this manuscript in the next chapter. This analysis shows that Textor’s argument is unsound.
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Recall that Frege’s ontology only recognizes objects and functions. Assuming truth
is a function, it must be a concept. Hence, truth must be an object. That is,
(TTV) Truth is the True.13
Our language misleads us to consider this object as a concept by labeling it with the
unsaturated term ‘· · · is true.’ Our language is so logically imperfect that it produces
a number of confusions of the same kind:
· · · We can scarcely avoid using such expressions as ‘the concept prime’. Here
there is no trace left of unsaturatedness, of the predicative nature. · · · So language
brands a concept as an object. (Frege 1906c: 177)
We cannot avoid using expressions like ‘the concept prime’ because of the defect of our
language. Likewise,
That we cannot [avoid using ‘· · · is true’] is due to the imperfection of language.
(Frege 1915: 252)14
Thus there is strong textual evidence for (TTV). But not many commentators ascribe
it to Frege as we have said.15 Rather commentators tend to deny that (TTV) is correct
of Frege’s conception of truth. For instance, Greimann (2004, 2007) and Künne (2008)
point to these passages.
What, in the first place, distinguishes it from all other predicates is that predicating
it is always included in predicating anything whatever. (Frege 1897: 129)
· · · We cannot recognize a property of a thing without at the same time finding out
the thought this thing has this property to be true. (Frege 1918a: 328)
13Greimann (2007) claims that truth is not even an object for Frege. However, Kim (2019) shows that
Greimann’s reading is grounded in a misinterpretation of Frege’s comments on saturation.
14Also, see ‘Concept and Object’ (Frege 1892b). One difference between the case of ‘the concept prime’
and ‘· · · is true’ is that Frege says that the former indeed refers to an object while he denies that the
latter refers to a concept. That again makes ‘· · · is true’ a sole exception to Frege’s rule of reference.
15A few exceptions would include Burge (1986) and Ricketts (2003).
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They regard these remarks as the evidence that for Frege truth is something that can
be predicated. Künne even maintains that the above remarks shows that Frege accepts
the omnipresence of truth:
(Omni) 〈〈p〉 is true〉 is the full articulation of 〈p〉.
(Omni) is not warranted. Those passages can also be read as supporting the following:
(Red) 〈〈p〉 is true〉 is reduced down to 〈p〉.
Our reading of MBLI in §2.1 seems to show that (Red) is the case. Frege’s point there is
that the sense of ‘true’ is not included in any thought—not that its sense is everywhere.
Neither show the above passages that Frege recognizes the concept truth. If there were
the concept truth and ‘· · · is true’ referred to it, 〈p〉 would differ from 〈〈p〉 is true〉. By
the above comments, Frege is merely pointing out the peculiarities of the sense and
the reference of ‘· · · true’. His goal is to suggest the idea that truth cannot be a concept:
· · · We cannot recognize a property of a thing without at the same time finding
out the thought this thing has this property to be true. · · · The [reference] of the
word ‘true’ seems to be altogether sui generis. May we not be dealing here with
something which cannot be called a property in the ordinary sense at all? (Frege
1918a: 328)
Frege’s comments in which Greimann and Künne’s rejection of (TTV) is grounded do
not show that he takes truth to be something that can be predicated. Greimann (2004,
2007) has other objections to (TTV). I address those objections in §2.3 of this chapter
and Chapter 4. As we will see, those objections can be satisfactorily responded to.
For now, let us accept (TTV) and go back to the tension in question. We can explain
why Frege is strongly committed to the following deflationist claims:
(Iden) The thought that p is identical with the thought that the thought
that p is true
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(Defl) The sense of ‘true’ makes no contribution to 〈〈p〉 is true〉 so that
〈〈p〉 is true〉 is identical to 〈p〉
Those claims are a part of his argument for (TTV)—the central thesis of his conception
of truth. Moreover, Frege’s commitment to them does not go against (LogT):
(LogT) logic is the science of truth.
By (TTV), logic is the science of the True. (Defl) and (Iden) are valuable observations
that lead us to identify what logic is the science of. We can also explain why logic needs
judgment qua advancement to truth-values. The True, or truth, is the reference of true
sentences. Therefore, we recognize truth only when we take a step from a thought to a
truth-value. This is the reason why advancing to truth-values is essentially necessary
for the sake of logic, i.e., the science of truth. (Assert)
(Assert) What logic concerns is contained not in the truth-predicate but
in the assertoric force.
now means that the advancement to the True, i.e., truth, is only made by the assertoric
force, but not by ‘· · · is true’.16 The tension is completely explained away. The related
exegetical question about the relationship between truth and the True is also answered.
A qualification ought to be added. It is not the case that Frege holds the conception
of truth as an object throughout his career. As Heck (2012) points out, the early Frege
appears to take truth as a property. Frege’s conception of truth as an object only comes
along with his sense-reference distinction. This is why the remarks that seemingly go
against (LogT) are found only in the mature Frege’s works. But those remarks do not
16One might wonder if (Assert) is compatible with Frege’s claim that truth is objective. My suggested
reading shows that (Assert) does not go against the objectivity of truth. (Assert) is basically the claim
that we can recognize the True via the act of judgment or assertion, not by the sense or reference of the
truth-predicate. Whether or not a thought belongs to the True is still independent of whether the True
of the thought is recognized by an epistemic subject.
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actually go against (LogT) in the mature Frege’s framework because, for him, (LogT)
only means that logic is the science of the True. The tension is only apparent.
One might ask in what sense logic is the science of the True. This is the question for
Chapter 6. However, here I provide a sketch of my answer to it. First, (propositional)
knowledge is reducible to the knowledge of the True. In ‘On Sense and Reference’,
Frege writes:
Comprehensive knowledge of the reference [of a proper name] would require us
to be able to say immediately whether any given sense belongs to it. (1892c: 58)
The reference of a proper name is an object. Thus Frege is claiming that comprehensive
knowledge of an object is achieved when we can immediately say whether any given
sense belongs to it. Thus, comprehensive knowledge of the True is achieved when we
can immediately say whether any given thought belongs to it. Being able to decide
whether a given thought 〈p〉 belongs to the True seems to be equivalent to knowing
that p or that it is not the case that p. To gather propositional knowledge is to pile up
our knowledge of the True and attempt to achieve comprehensive knowledge of it.
Now, logic is only concerned with the True. Frege’s logic, Begriffsschrift, has logical
laws and inferential rules. Inferential rules are the rules that lead us from a truth to
another truth, which means that, given a thought that belongs to the True, it leads
to another thought that also belongs to the True. Logical laws are indubitably true,
i.e., they obviously belong to the True. To accept certain thoughts as logical laws is to
accept that the truth-value True is the object to which those thoughts obviously belong.
We never introduce any other object into logic unless we can deduce its existence from
logical laws by inferential rules.17 Hence, logic purports to expand our knowledge of
17For instance, the existence of value-ranges follows from the laws of logic.
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the True without depending on the knowledge of any other object. It is in this sense
that logic only concerns the True and is the science of the True.18 But again, this is
merely a sketch of what will come in Chapter 6.
2.3. Does Frege Have a Truth-Predicate?
Closing this chapter I address one more objection to the claim that truth is the True. The
objection is that Frege has a substantive Tarskian truth-predicate. This claim has been
supported by other scholars like Künne (2008) and Taschek (2008). But Dirk Greimann
(2008) provides the most developed formulation of it and a strong argument for it. So
I focus on Greimann’s discussion here.
2.3.1. TheMetalinguistic Justification for Logical Laws?
Does Frege have a meta-linguistic conception of logic? Many commentators say ‘No’;
they say that Frege’s conception of logic differs from the current meta-linguistic concep-
tion of logic.19 Still, commentators like Heck (2012) and Greimann (2008) disagree; they
claim that Frege’s conception of logic substantively hinges on semantics. Greimann
(2008) even insists that we can find a meta-linguistic truth-predicate in Frege’s mature





18The question as to why Frege chooses Laws I∼VI among other obviously true thoughts is not answered
by it. He might have thought that Laws I∼VI are the most obviously true thoughts, or that other
obviously true thoughts can be reduced to Laws I∼VI (Frege 1893: Forword). In any event, this
is a challenge not just for my interpretation of Frege’s conception of logical law, but also for other
interpretations.
19For this point, see, e.g., Burge 1986, Ricketts 1996, 2003, Goldfarb 2001, etc.
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would be the False only if Γ and ∆ were the True while Γ was not the True. This is





Note that Frege’s explanation of Law I looks like a meta-linguistic justification of an
axiom of a logical system. Also, note that the predicate ‘x is the True’ looks like a
truth-predicate in such a meta-linguistic justification. We can find similar passages for
other laws and inference rules of Begriffsschrift, and can also find the same predicate in
those passages. Greimann’s contention is that this predicate is a meta-linguistic truth-
predicate for Frege. I will call Greimann’s reading ‘the truth-predicate (TP) reading (of
‘x is the True’)’. The TP reading is important to our discussion because it constitutes a
strong objection to my main thesis that truth is an object for Frege. The aim here is to
critically examine Greimann’s argument for the TP reading.
One might immediately object that ‘x is the True’ is not a meta-linguistic truth-
predicate, but just an identity predicate like ‘x is 2’ in Frege’s formal language. But
Greimann argues that the predicate as such still can, and does, work as a truth-predicate
in the relevant sense. What I want to show here is that Greimann’s argument for the
TP reading is not satisfactory. §2.3.2 introduces his argument through a certain tension
concerning Frege’s assimilation of sentences with proper names. His argument is that
a plausible way to explain away this tension implies that ‘x is the True’ is a truth-
predicate in a relevant sense. §2.3.3 shows that Greimann’s suggested solution cannot
be what Frege would be willing to accept. §2.3.4 presents an alternative solution to
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the tension strictly grounded in Frege’s remarks.20
2.3.2. Greimann’s Argument for the Truth-Predicate in Frege
Greimann (2008: 409) argues that if ‘x is the True’ is a truth-predicate for Frege in the
relevant sense, i.e., if Frege’s explanations of logical laws that make use of the pred-
icate are metalinguistic soundness arguments, then we ought to be able to formulate
Tarskian T-sentences like the following:
‘Grass is green’ is true in English iff grass is green.21
For Frege, however, sentences can be true or false only in the sense that the thoughts
expressed by them are true or false. So the relevant kind of (quasi) T-sentences would
be something like this:
The thought that grass is green is true iff grass is green.
Greimann (2008: 410) claims that we can construct a schema for the relevant kind of
T-sentences out of ‘x is the True’:
(FSch) The truth-value of the thought that p is the True iff p.
Therefore, there is no problem with taking ‘· · · is the True’ as a truth-predicate in the
relevant sense. Or so argues Greimann.
An immediate objection, however, would be that (FSch) includes the operator ‘the
truth-value of’. Frege never uses such an operator in his explanations of logical laws.
20I do not deal with whether Frege’s explanations of logical laws and inference rules are meta-linguistic
justifications. Greimann’s argument that ‘x is the True’ is a truth-predicate is independent of the
point that Frege uses the predicate in his explanation of logical laws that looks like a meta-linguistic
justification. As we will see later, examining Greimann’s argument leads to an important point with
regard to how we should understand Begriffsschrift.
21J. Weiner (2005) claims that ‘x is the True’ cannot be a truth-predicate because its extension only
involves one and the only object, the True, while what we need for semantics is a predicate under which
all the true sentences of an object language falls. Against this, Greimann claims that as far as we can
formulate Tarskian T-sentences out of the predicate, it is sufficient for semantics.
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It rather seems as if Frege is using it simply as the identity predicate ‘x = the True’, so
to speak, as in
(S) 2+2=4 is the True.
If so, we cannot confirm that Frege is using ‘x is the True’ like a truth-predicate in the
relevant sense (Greimann 2008: 410).
As a response to this objection, Greimann claims that the sense of any sentence ‘p’
is identical with that of the phrase ‘the truth-value of: (the thought) that p’ in Frege. If
so, then even sentences such as (S) are in fact instances of (FSch). This is his argument
that ‘x is the True’ is a Tarskian truth-predicate.22 Let us see why Greimann argues so.
In §2 of Grundgesetze, Frege writes:
‘02 = 4’, ‘12 = 4’, ‘22 = 4’, ‘32 = 4’
are expressions of thoughts, some true, some false. I express it like this: the value
of the function ξ2 = 4 is the truth-value of the true, or that of the false. It is already
clear from this that I do not want to assert anything yet when I simply write down
an equation, but that I merely designate a truth-value; just as I assert nothing when
I simply write down ‘22’, but merely designate a number.
The point that a sentence refers to a truth-value is relevant to understanding this. A
sentence—an equation in this case—always includes a predicate: a word that denotes
a concept, i.e., a function whose value is always a truth-value. For instance, in the
above equations, we commonly find the predicate ‘ξ2 = 4’. Now, e.g., ‘22 = 4’ refers
to the value of the concept ‘x2 = 4’ saturated with the argument 2. Therefore, it refers
to the True. Because the value of a function is an object, truth-values are objects, and
22I do not dispute Greimann’s claim that (FSch) gives us quasi T-sentences. Further, I do not dispute
the claim that Frege provides a sort of meta-linguistic justifications of logical laws. The aim of this
chapter is to critically examine this particular argument for those claims, which will be explained in the
following.
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thus the reference of a sentence, or an equation, is an object. Now, equations as such
express thoughts. In Frege’s Begriffsschrift, however, writing an equation down is not
asserting that the thought it expresses is true. By writing it down, we only designate a
truth-value. For asserting, a special sign is necessary:
Above it is already stated that within a mere equation no assertion is yet to be
found; with ‘2+3=5’ only a truth-value is designated, without its being said which
one of the two it is. Moreover, if I wrote ‘(2+3=5)=(2=2)’ and presupposed that
one knows that 2=2 is the True, even then I would not thereby have asserted that
the sum of 2 and 3 is 5; rather I would only have designated the truth-value of:
that ‘2+3=5’ refers to the same as ‘2=2’. We are therefore in need of another special
sign in order to be able to assert something as true. To this end, I let the sign ‘ ’
precede the name of the truth-value, in such a way that, e.g., in
(B) ‘ 22 = 4’
it is asserted that the square of 2 is 4. (Frege 1893: §5)
Expressions like (B) are well-formed sentences of Begriffsschrift (Begriffsschriftsatz).
If (B) is a sentence, a question can be raised. The reference of a sentence is always
a truth-value. Therefore, (B) is also the name of a truth-value. Now, say ξ2 = 4 is a
concept such that it yields the True as its value if 2 is given as an argument and the
False otherwise. Then, it follows that (B) also designates a truth-value as the equations
in the earlier passage do. However, Frege clearly denies it:
The assertion sign cannot be used to construct a functional expression; for it does
not serve in conjunction with other signs, to designate an object. ‘ 2 + 3 = 5’ does
not designate anything; it asserts something. (Frege 1891: 34n)
This raises the question of how (B) can be a name of a truth-value while ξ2 = 4 is not
a concept.
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Greimann maintains that Frege distinguishes sentences from (mere) singular terms
for truth-values. Only expressions such as (B) are sentences. Equations such as ‘22 = 4’
are not sentences but singular terms for truth values. Both sentences and singular terms
for truth-values are of course proper names of truth-values; they ‘denote (bedeuten)’
(Greimann 2008: 414) truth-values. However, singular terms for truth-values differ
from sentences in that only the former can be used for the speech-act of reference
qua a proper part of the speech act of assertion; only singular terms for truth-values
‘designate (bezeichnen)’ (Greimann 2008: 414) in this sense.
Then, the sense of an equation such as ‘22 = 4’, which would be taken as a sentence,
must be that of an expression that can be used as a part of a sentence like (B) for the
sake of the speech-act of reference qua a proper part of assertion. Indeed, Greimann
argues, Frege is paraphrasing the sentence in the ordinary sense ‘(2+3=5)=(2=2)’ into a
non-sentential phrase like this: ‘the truth-value of: that “2+3=5” refers to the same as
“2=2”’. Greimann insists that in general the sense of a singular truth-value term ‘p’ is
identical with that of ‘the truth-value of: that p’. Therefore, even ‘2+2=4 is the True’
is indeed equivalent to the (quasi) T-sentence ‘The truth-value of: that 2+2=4 is the
True’.23 Greimann concludes: ‘x is the True’ is a truth-predicate in the relevant sense.
2.3.3. Objection: Sentence and Thought in Frege
In a nutshell, Greimann believes that in Frege ‘2+2=4’ can be paraphrased into ‘the
truth-value of: that 2+2 is 4’. Consider the following objection to his interpretation.
In a number of places, Frege says that the sense of a sentence in the usual sense is a
23See Greimann (2007: 136). Here, Greimann argues that because the thought of a sentence is a condition
when the sentence refers to the True, ‘2+3=5’ indeed has the same sense as ‘the truth-value of: that 2+3
equals 5’. He does not repeat the same argument in his 2008 paper. This argument, however, does not
work if our discussion is along the right lines. For the critical discussion of Greimann 2007, see Kim
2019.
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thought. Since ‘2+2=4’ is a sentence in the usual sense, its sense must be a thought,
i.e., 〈2+2 is 4〉. On the contrary, ‘the truth-value of: that 2+2 is 4’ is not a sentence in the
usual sense. So its sense is not a thought. Thoughts differ from senses of non-sentential
singular terms. Here is an argument. For an arbitrary thought 〈p〉, it is always identical
with 〈〈p〉 is true〉 (Frege 1892c, 1897, 1906a, 1914, 1915, etc.). But the same point is not
applicable to a non-sentential singular term. A case in point: ‘the truth-value of: that
2+2 is 4’. Its sense differs from 〈The truth-value of: that 2+2 is 4 is true〉.24 If ‘2+2=4’
and ‘the truth-value of: that 2+2 is 4’ have different senses, then one cannot be the
paraphrase of the other.
Greimann has a reply. He does not reject that a thought as the sense of a sentence
differs from the sense of a singular term like ‘the truth-value of: that 2+2 is 4’. When
he says that ‘the truth-value of: that 2+2 is 4’ is a paraphrase of ‘2+2=4’, he is arguing
that the latter as an expression of Begriffsschrift is not a sentence expressive of a thought.
Let me explain. According to Greimann, it is not the case that Frege ‘wants to defend
the absurd view that in natural languages an expression such as ‘22 = 4’ is used as
a singular [truth-value] term [like ‘the truth-value of: that 22 equals 4’]’ (Greimann
2008: 412). In natural language, it expresses 〈22 equals 4〉, and as such ‘can be used to
assert something, but not to designate something’ (Greimann 2008: 412).25 Greimann
argues that Frege turns what we take to be sentences in natural languages into singular
24What only thoughts—but not non-sentential singular terms—have is not assertoric force but positive
predication. Positive predication itself does not amount to assertoric force. Thoughts do not carry
assertoric force with themselves as we’ve already seen. Frege’s thesis that 〈p〉 is identical with 〈〈p〉 is
true〉 is rather his argument that a thought does not contain assertoric force.
25Greimann (2008: 412) also claims that Frege’s functional analysis of sentences is only intended to
be applied to formal sentences. But this is not really clear. For instance, when Frege (1906c: 177-8)
explains the sentence ‘2 is prime’ in terms of the saturation of a concept, does he talk about formal
languages or natural languages? Or, is he talking about language in general? Greimann’s claim seems
to be question-begging without further discussion.
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truth-value terms in Begriffsschrift because he makes a clear distinction between a mere
entertainment of a thought—what he calls ‘predication’—and assertion. With ordinary
language sentences such as ‘2+2 is equal to 4’, however, we cannot clearly mark the
distinction. For we can use ordinary language sentences to perform both predication—
entertainment of a thought—and assertion (Greimann 2008: 412). In order to make
the distinction clearly shown, Greimann claims, Frege regards ‘2+2=4’ qua term of his
formal language to mean ‘the truth-value of: that 2+2 equals 4’, which alone cannot
be used for the act of assertion because it is not a sentence. A sentence is constructed
and assertion is performed, only when we write ‘ ’, a special truth-predicate or truth-
operator (Greimann 2004, 2007), in front of such a term.
To check the emerging explanation of Begriffsschrift, say—following Greimann—
‘2+2 equals 4E’ is an English sentence and ‘2+2=4F’ a corresponding singular term in
Begriffsschrift. ‘2+2 equals 4E’ expresses 〈2+2 equals 4〉, and is a sentence in the sense
that it can be used to assert but not to designate an object. However, ‘2+2=4F’ does
not express such a thought; it only expresses the sense of a singular term. Therefore,
it is not a sentence in the same sense. We come to have a sentence in this sense only
if we put ‘ ’ in front of it. Now, ‘ 2 + 2 = 4’ does express a thought, namely, 〈The
truth-value of: that 2+2 equals 4 is the True〉. Therefore, ‘ ’ is a formal version of ‘x
is the True’ (Greimann 2004, 2007), and is the only genuine predicate—which is also
a truth-predicate or -operator—of Begriffsschrift in the sense that only with ‘ ’ we can
have a sentence.26, 27
26Indeed, the early version of Begriffsschrift (Frege 1879a) understands ‘ ’ in this way. However, in the
version in Grundgesetze, Frege clearly denies this view because the judgment stroke is not a predicate
anymore (the judgment stroke is not identified as a primitive function). Frege has reasons for this
change according to Heck (2012: §2.3).
27One problem with taking ‘ ’ to be a truth-predicate is that ‘ 2’ can also count as a Begriffsschriftsatz.
Greimann must accept that in such a case ‘ ’ is not a truth-predicate, but a mere identity predicate.
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This explanation presupposes that ‘ ’ is a predicate whose sense constitutes a part
of thoughts. At the same time, the sign ‘ ’ stands for assertoric force. Therefore, here,
‘ ’ (i) contributes to the formation of a thought and (ii) indicates assertoric force. In a
significant sense, this explanation takes assertoric force to contribute to the formation
of a thought. However, this is what Frege emphatically rejects as we have already
seen. Recall what he says in ‘On Schoenflies’:
We can of course express a thought, without stating it to be true. The thought is
strictly the same whether we merely express it or whether we also put it forward
as true. Thus assertoric force, which is often connected with the copula or else
with the grammatical predicate, does not belong to the expressions of the thoughts
· · · . (Frege 1906c: 177)28
In fact, the main logical defect of natural language concerning assertoric force—and
assertion—is that it leads us to believe that assertoric force comes as a part of thought.
That is what Frege says in MBLI:
So the word ‘true’ [in the sentences of the form ‘The thought that p is true’] seems
to make the impossible possible: it allows what corresponds to the assertoric force
to assume the form of a contribution to the thought. (Frege 1915: 252)
Frege’s point is that the attempt to make assertoric force constitute a part of a thought
is defective because assertoric force is not a part of a thought. It is unlikely that Frege
would let his logic commit the mistake he himself points out—the mistake of making
assertoric force a contribution to a thought.
Then, why don’t we say that it is such a mere identity predicate? This leads to a doubt against his
reading of ‘· · · is the True’ because ‘2 is the True’ seems to be a perfectly legitimate. But Greimann
does not seem to take this issue seriously. He simply admits that in such a case ‘· · · is the True’ fails to
work as a truth-predicate. Greimann’s basic idea seems to be that as long as the predicate provides all
instances of (FSch), the fact that it can play a different role does not prevent us from taking it to be a
truth-predicate.
28Also, Frege (1914: 233) says that to assert, ‘we do not need a special predicate’. Greimann’s reading
makes ‘ ’ a special predicate for assertion.
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I believe that Greimann is right when he argues that (i) Frege needs a category of
‘expressions that are supposed to express a thought without simultaneously asserting
its truth’ (Greimann 2008: 412) and that (ii) ‘2+2=4F’ falls under such a category.
The problem is, I believe, that from those true claims, he proceeds to the conclusion
that ‘2+2=4F’ must correspond to something like ‘the truth-value of: that 2+2 is 4’ in
English. First of all, the latter in English does not express a thought. It involves ‘(the
thought) that 2+2 is 4’. However, it is the name of a thought. Strictly speaking, a name
refers to its reference and expresses its sense (Frege 1892c: 61; 1893: §2). Thus, ‘(the
thought) that 2+2 is 4’ does not express 〈2+2 is 4〉 but refers to it. What it expresses is
the sense of ‘(the thought) that 2+2 is 4’ (Frege 1892c: 66). Given that what a name
expresses is its sense, a name that expresses a thought is a name that has a thought as its
sense, i.e., a sentence in the usual sense. If ‘2+2=4F’ expresses a thought as Greimann
says, it must be a sentence in the usual sense, not a non-sentential singular term like
‘the truth-value of: that 2+2 is 4’.
Even if we leave this issue aside, a problem remains: it is not clear at all why Frege
ought to turn ‘2+2=4F’ into a non-sentential term in order to deprive assertoric force
of it. Why can’t he simply regard ‘2+2=4F’ as corresponding to ‘2+2 is 4’ in English
to which assertoric force is not added, e.g., the sentence uttered by an actor on a stage
(cf. Frege 1892c)? Is that because as soon as we form a sentence and thereby express
a thought, we come to make an assertion, i.e., because sentences or thoughts contain
assertoric force in themselves? But that is exactly what Frege rejects as we have seen
throughout this chapter. It does not appear that in order to detach assertoric force
from ‘2+2=4F’ we ought to turn it into a non-sentential term. All we need to do is to
realize that assertoric force is not its semantic component. If we realize it, then we can
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take ‘2+2=4F’ to be a sentence that expresses 〈2+2 is 4〉 but is not asserted. Assertoric
force is added to the thought by ‘ ’.
Indeed, ‘2+2=4F’ or what Greimann calls ‘singular truth-value term’ in general is a
sentence that expresses a thought. After introducing eight primitive functions, Frege
writes:
However, not only a reference but also a sense belongs to all names correctly formed
from our signs. Every such name of a truth-value expresses a sense, a thought. For
owing to our stipulations [for those primitive functions], it is determined under
which conditions it refers to the True. The sense of this name, the thought, is: that
these conditions are fulfilled. Now, a [Begriffsschriftsatz] consists of a judgment-stroke
with a name, or a Roman marker, of a truth-value (Frege 1893: §32).
First, note that Frege takes a Begriffsschriftsatz like
(B) 22 = 4
to be the combination of the judgment-stroke (the vertical stroke) and a name of a truth-
value. Therefore, what Frege calls ‘name of a truth-value’ is not a Begriffsschriftsatz.
Rather, something like the following is an instance of such a truth-value name:
(N) –ε( ε)
By the stipulations given for the functions involved in (N), we can specify when it refers
to the True. Frege’s point entails that (N)’s sense is 〈Those conditions are met〉, i.e.,
〈The value-range of the concept referred by the horizontal falls under the concept〉.29, 30
(N) is a typical case of what Greimann takes as a singular truth-value term: it certainly
refers to a truth-value though it is not a Begriffsschriftsatz. Frege’s remarks here are
29The horizontal sign called ‘the horizontal’ in Grundgesetze refers to a concept such that it yields the
True given the True as a value, and the False otherwise.
30The sentence in the latter angled brackets is a natural language analogue of (N).
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explicit enough to affirm that such a singular truth-value term ‘p’ in general expresses
〈p〉. A thought is the sense of a sentence. So Frege takes singular truth-value terms to
be sentences. A singular truth-value term ‘p’ cannot be translated into a non-sentential
term like ‘the truth-value: that p’. Greimann’s argument for the TP reading must be
rejected.
2.3.4. Assertion Sign ‘ ’: a Prelude to Chapter 5
The following still has to be explained: only expressions like (B) count as sentences in
Frege’s Begriffsschrift by means of which we can assert but cannot designate a truth-
value, while expressions such as ‘2+2=4’ only designate a truth-value. It is clear that for
Frege, an expression cannot be used alone for asserting even if it expresses a thought.
The answer is in one of the passages from Grundgesetze we’ve already seen:
Above it is already stated that within a mere equation no assertion is yet to be
found; with ‘2+3=5’ only a truth-value is designated, without its being said which one
of the two it is. (Frege 1893: §5; italics mine)
Designating a truth-value corresponds to writing down a name of a truth-value such
as ‘2+3=5’ without saying whether it refers to the True or the False. Then, to assert that
2+3=5, i.e., to write down ‘ 2 + 3 = 5’, is to ‘say’ that 2+3=5 is the True.
To this end [of asserting] I make use of a vertical stroke at the left end of the
horizontal, so that, e.g., by writing
2 + 3 = 5
we assert that 2+3 equals 5. Thus here we are not just writing down a truth-value,
as in
2 + 3 = 5,
but also at the same time saying that it is the True. (Frege 1891: 34; italics mine)
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To assert that 2+3 equals 5 is to identify 2+3=5 as the True. The act of asserting as such
is distinguished from that of designating a truth-value. Thus to write down ‘ 2+3 = 5’,
i.e., to assert that 2+3 equals 5, is not to designate a truth-value.
It might be objected that an act of identifying an object O1 as O2 is just an act of
assertively predicating ‘x = O2’ of ‘O1’. If so, it might seem, Greimann’s reading is
partially true—namely the claim that ‘ ’ is a formal version of ‘· · · is the True’. But
again that cannot be correct. Return to another passage we have seen:
Moreover, if I wrote ‘(2+3=5)=(2=2)’ and presupposed that one knows that 2=2 is
the True, even then I would not thereby have asserted that the sum of 2 and 3 is 5;
rather I would only have designated the truth-value of: that ‘2+3=5’ refers to the
same as ‘2=2’. (Frege 1891: 34)
What Frege points out is that one cannot ‘say’ that p is the True even by predicating the
identity predicate ‘x = T’ of ‘p’ where ‘T’ is the most obvious name of the True. (It is not
clear whether Frege intends to provide a non-sentential paraphrase of ‘(2+3=5)=(2=2)’.
That point is not relevant to understanding this passage.) This shows that to assert
that p, i.e., to ‘say’ that p is the True, cannot be done by predicating ‘x is the True’ of
‘p’. Thus, ‘ ’, the device for asserting, cannot be such a predicate.
Then what is it? We will come back to this issue in Chapter 5. Here I provide a brief
sketch. I believe that ‘ ’ is purely a performative for performing a non-predicational act
of identification. We are not unfamiliar with the non-predicational and non-assertoric
conception of identification. According to Millikan (1998, 2000) or Camp (2002), the
act of identifying is neither an act of predicating an identity predicate nor asserting an
identity. Identification is an activity of its own kind that is arguably more fundamental
than an act of predication or assertion. I believe that Frege is certainly appealing to
such a conception of identification when he elucidates that asserting that p is taking a
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step from 〈p〉 to its truth-value in ‘On Sense and Reference’ (Frege 1892c).31 Chapter
5 provides the detail of this reading. What is important is that, given all his remarks
we have seen, Frege would rather understand ‘ ’ as a performative for such a non-
predicational and non-assertoric identification. This understanding of the device goes
well along with Frege’s sharp distinction between predicating and asserting, and with
his claim that we do not need any special predicate or copula for the sake of assertion.
The expressions like ‘ ξ2 = 4’ are not functional expressions, because ‘ ’ is not a functor
at all. What we have by putting ‘2’ in the position of ‘ξ’ is not a truth-value, but an act
of asserting that 22 equals 4, i.e., ‘saying’ that 22 = 4 is the True. Begriffsschriftsätze are
not names of truth-values. Thus, they do not designate truth-values.32
Given the evidence that truth is not a concept for Frege, the predicate ‘· · · is the True’
is rather to be regarded as an identity predicate of the form ‘x = a’.33 Of course, Frege
seems to provide justifications for logical laws that are pretty similar to meta-linguistic
ones. Still, because he depends on this identity predicate in those justifications, they
are at most precursors or prototypes of meta-linguistic justifications.
31If judging is indeed such a fundamental act of identifying, we can make better sense of Frege’s claim
that ‘judgment is something peculiar and incomparable’ (Frege 1892c: 65).
32Note that, in §32 of Grundgesetze, Frege does not classify Begriffsschriftsätze as names of truth-values.
Also, recall that Frege says that a Begriffsschriftsatz asserts something. Sentences in the ordinary sense
do not assert; we assert with sentences. Begriffsschriftsätze are not sentences in the ordinary sense.
Greimann’s reading, however, compares Begriffsschriftsätze to sentences in the ordinary sense. That
point is what distinguishes his reading from mine.
33Our discussion implies that a thought is not a truth-condition. Refer to Maunu (2002)’s discussion
regarding this point.
Chapter 3
Argument 2: Frege is Not a Primitivist
In the last chapter we have dealt with Frege’s deflationist claims. Our discussion shows
that Frege is not a deflationist. His deflationist comments are rather his arguments
that truth is an object, i.e., the True.
Frege is also known as a truth primitivist in the literature. This is mainly because
of his famous argument for the indefinability of truth. We can find it in ‘Logic’ (Frege
1897) and ‘Thought’ (1918a). The aim of this chapter is to show that this indefinability
argument is not an argument that truth is not definable. It is an argument that truth
cannot be defined as a concept because it is not a concept. Therefore, it is not a primitivist
argument, but an argument for Frege’s conception of truth as an object.
In Frege scholarship the indefinability argument has been taken to be an argument
that if truth is definable then an absurd result is produced. A number of commentators
take this absurd result to be a vicious infinite regress (Carruthers 1981; Dummett 1993;
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Heck 2010, 2012; Heck and May 2018; Kemp 1995; Kremer 2000; Soames 1999; Pagin
2001; Ricketts 1986, 1996). I agree with these commentators. So the reading I develop
here also identifies the absurd result as an infinite regress. However, there are other
philosophers who believe that Frege is appealing to a sort of circularity in the argument.
Baldwin (1995) and Grossmann (1969) adumbrate this idea, and Künne (2003, 2008)
fully develops a reading of the argument under which it appeals to a kind of vicious
circularity.1
I start my discussion of Frege’s indefinability argument by critically examining the
circularity reading of Künne (§3.1). Then I turn to developing my own interpretation
of the argument (§3.2).
3.1. The Circularity Reading
Here is the indefinability argument in ‘Thought’:
· · · Could we not maintain that there is truth when there is correspondence in a
certain respect? But which respect? For in that case what ought we to do so as to
decide whether something is true? We should have to inquire whether it is true
that an idea and a reality, say, correspond in the specified respect. And then we
should be confronted by a question of the same kind, and the game could begin
again. So the attempted explanation of truth as correspondence breaks down.
And any other attempt to define truth also breaks down. For in a definition certain
characteristics would have to be specified. And in application to any particular
case the question would always arise whether it were true that the characteristics
were present. So we should be going round in a circle. (Frege 1918a: 327)
Though Frege starts the argument with (a version of) the definition of truth qua corre-
spondence, he generalizes it into other definitions. The argument is clearly a reductio;
1Sluga (2002) provides a historical approach to the indefinability argument—tracking down the origin
of the indefinability thesis. This kind of historical approach to the argument seems to be compatible
with any of the philosophical readings we will deal with here.
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it attempts to establish that, if truth is definable, then an absurd result is produced.
The text appears to give a reason to think that the absurd result is an infinite regress.
However, Wolfgang Künne writes:
Many commentators misconstrued this objection as a vicious infinite regress ar-
gument. [The sentence ‘We should be going round in a circle’] makes it as clear
as can be that Frege takes himself to be offering a kind of vicious circle objection.
(2008: 13)
In this chapter, we critically examine Künne’s circularity reading. I first establish
that the circularity reading depends on the notion of concept that appears to be alien
to Frege. I also establish that the circularity reading makes the indefinability argument
a non-starter. If my criticism is along the right lines, Frege’s indefinability argument,
central to his conception of truth and judgment, ought to be interpreted in a different
way.
3.1.1. The Circularity Reading
The circularity reading concentrates on Frege’s ‘global’ (Künne 2008: 12) indefinability
argument—the indefinability argument against truth definition in general. The global
argument is contained in the second half of the passage from ‘Thought’.
And any other attempt to define truth also breaks down. For [1] in a definition
certain characteristics would have to be specified. And [2] in application to any
particular case the question would always arise whether it were true that the
characteristics were present. [3] So we should be going round in a circle. (1918a:
327; numbering is Künne’s.)
According to the circularity reading, ‘definition’ in [1] must mean ‘analytic definition’.
When we attempt to define ‘true’, we try not to ‘graft a new meaning upon this word’
(Künne 2008: 13) as we do in physics or mathematics, but to clarify the old meaning of
50 Chapter 3. Argument 2: Frege is Not a Primitivist
the word by the conceptual analysis. That is, we are seeking an analytic definition of
‘true’. Now, such an analytic definition of a concept C specifies the characteristics of
C, i.e., concepts constitutive of C. Thus, in an analytic definition of the concept truth,
its characteristics are specified as [1] states.2
Künne writes:
But according to Frege one feature · · · is shared by all adequate analytic definitions:
they capture an order of epistemic priority—we come to know that the definien-
dum applies to an object through coming to know that the definiens applies to it.
Consequently, · · · an analytic definition of a predicate P is to be rejected if having
the concept expressed by P is a precondition for deciding whether the alleged
definiens applies in any given case. If we now assume, as Frege does in [2], that
one cannot decide whether the characteristics specified in an alleged definiens of
‘true’ are exemplified in a given case without deciding whether it is true that they
are exemplified, the conclusion in [3] follows, for one can hardly decide whether
something is thus and so (e.g., true) without having the concept of a thing’s being
thus and so (of a thing’s being true). (2008: 14)
Say we have an analytic definition of truth like this:
(T) x is true just in case x is ∆.3
2In the earlier version of the circularity reading, Künne takes Frege’s technical use of the term ‘char-
acteristic’ into account. In Frege’s technical use a concept C1 is a characteristic of a concept C2 just
in case ‘C1’ shows up in an analytic definition of C2 and so something that falls under C1 also falls
under C2. However, Künne claims that one more condition ought to be added: C1 is not a sufficient
condition for C2. If Künne is correct, a concept can have a characteristic in this technical sense only if it
has a conjunctive definition (‘x falls under the concept C just in case x falls under C1, · · · , and Cn’). The
earlier version of the circularity reading is based on Künne’s own reading of ‘characteristic’. However,
as we will see in the next section, the additional condition is certainly not a part of Frege’s use of the
term ‘Characteristic’. Moreover, as Künne correctly points out, this use of ‘characteristic’ strengthened
by himself is not relevant here because ‘the very definition he had been concerned with in his local
argument, “For all x, x is true iff x corresponds with reality”, lacked this kind of structure’ (Künne 2008:
13). Giving the earlier version of this reading in his Conceptions of Truth (Künne 2003), Künne reads
‘characteristic’ in Frege’s technical sense, and admits that the fact that not all definitions of truth have
a conjunctive form can work as evidence against this earlier version of the circularity reading or as an
objection to Frege’s argument (2003: 132–3). It seems as if in his 2008, Künne thinks that he has a way
to bypass this exegetical issue as we will see below.
3Künne distinguishes analytic definitions from constructive or stipulative definitions, and says that
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The correspondence definition is an instance of (T) where ‘∆’ is substituted by ‘corre-
sponding to reality’. As Künne points out an analytic definition such as (T) gives the
following epistemic priority of the concept ∆.
(C1) Having the concept truth cannot be a precondition for deciding
whether something is ∆.
The circularity reading now ascribes the following claim to Frege:
(C2) one cannot decide whether x is ∆ without deciding whether it is
true that x is ∆
where ‘that x is ∆’ refers to a truth-candidate whose content is that x is ∆ and ‘true’
is a predicate that refers to the property of truth. Because a truth bearer is the sense
of a sentence, i.e., a thought for Frege in his mature career, (C2) is equivalent to the
following: one cannot decide whether x is ∆ without deciding whether 〈x is ∆〉 is true.
Hereafter, I use the expression ‘The thought that p is true’ instead of the expression ‘It
is true that p’.
Lastly, the circularity reading takes the following as a premise of the argument.
(C3) One cannot decide whether something is true without having the
concept truth.
(C2) and (C3) entail that
(C4) One cannot decide whether x is ∆ without having the concept
truth.
(C4) contradicts (C1). Our assumption ought to be denied: there cannot be an analytic
definition of truth of the form (T). This way, Frege’s indefinability argument is appeal-
ing to the vicious circularity of an analytic definition of the concept truth. Or so argues
the circularity reading.
the indefinability argument concerns the former. According to Künne, analytic definitions ‘purport to
capture, by means of a compound expression, the sense of an atomic expression already in use’ (Künne
2008: 13).
52 Chapter 3. Argument 2: Frege is Not a Primitivist
3.1.2. Criticism
3.1.2.1. An Interpretative Issue with (C1) and (C3)
(C1) and (C3) have the phrase ‘having the concept truth’. Künne (2008: 13)’s presen-
tation of the circularity reading starts with his explanation of the notion of concept in
Frege, and no other conception of concept is explicitly introduced. If so, it appears to
be a reasonable assumption that ‘concept’ in (C1) and (C3) means ‘Fregean concept’.
However, if we read ‘the concept truth’ in (C1) or (C3) as meaning ‘the Fregean concept
truth’, it is hard to make sense of them. Certainly, the phrase ‘having the concept truth’
concerns us, epistemic subjects, having the concept truth. It is perfectly proper to say
‘S has a certain concept’—only if we take ‘concept’ as denoting units of mental rep-
resentations or mental contents constitutive of our conceptual scheme. Nevertheless,
a Fregean concept (F-concept) is not such a component of our conceptual scheme. It
is rather an entity in the world; an F-concept is a function whose value is always a
truth-value: the True or the False. But if an F-concept is not a unit of our conceptual
scheme, what does ‘S has the F-concept F’ mean?
One might respond by saying that ‘having’ in (C1) and (C3) means ‘knowing’ while
‘concept’ still means ‘F-concept’. Someone might find the sentence (1) ‘S knows the
F-concept truth’ to sound similar to (2) ‘S knows Gottlob Frege’. It looks as though the
verb ‘know’ in sentences like (2) can have two different meanings: it can mean (i) the
subject’s acquaintance with an object (Hanks 2007: 145) or it can mean (ii) the subject’s
ability to identify an object (Millikan 2000). The verb ‘know’ with the meaning (i) does
not seem to produce an intensional context. S is acquainted with Frege if and only if
S is acquainted with the author of Grundgesetze. If (T) is true, the F-concept truth is
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identical with the F-concept ∆ because they should be exactly the same function. Let
‘know(i)’ be ‘know’ with the meaning (i). If ‘having’ in ‘having the [F-]concept truth’
means ‘knowing(i)’, (C1) comes down to this:
(C1*) Knowing(i) the Fregean concept ∆ cannot be a precondition for
deciding whether something is ∆.
However, (C1*) contradicts the circularity reading’s own rationale for (C3): ‘[...] one
can hardly decide whether something is thus and so (e.g., true) without [knowing(i)]
the [F-]concept of a thing’s being thus and so (of a thing’s being true)’ (Künne 2008:
14). Similar considerations apply if we take ‘know’ to have (ii) as its meaning.
One might still take ‘know’ in ‘S knows o’ as producing an intensional context. For
instance, one might claim that, even if N1 is identical with N2, the fact that one knows
N1 (N2) does not entail that one knows N2 (N1) if the sense of ‘N1’ differs from that of
‘N2’. However, this does not help because we already assume that (T) is a true analytic
definition of ‘true’. If (T) is really a correct definition in the analytical sense, then the
sense of ‘true’ must be identical with that of ‘∆’—as Künne (2008: 13) acknowledges.4
A more reasonable, or perhaps the only, way to make sense of the phrase ‘having
the concept’, I believe, is to hypothesize that ‘concept’ there means not ‘F-concept’ but
something else (although Künne specifies no other conception of concept). Perhaps,
‘concept’ in (C1) and (C3) might refer to concepts qua psychological constructs that
constitute our conceptual scheme. Let us call concepts as such ‘P-concept’. P-concepts
must differ from Fregean senses. To make sense of (C1) and (C3), we ought to differen-
tiate the P-concept truth from the P-concept ∆. However, the Fregean sense of ‘true’ is
4In the earlier version of the circularity reading Künne takes ‘concept’ to mean ‘sense’ (2003: 132ff). It
works in the earlier version because it is based on the assumption that a characteristic of a concept is
not a sufficient condition for the concept. See Footnote 2 of this chapter. However, in this later version
of the circularity reading where this assumption is dropped, taking ‘concept’ to mean ‘sense’ does not
help as we’ve just seen. Indeed Künne (2008) does not say that ‘concept means ‘sense’.
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identical with that of ‘∆’ if (T) is an analytic definition. Therefore, the P-concept truth
(the P-concept ∆) must differ from the Fregean sense of ‘true’ (the Fregean sense of
‘∆’). However, it is not evident at all that Frege is appealing to the notion of P-concept
—with which we can avoid the paradox of analysis—in the passage from ‘Thought’.
Given Frege’s strong anti-psychologism (cf. Frege 1893: Foreword), it is not evident
that he ever endorses such a psychological conception of concept. This raises a serious
doubt against the exegetical propriety of the circularity reading.
3.1.2.2. Philosophical Issues with the Circularity Reading
Even if we concede that Frege adopts the notion of P-concept and that ‘concept’ in (C1)
and (C3) means ‘P-concept’, the indefinability argument under the circularity reading
turns out to be a non-starter. First, it has an implausible premise. Also, it is too difficult
to defend all its premises altogether.
The Omnipresence of Truth? Let us examine the way the circularity reading explains
how Frege motivates (C2). The circularity reading claims that (C2) is an instance of the
following schema Frege would be willing to endorse:
(S) ‘One cannot VERB that / whether p, without thereby VERB-ing that
/ whether [the thought that p] is true.’ (Künne 2008: 16)
where ‘VERB’ is substituted by a verb for a mental action with a thought. To support
this scheme Künne points to (Iden)
(Iden) 〈p〉 is identical with 〈〈p〉 is true〉. (Frege 1892c, 1897, 1906a, 1906c,
1914)
Künne’s point is that given this identity thesis, performing an act with 〈p〉 is just per-
forming the act with 〈〈p〉 is true〉. Hence, Künne claims, every instance of (S) including
(C2) is true for Frege.
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However, (C3) does not square well with the identity thesis if the latter is read in a
certain way. Say that the following is the rationale that underlies the identity thesis:
(Def) The sense of ‘true’ contributes nothing to 〈〈p〉 is true〉, and hence
neither 〈p〉 nor 〈〈p〉 is true〉 has what we may take as the sense of
‘true’ qua predicate.5
If (Def) is the rationale for the identity thesis, (C3) is false because to decide whether
〈p〉 is true is just to decide whether p. Thus, we do not have to have the P-concept
truth or know the sense of ‘true’ in order to decide whether 〈p〉 is true.
Of course, there is another way to understand the identity thesis:
(OP) The sense of ‘true’ is hidden even in the sense of a sentence that
does not have a truth-predicate, and so 〈p〉 always comes down to
〈〈p〉 is true〉.
If (OP) is the case, deciding whether p always comes down to deciding whether 〈p〉 is
true. To do the former, one should already have the P-concept truth and know the
sense of ‘true’. If (OP) is the rationale that underlies the identity thesis, the proponent
of the circularity reading can defend (C3) by appealing to the identity thesis.
As our discussion of Frege’s ‘My Basic Logical Insights’ shows, what Frege intends
to argue for through (Iden) is rather closer to (Def). His point is that the fact, that ‘true’
has nothing to contribute to the sense of a sentence where it shows as a predicate, in
a sense gives an expression to the fact that the act of assertion does not form a part of
the asserted thought. However, let us leave this issue aside.
Künne does attribute (OP) to Frege although he does not seem to take it to be a part
of the indefinability argument.6 What our consideration establishes, however, is that
5(Def) seems to be what Frege says in ‘My Basic Logical Insights’ (Frege 1915: 252).
6Künne (2008) claims that Frege attempts to resist the view that truth is a property and that the
indefinability argument is one of such attempts. However, Künne also claims, Frege could not but
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the indefinability argument under the circularity reading ought to involve (OP) as its
part. If the identity thesis were underwritten not by (OP) but by (Def) or something like
it, (C3) would become implausible. However, if the indefinability argument depends
on (OP), it appears to be a non-starter. Let ‘p’ be an arbitrary sentence. If (OP) is true,
then its sense is 〈〈p〉 is true〉, i.e., the sense of ‘〈p〉 is true’. Likewise, the sense of ‘〈p〉
is true’ is 〈〈〈p〉 is true〉 is true〉, i.e., the sense of ‘〈〈p〉 is true〉 is true’. This regress
will never stop. The consequence of this regress is that we cannot fix the sense of a
sentence, which is by no means plausible. To base the indefinability argument on (OP)
is to make it a non-starter.
The Instability of the Argument under the Circularity Reading Even if we concede
that (OP) is plausible, the argument is still unstable because it is not possible to justify
all its premises at the same time. Let me first note that not every instance of (S) is true.
Only given the identity between 〈p〉 and 〈〈p〉 is true〉, the instance of (S) holds only
if the mental action denoted by the verb ‘φ’ that substitutes ‘VERB’ is merely thought-
sensitive, i.e., only if the identity between 〈p〉 and 〈q〉 is a sufficient condition for the
identity between φ-ing that p and φ-ing that q. If φ-ing is not only thought-sensitive
but also P-concept-sensitive, i.e., if φ-ing that p is identical with φ-ing that q just in
case (i) 〈p〉 is identical with 〈q〉 and (ii) the P-conceptual content of ‘p’ is identical with
that of ‘q’, the identity between 〈p〉 and 〈〈p〉 is true〉 does not entail the instance of (S)
with ‘φ’: ‘We cannot φ that p without φ-ing that 〈p〉 is true’. Therefore, if (C2) is a true
instance of (S), the act of deciding whether p is merely thought-sensitive.
If deciding whether p is merely thought-sensitive, however, it is difficult to motivate
return to the property view and accept that all we can say about truth is (OP), which shows according
to Künne that truth is a peculiar or sui generis property of thoughts. This shows that Künne takes (OP)
to come after the considerations like the indefinability argument.
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that
(C3†) One cannot decide whether something is true without having the
P-concept truth,
i.e., (C3) with the notion of P-concept. Say that I have the P-concept ∆, I know the sense
of ‘∆’, and recognize the F-concept ∆. Intuitively, it looks as if I can decide whether
something is ∆. Then I can also decide whether something is true without having
the P-concept truth. Here is an argument. Supposing (T) is an analytic definition of
‘true’, 〈x is true〉 is identical with 〈x is ∆〉. Because the act of deciding whether p is
merely thought-sensitive, deciding whether x is ∆ is identical with deciding whether
x is true. Therefore, if I can decide whether x is ∆, I can thereby decide whether x is
true. Thus, having the P-concept truth is not necessary for deciding whether 〈p〉 is
true. (C3†) seems to be false if deciding whether p is merely thought-sensitive.
Here, appealing to (OP) would not help. If (OP) is the case, of course, deciding
whether x is ∆ comes down to deciding whether 〈x is ∆〉 is true. Nevertheless, this
does not imply that we need the P-concept truth to decide whether x is ∆. Given (T),
〈〈x is ∆〉 is true〉 is identical with 〈〈x is ∆〉 is ∆〉. Given that deciding whether p is merely
thought-sensitive, deciding whether 〈x is ∆〉 is true is identical with deciding whether
〈x is ∆〉 is ∆. When I perform the latter, I thereby perform the former. It still seems
intuitively true that I can decide whether 〈x is ∆〉 is ∆ as far as I have the P-concept
∆, know the sense of ‘∆’, and recognize the F-concept ∆. Thus, the proponent of the
circularity reading cannot defend (C3†) by appealing to (OP).
There are two ways of defending (C3†) against the objection. One is to claim that,
without the P-concept truth, we cannot decide whether something is ∆ even if we have
the P-concept ∆, know the sense of ‘∆’, and recognize the F-concept ∆. Nevertheless,
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it is difficult to see how we can motivate this claim given that (OP) does not help. The
other, more plausible, way is to claim that, merely by deciding whether something is
∆, we cannot decide whether something is true. One can motivate this claim by saying
that deciding whether p is not merely thought-sensitive but also P-concept-sensitive.
However, if we accept that deciding whether p is also P-concept-sensitive for some
reasons, (C2) comes to be implausible. As we said, only given the identity between 〈p〉
and 〈〈p〉 is true〉, ‘VERB’ in (S) should be substituted by a verb that refers to a merely
thought-sensitive mental act. Of course, one can argue that the P-conceptual content
of ‘p’, or simply [p], is identical with [〈p〉 is true]. However, this idea seems to be too
far gone from what Frege is trying to argue in the passage from ‘Thought’. Even if we
concede that Frege adopts the identity between [p] and [〈p〉 is true], it is unclear how
we can motivate it. One way we can think of is to claim that because 〈p〉 is identical
with 〈〈p〉 is true〉, [p] is identical with [〈p〉 is true]. However, if that is the case, then [〈p〉
is true] must also be identical with [〈p〉 is ∆] given that 〈〈p〉 is true〉 is identical with
〈〈p〉 is ∆〉. If so, the P-concept truth is identical with the P-concept ∆. As we have
said earlier, however, we cannot make sense of (C1) (with ‘P-concept’) and (C3†) if the
P-concept truth is identical with the P-concept ∆.
3.1.3. Concluding Remarks
It is difficult to motivate (C1), (C2), and (C3) altogether (where ‘concept’ means ‘P-
concept’). Even if we were able to do so somehow, it ought to depend on an implausible
way of understanding the identity thesis, i.e., (OP). The argument under the circularity
reading turns out to be a non-starter. Moreover, the circularity reading ascribes to Frege
the notion of P-concept that is entirely alien to him. For these reasons, I conclude that
the circularity reading should be discarded. Closing my discussion of the circularity
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reading, I provide an interpretative point that seems to suggest that the indefinability
argument may entirely differ from the argument under the circularity reading.
Recall Frege’s argument against the correspondence definition.
· · · Could we not maintain that there is truth when there is correspondence in a
certain respect? But which respect? For in that case what ought we to do so as to
decide whether something is true? We should have to inquire whether it is true
that an idea and a reality, say, correspond in the specified respect. (1918a: 327;
italics mine)
The point Frege makes is conditional: (CC) if truth is defined as correspondence, one
cannot decide whether x is true without deciding whether 〈x corresponds to reality〉 is
true. Recall that the circularity reading needs the following:
(C2C) One cannot decide whether x corresponds to reality without de-
ciding whether 〈x corresponds to reality〉 is true.
Supposing that truth is defined as correspondence, we can deduce (C2C) from (CC).
However, if Frege is appealing to the identity thesis in this passage, this inference is
unnecessary because (C2C) directly follows from the identity thesis alone. It is unlikely
that Frege is putting forward (CC) to acquire (C2C). If it is (CC) that Frege is putting
forward here, it is implausible that he is appealing to the identity thesis here.
A more promising interpretation of the above passage appears to be saying that
the premise of the argument against the correspondence definition is not (C2C) but
(CC) and that the identity thesis is irrelevant to the argument. If so, the same goes
for the global argument. The premise of the global argument is not (C2) but this: one
cannot decide whether x is true without deciding whether 〈x is ∆〉 is true if truth is
defined as a F-concept ∆. The identity thesis is also irrelevant to the global argument.
If this exegetical point is along the right lines, then what we ought to ask to understand
60 Chapter 3. Argument 2: Frege is Not a Primitivist
the argument is why Frege takes it for granted that defining truth as a F-concept ∆
implies that deciding whether 〈x is ∆〉 is true is necessary for deciding whether x is
true. To pursue this exegetical question, I think, will lead to a different reading of the
argument.7 I turn to developing such a reading in the next section.8
3.2. Literal Reading of the Indefinability Argument
The indefinability argument is cryptic. It is hard to see what the rationales are for the
literal assertions Frege makes in the passages that contain the indefinability argument.
Because of this difficulty, secondly, it is difficult to figure out what exactly the premises
of this argument are. Given these exegetical difficulties, one who attempts to interpret
this argument can choose either of the following two methods. One is to read Frege’s
points made in his other works into the passages that contain the indefinability argu-
ment and reconstruct the argument through this projection (e.g., Künne’s circularity
reading). The other is to retrieve the premises of the argument by a line-by-line literal
analysis of those passages and then examine if what we’ve retrieved make sense or
whether they are well connected to Frege’s other points. Both strategies are perfectly
legitimate in interpretative works that have their own strengths and weaknesses. In
the case of the indefinability argument, nonetheless, there are few works that adopt
the second strategy. What I would like to do is to develop an interpretation of the
7Heck (2012: §2.3) and Pagin (2001) follow this idea. They claim that the act of deciding whether p
is basically the act of judging that p and that Frege’s conception of judgment as acknowledgment of
truth is related to the argument. Specifically, they argue that given Frege’s conception of judgment as
such, if truth is a property, acknowledging the truth of 〈p〉 is assertively predicating the property truth
of 〈p〉, which is equivalent to judging that 〈p〉 is true, i.e., acknowledging the truth of 〈〈p〉 is true〉. I
believe their interpretation is on the right track. However, as we will see, their interpretation also has a
problem. My interpretation will be an attempt to fix the problem with their reading.
8
§3.1 is a slightly modified version of my paper ‘The Circularity Reading of Frege’s Indefinability
Argument’ (Kim 2020) published in Thought and has been reproduced here with the permission of John
Wiley and Sons.
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argument that adopts the second strategy. In other words, I develop a literal analysis
of the passages and then connect what are retrieved to Frege’s other works.
We can determine the structure of the indefinability argument fairly uniquely by a
line-by-line interpretation of the passage from ‘Thought’. The literal analysis reveals
that the argument presupposes the Fregean conception of judgment—a conception
criticized by Hanks (2007, 2011, 2015, 2018).9 It also establishes that the argument,
assuming the conception is true, concludes that truth is not a Fregean concept, i.e., a
property. If my suggested reading is along the right lines, Frege is urging us to retain
the Fregean conception of judgment and abandon the common belief that truth is a
property of truth-bearers. Frege’s argument is not a primitivist argument. It is an
argument that truth is not a property but an object.
Under my suggested reading, the conclusion of the argument is that there cannot
be a proper truth definition of the following form:
(TD) x is true iff x is ∆.
The argument contained in the passage is the following reductio:
Assumption: There is a proper definition of truth of the form (TD).
(TPro) If there is a proper definition of truth of the form (TD), truth is a
property.
(JPro) If truth is a property, one acknowledges the truth of x iff one
acknowledges the truth of 〈x is true〉. (‘〈p〉’ means ‘the thought
that p’.)
9Hanks puts forward a non-Fregean conception of proposition based on a non-Fregean understanding
of judgment. He claims that the Fregean conception of judgment posits the existence of propositions as
abstract entities that have truth-conditions independently of any human acticity. According to Hanks,
that is a fundamental mistake. I return to Hanks’s conception of judgment and his criticism of the
Fregean conception of judgment later in §7.1.
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(VIR) If one acknowledges the truth of x iff one acknowledges the truth
of 〈x is true〉, an absurd result is produced.
∴ There is no proper definition of truth of the form (TD).
§3.2.1 develops this reading. §3.2.2 and §3.2.3 develop the rationales for (VIR) and
(JPro) respectively. A few notes. ‘An absurd result’ in (VIR) refers to a vicious infinite
regress. I explain this point when I develop a rationale for (VIR) in §3.2.2. The Fregean
conception of judgment is related to (JPro). As we will see in §3.2.3, (JPro) is true if the
Fregean conception of judgment is true.
3.2.1. The Analysis of the Passage from ‘Thought’
Two preliminaries. First, though the argument is woven in terms of the act of deciding
whether something is true on the surface, it is judging that it is really concerned with.10
For Frege, to judge is to acknowledge the truth of a truth-bearer. Recall the question
at the beginning of the passage:
For in that case [i.e., if truth is defined as correspondence] what ought we to do so
as to decide whether something is true? (1918a: 325)
This presupposes that what it takes to decide whether something is true relies on how
truth is defined, i.e., what the nature of truth amounts to. Judging qua acknowledging
the truth of a truth-bearer relies on the nature of truth exactly in that way: depending
on the nature of truth, what it takes to acknowledge the truth of something must be
different. Hence, this passage is about judgment. This means that we can paraphrase
‘decide whether x is true’ in the argument into ‘acknowledge the truth of x’.11
10For the relationship between the indefinability argument and judgment, see Heck 2007, 2012, Kremer
2000, Pagin 2001, and Ricketts 1996.
11In Frege, deciding that x is not true is also reduced to acknowledging the truth of the thought that x
is not true. As we can see in ‘Negation’ (1918b), Frege rejects that there is the act of rejecting that is not
reduced to the act of judging. Thus, for him, rejecting that p is judging that the thought that p is not
true.
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The second point is concerned with truth-bearers in Frege. Truth-bearers for him
in his mature career are thoughts, i.e., the senses of sentences, and to acknowledge the
truth of the thought that p, or 〈p〉, is to judge that p. However, Frege initially talks not
about thoughts but about ideas in the argument, which means that the argument must
not depend on whether truth-bearers are thoughts. As we will see, the argument only
requires it to be true that thoughts are one kind of truth-bearers.
Now, I turn to retrieving (JPro) from the passage. Given that Frege is talking about
judgment, the question in the passage, ‘In that case what ought we to do so as to
decide whether something is true?’, is asking what must go into the place of ‘φ’ in the
following:
(JCor) If truth consists in correspondence, one acknowledges the truth of
a truth-bearer x iff φ.
Frege immediately answers:
We should have to inquire whether it is true that an idea and a reality, say, corre-
spond in the specified respect. (1918a: 325)
If we translate ‘inquire (i.e., decide) whether · · · is true’ into ‘acknowledge the truth of
· · · ’, the that-clause remains. To see what it refers to, we need to take it into account
that truth is defined as correspondence to reality, which implies that truth is defined as
a property a truth-bearer has. Thus, in ‘It is true that an idea and a reality correspond
in the specified respect’, ‘It is true’ must denote the property truth. Then, the that-
clause must refer to a truth-bearer that has the property: a sort of propositional content
Frege calls ‘thought’. So Frege’s above statement can be paraphrased as follows: ‘One
should have to acknowledge the truth of 〈x corresponds to reality〉’. That is, we have
the following:
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(JCor*) If truth consists in correspondence, one acknowledges the truth of
a truth-bearer x iff one acknowledges the truth of 〈x corresponds
to reality〉.
In the generalized indefinability argument, (JCor*) is generalized into (JPro). Frege
remarks:
For in a definition certain characteristics would have to be specified. (1918a: 325)
First, the term ‘characteristic (mark)’ must be explained. In Grundgesetze Frege says:
If one says: “a square is a rectangle in which adjacent sides are equal”, one defines
the [property] square by stating what properties something must have in order
to [have] it. I call these properties characteristic marks of the [property]. (1893:
XIV)12
The characteristics of a property P are properties constitutive of P that will be specified
in the analytic definition of P if there is such a definition.13 Therefore, ‘characteristics’
in the passage means ‘characteristics of truth’. This establishes that the indefinability
argument targets at truth definitions which specify the characteristics of truth, i.e.,
those of the form (TD):
(TD) x is true iff x is ∆.
This is also confirmed by the indefinability argument in ‘Logic’ where Frege identifies
the target of his argument as follows:
The same [point that an absurd result is produced] would hold of any definition
of the form ‘A is true if and only if it has such-and-such properties’ · · · . (1897: 128)
12The original translation uses ‘concept’ instead of ‘property’. I use ‘property’ to simplify our discussion
here. Doing so does not distort any of Frege’s points. This is shown by the fact that what Frege calls
‘properties’, i.e., characteristics, also refer to concepts, strictly speaking. We will see Frege’s concept of
concept in the next section.
13A primitive property PP that is not constituted by other properties still has its characteristic, i.e., PP
itself. All properties are their own characteristics.
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Now, let us return to ‘Thought’. Frege writes:
For in a definition certain characteristics would have to be specified. And in
application to any particular case the question would always arise whether it were
true that the characteristics were present. (1918a: 325)
The first statement means that if we have a proper truth definition of the form (TD),
truth is a property that has characteristics. The second statement must be the answer
to the question as to what we ought to do to decide whether something is true if truth
has specified characteristics. The following seems to be what we have in the second
statement:
(JGen) If truth has characteristics, one acknowledges the truth of x iff one
acknowledges the truth of 〈those characteristics obtain〉.
‘Those characteristics obtain’ must mean ‘x has the properties constitutive of truth, i.e.,
has the property truth’ or simply ‘x is true’. Moreover, truth having characteristics is
equivalent to truth being a property. Hence, (JGen) comes down to the following:
(JPro) If truth is a property, then one acknowledges the truth of x iff one
acknowledges the truth of 〈x has the property truth〉, i.e., the truth
of 〈x is true〉.
(JCor*) is an instance of (JPro) because to define truth as correspondence is to define it as
a property of truth-bearers. (JPro) is indeed what the indefinability argument depends
on.
Before turning to retrieving other premises, I address an objection to taking (JPro) to
be a premise of the argument. Regarding it as a premise, I’ve assumed that an entity
is a property just in case it has characteristics. Künne (2001) would disagree. He says
a characteristic mark M of a property P must satisfy the following condition: ‘M is a
property, M is · · · a component of an analytic definition [of P], and nothing can [have
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P] without [having M]’ (2008: 13). If he is right, a primitive property cannot have
a characteristic. However, the second condition Künne assigns on characteristics is
groundless. All Frege says about characteristics and definitions is that we come to have
a definition of a property by specifying its characteristics; that does not imply that only
a property that shows up in a definition of P can be a P’s characteristic. Any property
‘that an object must have in order to have P’ (Frege 1903a: §150) is a characteristic of
P. Künne (2001) takes the second condition to be necessary for the following reasons.
Given only what Frege says, a characteristic of P is merely a necessary condition for P.
Then, properties like not both Q and not Q or Q or not Q are characteristics of P. Künne
claims that ‘the content of any concept would be so rich that nobody could have one
concept expressible in English without having all of them’ (2001: 276). But this claim
presupposes that all characteristics of P must show up in its definition. That is false;
all Frege says is that only characteristics of P can show up in its definition, which does
not imply the presupposition at all. A primitive property PP can have a characteristic,
i.e., PP itself according to Frege’s definition of characteristic.
Given (JPro), we can easily see that (VIR) is also a part of the indefinability argument:
(VIR) If one acknowledges the truth of x iff one acknowledges the truth
of 〈x is true〉, an absurd result is produced.
Recall Frege’s argument against the correspondence definition:
We should have to inquire whether it is true that an idea and a reality, say, corre-
spond in the specified respect. And then we should be confronted by a question
of the same kind, and the game could begin again. So the attempted explanation
of truth as correspondence breaks down. (1918a: 325; numbering mine)
The first claim is the consequent of (JCor*). It is followed by the claim that an absurd
result, which breaks down the correspondence definition, would be produced. So we
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have the following:
(VIR*) If one acknowledges the truth of x iff one acknowledges the truth
of 〈x corresponds to reality〉, an absurd result is produced.
The same reading is applied to the part for the generalized indefinability argument.
Hence, we have (VIR). As I said, I explain why the absurd result (VIR) points to is a
vicious infinite regress in the next section. Here, what we need to focus is the point
that Frege takes the antecedent of (VIR) by itself leads to an absurd result.
Let us take stock of what we have so far:
(JPro) If truth is a property, one acknowledges the truth of x iff one
acknowledges the truth of 〈x is true〉.
(VIR) If one acknowledges the truth of x iff one acknowledges the truth
of 〈x is true〉, an absurd result is produced.
To have the absurd result under the assumption that we have a proper definition of
truth of the form (TD), we need the following:
(TPro) If there is a proper definition of truth of the form (TD), truth is a
property.
Ascribing (TPro) to Frege here seems legitimate because, first, he needs it to have the
intended conclusion and, second, the consequent of (TPro) is obviously entailed by the
logical form (TD). Hence, the reductio that depends on (TPro), (JPro), and (VIR) is the
actual argument contained in the passages from ‘Thought’.
I turn to motivating (JPro) and (VIR). In this discussion, we will see that the argument
forces us to choose either the Fregean conception of judgment or the intuitive idea that
truth is a property of truth-bearers.
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3.2.2. TheMotivation for (VIR)
Recall (VIR):
(VIR) If one acknowledges the truth of x iff one acknowledges the truth
of 〈x is true〉, an absurd result is produced.
The absurd result is a vicious infinite regress. Call the antecedent of (VIR) ‘(AA)’. One
thing to be noted is that the right side of (AA) specifies what we ought to do in order
to acknowledge the truth of x. That is how Frege reaches (JPro). Now, suppose that
(AA) is true. Say one attempts to acknowledge the truth of a truth-bearer b. By (AA),
one can do so by and only by acknowledging the truth of 〈b is true〉. This is where the
argument depends on the assumption that thoughts are at least a kind of truth-bearers.
〈b is true〉 is a truth-bearer because it is a thought, and thus it satisfies (AA). By (AA),
one can acknowledge its truth by and only by acknowledging the truth of 〈〈b is true〉
is true〉. By (AA) again, one can perform the latter by and only by acknowledging the
truth of 〈〈〈b is true〉 is true〉 is true〉. This regress will continue endlessly. This infinite
regress seems to be what Frege is getting at when he says the following:
And then we should be confronted by a question of the same kind, and the game
could begin again. (1918a: 325)
It might be objected that the infinite regress is vicious only if acknowledging the
truth of 〈p〉 is not identical with acknowledge the truth of 〈〈p〉 is true〉. Indeed, it is
tempting to think that the former is identical with the latter for Frege. First of all,
judgment is thought-sensitive:
(Tht) Acknowledging the truth of 〈p〉 is identical with acknowledging
the truth of 〈q〉 iff 〈p〉 is identical with 〈q〉.
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In ‘On Sense and Reference’ (1892c), Frege elucidates judging that p as taking a step
from 〈p〉 to the reference of ‘p’, i.e., one of the truth-values, the True and the False. We
will see later what this metaphorical elucidation means. However, it already appears
clear that it implies (Tht): taking a step from 〈p〉 is identical with taking a step from
〈q〉 iff 〈p〉 is identical with 〈q〉. Secondly, as we have already seen, Frege does claim
that 〈p〉 is identical with 〈〈p〉 is true〉. Then, by (Tht), acknowledging the truth of 〈p〉 is
identical with acknowledging the truth of 〈〈p〉 is true〉. Then, it seems that the infinite
regress produced by (AA) is not vicious.
But this objection misses the point that while accepting the identity thesis that 〈p〉 is
identical with 〈〈p〉 is true〉, Frege also accepts the following:
(Diff) If ‘· · · is true’ denotes a property, 〈p〉 is different from 〈〈p〉 is true〉.
As we’ve already seen, Frege endorses it in his argument in ‘On Sense and Reference’
that the True is not a property of a thought but its reference. Here is how the argument
is reformulated:
(P1) If the True is a property, then ‘· · · is true’ denotes the property.
(P2) If ‘· · · is true’ denotes a property, 〈p〉 is different from 〈〈p〉 is true〉.
(P3) 〈p〉 is identical with 〈〈p〉 is true〉.
(C1) ∴ ‘· · · is true’ does not denote a property.
(C2) ∴ The True is not a property.
If this reformulation of the argument is acceptable, Frege is committed to (Diff), i.e., (P2).
By our assumption that there is a truth definition of the form (TD), truth is a property.
By (Diff) and (Tht), acknowledging the truth of 〈p〉 is different from acknowledging
the truth of 〈〈p〉 is true〉. Hence, the objection to (VIR) does not succeed.
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(Diff) is arguably plausible; saying that snow is white certainly seems to be radically
different from saying that a thought has a certain property. Presumably, this is why, in
the literature, it is hard to find out a theory of truth that takes truth to be a property
and takes 〈p〉 to be identical with 〈〈p〉 is true〉. For instance, Horwich (1998), who takes
truth to be a property in a minimal sense —i.e, in the sense that ‘true’ is a legitimate
predicate—, still takes 〈p〉 to be different from 〈〈p〉 is true〉 because truth is a property.
A number of readings of the indefinability argument take the identity thesis to be
a part of the argument (cf. Künne 2008 or Soames 1999). But Frege’s commitment to
(Diff) provides a reason to doubt this claim. In Frege’s own understanding, the identity
thesis would not obtain if truth were a property. However, the argument assumes that
truth is a property. Under that assumption, Frege cannot depend on the identity thesis
without going against his own commitment to (Diff).
Note that the argument from ‘On Sense and Reference’ concludes that truth is not
a property of thoughts. The indefinability argument leads us to the same conclusion.
Given (JPro) and (VIR):
(JPro) If truth is a property, one acknowledges the truth of x iff one
acknowledges the truth of 〈x has the property truth〉, i.e., 〈x is
true〉;
(VIR) If one acknowledges the truth of x iff one acknowledges the truth
of 〈x is true〉, an absurd result is produced;
the assumption that truth is a property will lead to the same infinite regress. Hence, we
should deny the assumption that truth is a property of truth-bearers, which implies that
truth is not a property of thoughts. Thus, the argument in ‘On Sense and Reference’ and
the indefinability argument are different arguments to the conclusion that truth is not
a property. The difference is that while the former depends on the identity between 〈p〉
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and 〈〈p〉 is true〉, the latter does not. The indefinability argument is Frege’s argument
that truth is not a property but an object.
3.2.3. TheMotivation for (JPro) and the Lesson from the Argument
Recall (JPro):
(JPro) If truth is a property, one acknowledges the truth of x iff one
acknowledges the truth of 〈x is true〉.
Before turning to the motivation for it, I first need to note that Heck (2012) and Pagin
(2001) also take (JPro) to be a premise of the indefinability argument. For instance, Heck
writes:
[Say] we do think of truth as a property of thoughts. Then, the idea that judgment
is admission of a thought’s truth becomes the idea that judging is a form of
predication: judging is predicating truth of a thought. · · · Predication in this sense
is itself a sort of judgment: To predicate truth of the thought that p is just to judge
that the thought that p is true · · · (Heck 2012: 47)
Heck is inferring (JPro) by the following two propositions:
(Q1) If truth is a property, one acknowledges the truth of x iff one
predicates the property truth of x.
(Q2) One predicates truth of x iff one judges that x is true, i.e., acknowl-
edges the truth of 〈x is true〉.
Pagin (2001: 5) presents the same inference to (JPro).
One problem with this inference is that in Frege’s conception of predication, (Q2) is
false. For him, predicating is grasping a thought, e.g., predicating a property P of an
object o is grasping 〈o is P〉. Grasping a thought does not amount to acknowledging its
truth.14 In this conception of predication (Q2) is false. Of course, what Heck means by
14See, e.g., Frege 1892c, Frege 1897, Frege 1906a, etc.
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‘predicate’ in (Q2) is strong predication that includes a commitment to the correctness
of predication. We can define strong predication within Frege: strongly predicating is
acknowledging the truth of the thought grasped by predication. (Q2) is an instance of
this definition. The problem is that (Q1) is made true only if we read the right side of
its consequent as (Q2) defines. Hence, (Q1) is simply (JPro). The inference from (Q1) to
(JPro) is circular.
At this point let us speculate about what Frege’s own motivation for (JPro) could
be. What is to be noted is that in the passage Frege puts forward (JPro) as something so
obviously true that he does not even provide an explanation. This suggests that (JPro)
is grounded in something to which Frege is so strongly committed that he cannot think
of any alternative. One thing Frege is committed to that strongly is his conception of
judgment as acknowledgment of truth. This conception has a particular implication
about the act of acknowledging a property of an object in general. Let o be an object
and P be a property objects can have. Consider the following descriptions of act-types:
(A1) Acknowledging the P-ness of o,
(A2) Judging that o is P, and
(A3) Acknowledging the truth of 〈o is P〉.
The Fregean conception of judgment elucidates (A2) as (A3). On top of that, it also
claims that it is by and only by performing (A3) that we perform (A1). The Fregean
conception of judgment entails that if truth is a property, it is by and only by acknowl-
edging the truth of 〈x is true〉—a case of (A3)—that one acknowledges the truth of x—a
case of (A1)—, which is what (JPro) asserts. Therefore if one is committed to the Fregean
conception of judgment, then one ought to also accept (JPro). It appears to be a salient
possibility that (JPro) in ‘Thought’ is grounded in the Fregean conception of judgment
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to which he is strongly committed.
If the Fregean conception of judgment is indeed Frege’s motivation for (JPro), how-
ever, he is committing a mistake here. For there is a viable alternative to the Fregean
conception of judgment. For instance, a non-Fregean conception of judgment has re-
cently been championed by Hanks (2011, 2015, 2018). For Hanks, (A2) is reduced to
(A1) where (A1) is predicating the property P of o.15 One cannot perform (A3) through
performing (A1); the former is an act-type different from the latter. (JPro) does not
obtain for Hanks; (A1) is not achieved by and only by doing (A3).
To recap, Frege puts forward (JPro) as obviously true because he is firmly committed
to the Fregean conception of judgment. But the Fregean conception of judgment is
not sufficient for motivating (JPro) because there is a viable alternative to it. Therefore,
Frege’s argument cannot really establish that truth is not a property, unless he has a
knock-down argument against the alternative.
Nevertheless, Frege’s indefinability argument still provides a crucial lesson. The
Fregean conception of judgment, under which judging is making a commitment to the
truth of a proposition as an abstract entity that represents things in a way, is a popular
point of view.16 Frege’s argument shows that the Fregean conception is incompatible
with the ordinary view that truth is a property of truth-bearers. For the following is
arguably true:
(JPro*) If the Fregean conception of judgment is correct, if truth is a prop-
erty, one acknowledges the truth of x iff one acknowledges the
truth of 〈x is true〉.
If we assume that the Fregean conception is true and that truth is a property, we come to
15For Hanks, predication is inherently committal. See ch.3 of Hanks 2015.
16See ch.1 of Hanks 2015.
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have the vicious infinite regress. We ought to abandon at least one of the assumptions.
Frege’s choice is to reject that truth is a property as we have seen. If truth is not a
property, the vicious infinite regress is not produced even if the Fregean conception of
judgment is correct. This is because acknowledging the truth of a truth bearer is not a
case of (A1) anymore (recall that ‘P’ in (A1) refers to a property). Now, this means that
Frege ought to provide an alternative conception of judgment qua acknowledgment
of truth. He does provide such an alternative in ‘On Sense and Reference’ and other
mature works as we will see in Chapter 5. This reversely shows that Frege is attempting
to justify his search for an alternative understanding of truth and judgment when he
builds up his arguments against the thought that truth is a property. Therefore, Frege’s




Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 establish that Frege’s deflationist and primitivist comments
are his arguments that truth is an object. In our discussion, we’ve already addressed
several objections. This chapter addresses two more objections to the claim that truth
is an object for Frege. §4.1 deals with what I call ‘the neo-Kantian reading’. This read-
ing interprets Frege’s philosophy in general by considering the historical connection
between Frege and the neo-Kantian philosophers at his time. The advocates of the neo-
Kantian reading claim that although Frege is forced by his logic to take a truth-value
to be an object, he still takes truth to be a property, specifically a value property, philo-
sophically. §4.2 deals with Greimann’s reading of Frege on truth according to which
truth is neither a property nor an object for Frege. According to Greimann, Frege is
rather an advocate of the ‘No Entity’ theory of truth according to which truth is not an
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entity although it still plays a logically significant role.
4.1. TheNeo-KantianReadingonFregeonTruth-Values
Gottfried Gabriel (1984, 2002, 2013a, 2013b) shows the historical connection of Frege to
‘the value-theoretical [Southwestern] school of neo-Kantianism’ (1984: 374). Gabriel
argues that, just like neo-Kantians, Frege regards truth as a value, and his term ‘truth-
value’ should be understood value-theoretically.1 In fact, it is Wilhelm Windelband
who started value-theoretical neo-Kantianism that first introduced the term and used
it in a value-theoretical sense. Both Windelband and Frege using ‘truth-value’ is not a
coincidence given that they studied under the advisory of Hermann Lotze at Göttingen
who talks about the value-difference between truths and untruths.2
The historical connection between Frege and neo-Kantianism appears to be well
entrenched. Also, the interpretation of Frege on truth-values grounded in this his-
torical context, what I call ‘the neo-Kantian reading’, provides a different dimension
through which we can explore Frege’s philosophical insights into truth-values and
truth. I believe that the neo-Kantian reading makes a valuable contribution to Frege
scholarship and that the historical connection between Frege and neo-Kantianism de-
serves more attention. Our discussion is not concerned with this positive aspect of the
neo-Kantian reading.
This section concerns the neo-Kantian reading’s take on Frege’s claim that a truth-
value qua the reference of a sentence is an object. The neo-Kantian reading maintains
that Frege is ‘forced’ (Gabriel 1984: 375) by his logic Begriffsschrift (Frege 1879a, 1893)
1According to Gabriel (1984: 374), the fact that Frege is using ‘truth-value’ in a value-theoretical sense
is revealed in ‘On Sense and Reference’ (1892c) where Frege argues that the Bedeutung of a sentence is a
truth-value.
2For this historical connection among Frege, Windelband, and Lotze, see Gabriel 2002, 2013a, and
Sluga 1980.
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to argue so and that he concedes that ‘taking truth-values as objects is an advantage
· · · only for semantics of a special formal language like Begriffsschrift’ (Gabriel 1984:
375). In short, the proponent of this reading thinks that Frege takes a truth-value qua
a sentential reference to be an object solely because of technical reasons, so to speak.3
The aim of this chapter is to establish that it is due to philosophical reasons that Frege
takes a truth-value to be an object.
Specifically I addresses the neo-Kantian reading’s two arguments that Frege takes
truth-values to be objects only for technical reasons. Its first argument (§4.1.1) appeals
to the correspondence between Frege and Russell. However, as we will see, the textual
evidence does not fully support the neo-Kantian reading. Its second argument (§4.1.2)
is that Frege concedes that taking truth-values as objects is an ‘advantage · · · only for
semantics of a special formal language like’ (Gabriel 1984: 376) Begriffsschrift. But we
will see that for Frege, taking a truth-value as an object denoted by a sentence plays an
important role in his understanding of judgement that has a philosophical significance
in his framework.
4.1.1. Argument I. Correspondence between Frege and Russell
The neo-Kantian reading argues that as Tugendhat (1970) suggests, Frege’s term ‘Be-
deutung’, which we have already translated as ‘reference’ consistently, should be under-
stood as meaning ‘significance’—especially when Frege is talking about ‘the Bedeutung
3By ‘technical’, I mean ‘logical’ or ‘logic-related’. The neo-Kantian reading appears to distinguish
technical contexts in this sense from philosophical contexts in Frege’s works. Although I do not believe
that this distinction obtains, I do not tackle it in this paper.
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of a sentence’.4, 5 The neo-Kantian reading’s point is that it is not really Frege’s intention
to assimilate sentences with proper names. The neo-Kantian reading recognizes that
by taking truth-values as objects, Frege misleads his readers to think that truth-values
are sentential references. According to this reading, however, we should not be misled
by Frege’s taking truth-values as objects.
Replying to Russell’s letter, Frege writes:
If the sign of identity is used between sentences, the truth-value must be recognized
as the Bedeutung of the sentences. (Frege 1980: 152)
The neo-Kantian interpretation (Gabriel 1984: 375-6) takes this passage as where ‘the
Bedeutung of the sentence’ means something close to ‘the reference of the sentence’ and
Frege is explaining why he is ‘forced’ (Gabriel 1984: 375) to point to the thought that
a truth-values is the reference of a sentence. According to the exegesis, the antecedent
of the above statement, which is required to be true by a part of Begriffsschrift, i.e., by
Frege’s theory of identity, implies that truth-values are objects.6 The gist of the neo-
Kantian reading is that Frege is confessing that he is forced by the technical requirement
of Begriffsschrift to say that truth-values are objects and thereby misleadingly point to
the idea that truth-values are references of sentences.
However, that is not what is going on in this passage. Let us turn to Russell’s letter
Frege is here responding to. In this letter, Russell writes:
4Tugendhat’s suggested translation was not well received; it was criticized by many commentators
including Dummett (1993: 199-203). Unlike Tugendhat, Gabriel does not deny that ‘Bedeutung’ has the
meaning of ‘reference’. His point is that, on top of that meaning required by Begriffsschrift, Frege also
means ‘significance’ or ‘value’ by the term.
5In general it is not an easy question how we should translate ‘Bedeutung’ in Frege’s terminology. This
difficulty has resulted in a number of different translations of it, e.g., ‘reference’, ‘referent’, ‘denotation’,
‘meaning’, ‘nominatum’, etc. There are a number of papers on this. See, e.g., Angelelli 1982; Bell 1980;
Green, forthcoming, etc. Beaney (2019)’s discussion provides an excellent review of this debate.
6It is not clear what Gabriel means by ‘theory of identity (in Frege)’. I assume it refers to the parts of
Begriffsschrift that deal with how the identity sign can be used.
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I cannot · · · believe that the True or the False is the [Bedeutung] of a [sentence] · · ·
as a certain person is the [Bedeutung] of the name Julius Caesar. (In Frege 1980:
151)
Russell’s complaint is certainly that by rendering a truth-value to be the Bedeutung of a
sentence, we come to assimilate sentences with proper names like ‘Julius Caesar’. This
shows that Russell is already understanding ‘Bedeutung’ as something like ‘reference’.
If Frege were thinking that it is misleading to take ‘Bedeutung’ in ‘the Bedeutung of a
sentence’ to mean ‘reference’, and trying to clarify this misconception by explaining
why he could not but say that truth-values are objects, it would have to be the case
that Frege at least makes a gesture at this misconception. However, Frege never talks
about this alleged misconception. What Frege is doing before the foregoing comment
in his letter to Russell (1980: 152) is to recommend Russell to read his ‘On Sense
and Reference’ and recap his arguments in it that a truth-values is the Bedeutung of a
sentence.7 If so, then what Frege is doing when he replies to Russell is not to make an
excuse for taking truth-values as objects or as sentential references, but to argue that
a truth-value is indeed the Bedeutung of a sentence when ‘Bedeutung’ is understood in
the sense Russell attributes to it, i.e., when it means something like ‘reference’.
Again, Frege’s comment in his letter to Russell immediately follows his recap of the
arguments in ‘On Sense and Reference’ that a truth-value is the reference of a sentence.
Then it is only natural to construe his comment as one of those arguments. If it is such
an argument, it is certainly an exceptional argument because, in other works, Frege
does not motivate the idea that the reference of a sentence is a truth-value through
7In particular, Frege is summarizing two arguments. The first one appeals to the point that we are
interested in whether the parts of a sentence have references only when we are interested in the truth-
value of a sentence. The second one appeals to the compositionality of reference. [A] is Frege’s third
argument that truth-values are sentential references.
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appealing to the point that the identity sign can come between sentences.8 However, if
we look into the correspondence between Frege and Russell, we can understand why
Frege provides Russell with such an argument. Unlike what the neo-Kantian reading
says, the antecedent of [A]—that the identity sign can be put between sentences—only
implies that sentences are proper names. Now, Russell has definitely read Grundgesetze,
and so he is highly familiar with Frege’ use of the identity sign between sentences. In
one letter Russell sent before the above one, he writes:
On p.49 you say that Γ = ∆ has a [Bedeutung] if Γ and ∆ are proper names for
ranges of values or names for truth-values. (In Frege 1980: 134)
Thus, Russell understands that the identity sign can appear between sentences. How-
ever, he does not tackle Frege’s use of the identity sign between sentences in any of
his letters. Then, what Frege is saying by his comment could be this: ‘Given that you
already agree to the use of the identity sign between sentences, you should be willing
to accept that sentential references are objects, in which case it is only natural, given
the previous arguments I have given, for you to accommodate that truth-values are
those objects referred to by sentences’. If so, what Frege is doing is not to provide
a technical reason to take truth-values to be objects, but to point out the incoherence
between accepting the use of the identity sign between sentences and denying that
sentential references are proper names, and thereby convince Russell that truth-values
are sentential references.
Recall that the neo-Kantian reading claims that it is only due to technical reasons
that Frege takes truth-values as objects. However, Frege’s statement in his letter to
Russell cannot support such a strong claim because, if our discussion is along the right
8For instance, that is not how he motivates the idea even in ‘Function and Concept’ (Frege 1891) which
is written for mathematicians.
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lines, it is not even clear that by the statement Frege is trying to give a technical reason
to take truth-values as objects.
4.1.2. Argument II. Semantic Uselessness of Truth-Values
Gabriel writes:
In fact, taking truth-values as objects is not an advantage for semantics in general,
but only for semantics of a special formal language like Frege’s [Begriffsschrift].
(Gabriel 1984: 376)
If Frege himself also shares this thought, then there is a reason to believe that it is only
for technical reasons that Frege takes truth-values as objects. Gabriel looks upon the
following as the textual evidence that Frege shares the same thought:
The designation of the truth values as objects may appear to be an arbitrary fancy
or perhaps a mere play upon words, from which no profound consequences could
be drawn. (Frege 1970: 63–4)
According to the neo-Kantian reading (Gabriel 2013b), truth is a property, or a concept
(following Frege’s own terminology), for Frege in the philosophical context.9 It is a
value concept, and this value concept of truth is what Frege would mean by ‘truth-
value’ in the philosophical context. The value of truth is a concept acknowledged in
our judgement, which constitutes the main thesis of the ‘acknowledgement theory of
truth’ the neo-Kantian reading ascribes to Frege.
However, it is not justified to argue based on the above statement that Frege thinks
that taking truth-values as objects is only beneficial for his Begriffsschrift. Note that
Frege says that ‘it may appear to be an arbitrary fancy’. This can be read as meaning
9Gabriel (2013b) concedes that Frege denies that truth is a concept, but also argues that the concept of
truth is still relevant to understanding Frege’s conception of truth. I assume that Gabriel is also appealing
to the distinction between the technical context and the philosophical context in Frege, although he does
not explicitly do so.
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that he in fact thinks that it is not an arbitrary fancy. I provide two arguments that this
reading is correct.
The first argument is based on the fact that, right after the above statement, Frege
presents a philosophical argument that truth-values are objects. Before taking a look
at this argument, let me note that the above statement is followed by this:
What I mean by an object can be more exactly discussed only in connexion with
concept and relation. I will reserve this for another article (i.e., ‘On Concept
and Object’). But so much should already be clear, that in every judgement, no
matter how trivial, the step from the level of thoughts to the level of reference (the
objective) has already been taken. (Frege 1892c: 64)
What Frege is pointing to in the first statement is his ontology according to which all
things that exist are classified as objects or functions. A function is unsaturated; it has
empty places for arguments. Saturated by arguments, a function yields an object as its
value. An object is saturated; it does not have any place for an argument. A concept
is a special kind of function whose value for given arguments is always a truth-value.
In the last statement of the above passage Frege elucidates judgement in terms of the
sense of a sentence, i.e., a thought, and the reference of a sentence, i.e., a truth-value.
We will talk more about this passage soon. What is crucial now is that it is imme-
diately followed by this argument we have already seen:
One might be tempted to regard the relation of the thought to the True not as that
of sense to reference, but rather as that of subject to predicate. One can, indeed,
say: ‘The thought, that 5 is a prime number, is true.’ But · · · nothing more has
been said than in the simple sentence ‘5 is a prime number.’ The truth claim arises
in each case from the form of the declarative sentence, and when the latter lacks its
usual force, e.g., in the mouth of an actor upon the stage, even the sentence ‘The
thought that 5 is a prime number is true’ contains only a thought, and indeed the
same thought as the simple ‘5 is a prime number.’ It follows that the relationship
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of the thought to the True may not be compared with that of subject to predicate.
(Frege 1892c: 64)
This is a philosophical argument concerning the nature of the True. It does not appeal
to any point from Begriffsschrift. Also, notice that Frege is using the terms ‘subject’ and
‘predicate’ he believes should be abandoned (Frege 1892a). He does not introduce his
official terms ‘concept’ and ‘relation’:
I will reserve [the discussion about concept and relation] for another article [i.e.,
‘On Concept and Object’]. (Frege 1892c: 64)
It seems as if he is trying not to touch those logically proper notions because he should
bring technical points to elucidate them. Hence, he is using more common notions of
subject and predicate he in fact is reluctant to use. This strongly suggests that he is
trying to avoid appealing to technical or logical points in the following discussion. In
the above argument, we can conclude, Frege is trying to establish philosophically that
the True must not be taken to be a concept under which thoughts fall. By establishing
it, he is urging the readers to swallow his suggestion that the True as an object is the
reference attached to thoughts.
My second argument against the neo-Kantian reading is that truth-values as objects
and sentential references play a philosophically crucial role in Frege—specifically in
his conception of judgment. Recall the following statement the neo-Kantian reading
depends on:
The designation of the truth values as objects may appear to be an arbitrary fancy
or perhaps a mere play upon words, from which no profound consequences could
be drawn. (1970: 63–4)
Frege admits that taking truth-values as objects can look like an arbitrary stipulation
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from which no meaningful consequence can be inferred. As we’ve seen, this statement
is followed by this passage:
What I mean by an object can be more exactly discussed only in connexion with
concept and relation. I will reserve this for another article (i.e., ‘On Concept
and Object’). But so much should already be clear, that in every judgement, no
matter how trivial, the step from the level of thoughts to the level of reference (the
objective) has already been taken. (Frege 1892c: 64)
In the first two statement Frege appears to be saying that the meaningful consequences
of taking truth-values as objects can be fully explained only by bringing his distinction
between objects and concepts, which he says he will do in a different paper. Then,
the connective ‘but’ in the last statement suggests that Frege is showing a meaningful
consequence of taking truth-values as objects that is already clear before going to such
(partly) technical points. The meaningful consequence concerns judgement; judging
is taking a step from a thought to a truth-value. If this reading is along the correct
lines, then it is not correct to say that Frege believes that taking truth-values as objects
has no profound consequence. Introducing truth-values as objects is rather necessary
for understanding the act of judgement.
We need an explanation about why it is an important consequence that judging is
taking a step from the level of sense to that of reference. After the argument that the
True is the reference of a sentence, Frege writes:
By combining subject and predicate, one reaches only a thought, never passes from
sense to reference, never from a thought to its truth-value. One moves at the same
level but never advances from one level to the next. (Frege 1892c: 64)
For Frege, the act of predication does not amount to that of judgement. Assume that
an actor on a stage says ‘Caesar is assassinated’. Predication occurs there; the property
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of being assassinated is predicated of Caesar. But an assertion, a speech-act counterpart
of judgement, does not occur. The question is in what judgement consists if it does
not consist in the act of predication.10 That is the problem Frege faces when he tries
to explain the act of judgement. Frege’s solution is, as we have seen, to introduce the
distinction between sense and reference. With it, Frege can now explain that to judge is
to take a step from the level of sense to that of reference. Predicating does not amount
to judging because it does not bring us to the level of reference. This appears to be an
important philosophical consequence of taking truth-values as objects and sentential
references: Frege can meaningfully distinguish predicating from judging.
We still need to explain how the elucidation of judgment as a step toward a truth-
value makes judgment distinguished from predication, or more generally, what judg-
ment as such a step amounts to. The next chapter answers these questions. However,
it already seems to be clear that Frege has philosophical reasons to take the reference
of a sentence to be an object, i.e., the True.
As I’ve said, it is not my intention to raise a doubt against the historical connection
between Frege and value-theoretical neo-Kantianism that I believe the neo-Kantian
reading convincingly shows. Neither is it my intention to challenge the neo-Kantian
reading’s thesis that, for Frege, truth is a value acknowledged in our act of judgement.
The only part of the neo-Kantian reading I find hard to accept consists in its claim
and arguments that it is only for technical reasons that Frege takes truth-values qua
sentential references to be objects. The evidence for it is indecisive, and the evidence
against it is more abundant and robust. However, the insightful observations of the
neo-Kantian reading do not have to come with such a controversial claim. The valuable
10According to Hanks (2015), it is a hard question the Fregean conception of proposition in general
must answer.
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contribution of the neo-Kantian reading, I believe, can rather be fully understood only
if Frege’s claim that truth-values are objects is taken at face value and seriously.11
4.2. The ‘No Entity’ Theory Reading of Frege on Truth
Frege’s arguments we’ve seen in Chapters 2 and 3 conclude that truth is not a property.
We’ve inferred from this conclusion that truth is an object. However, Greimann (2004,
2007) would object to this inference. He insists that like the property reading of Frege on
truth, the object reading does not square well with textual evidence. His first argument is
that ‘Thought’ (Frege 1918a) in which Frege mainly talks about truth ‘is not concerned
with determining the logical category of the truth-values; rather, the truth-values are
not mentioned at all’ (Greimann 2004: 438). This seems to show that Frege’s conception
of truth is not related to the True. Greimann’s second argument (2004: 438; 2007: 141–2)
concerns the peculiarity of truth Frege points out. In ‘Thought’, Frege remarks:
[...] [W]e cannot recognize a property of a thing without at the same time finding
the thought this thing has this property to be true. So with every property of a thing
there is tied up a property of a thought, namely truth. (Frege 1918a: 328)
Even though Greimann does not take this passage to show that truth is a property for
Frege, he thinks that Frege is here revealing a crucial part of his conception of truth,
which is that predicating truth is always included in predicating anything whatever’
(2004: 438). Truth, Greimann claims, is something that can be predicated although it
is not a property. But the True—an object—cannot be predicated.
Greimann’s third argument against the object reading concerns the indefinability
of truth. Frege (1897, 1918a) famously holds that truth is indefinable. The problem is
11It is well known that Dummett (1993) strongly criticizes Frege’s assimilation of sentences with proper
names. But a number of Frege scholars now do not necessarily agree to those criticisms. See, e.g., Burge
1986, Heck 2012, and Ricketts 2003. Combining their insights with the neo-Kantian reading, I believe,
will lead to a deeper understanding of Frege’s philosophy.
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that the True seems to be definable. Greimann points out that, ‘[i]n order to overcome
the referential indeterminacy of value-[range] terms in his system, Frege identifies in §
10 of Grundgesetze with the value-[range] of the function x’ (Greimann 2007: 142).12
Greimann interprets this fact as showing that Frege defines the True as follows: The
True = –ε( ε). If so, the True which is definable cannot be truth.
If this critique is correct and truth cannot even be an object for Frege, we are lost in
regards to his conception of truth. If truth is neither a property nor an object, what is
it then?
Greimann presents an alternative reading. In this reading whose detail I introduce
below, Frege’s conception of truth consists in what we may call ‘the “No Entity” theory
of truth (the NE-theory)’, the main claim of which is that truth is neither a property
nor an object.13 According to the theory, truth is ‘no thing’. If we fully understand the
NE-theory of truth, Frege’s remarks on truth we have seen are not puzzling anymore.
Or so argues Greimann.
I call this alternative ‘the NE-theory reading’. My first aim is to establish that Frege
cannot accept the main claims of the NE-theory. If my argument is sound, then the
NE-theory reading should be discarded. Also I show that Greimann’s criticism of the
object reading can be satisfactorily responded to.
§4.2.1 explains the NE-theory reading. §4.2.2 is my critique of the reading. §4.2.3
responds to Greimann’s criticisms of the object reading.
12I use ‘value-range’ instead of ‘value-course’ following Ebert and Rossberg’s translation (Frege 2013)
of Grundgesetze.
13Greimann himself calls this theory ‘the assertion theory of truth’ because he thinks that for Frege truth
is something expressed by assertion. Then Greimann claims that truth as such is neither an object nor
a concept. The part where Greimann claims that truth is expressed by assertion essentially depends on
his understanding of ‘· · · is the True’, which we have already criticized in Chapter 2. I do not repeat
this part again here. Instead I focus on the part of Greimann’s reading where he claims that for Frege
truth is a non-entity.
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4.2.1. The NE-Theory Reading of Frege’s Conception of Truth
In §2.3 we have Greimanns’s argument for the Truth Predicate Reading of ‘· · · is true’.
He accepts that
(A1) 〈p〉 is true if and only ifA the truth-value of 〈p〉 is the True
where ‘p if and only ifA q’ or ‘p iffA q’ entails ‘〈p〉 is identical to 〈q〉 and 〈q〉 constitutes the
analysis of 〈p〉’. As we have seen ascribing (A1) to Frege conflicts with his conception of
assertion. But let us set aside those problems and focus on the following problematic
implication of (A1): Truth is a property of thoughts. To say 〈p〉 has the True as its
truth-value is to say that 〈p〉 has the property of having the True as its truth-value. (A1)
looks like the claim that this property of 〈p〉 constitutes the truth of 〈p〉. Frege cannot
accommodate this because truth is not a property for him as the NE-theory reading
itself admits. However, the NE-theory reading claims that the NE-theory of truth has
additional components that cancel out this implication. The NE-theory reading finds
these components in Frege’s conception of saturation (of a concept).
A small reminder would have a merit here. What we call ‘properties’ fall under the
category of concept in Frege’s framework. Concepts are functions the value of which
is always a truth-value. Frege (1891, 1892b) looks upon functions as unsaturated. To
say that a function is unsaturated is to say that a function has empty places that must
be saturated by arguments in order for the function to provide an object as its value.
Concepts are also unsaturated. Saturated, they provide a truth-value as its value. A
concept is thus predicative (Greimann 2007: 128-9).
On the saturation of (a particular kind of) concepts, Frege writes:
In the sentence ‘Two is a prime’ we find a certain relation designated: that of sub-
sumption. We may also say the object falls under the concept prime [...]. This also
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creates the impression that the relation of subsumption is a third element super-
venient upon the object and the concept. This isn’t the case: the unsaturatedness
of the concept brings it about that the object, in effecting the saturation, engages
immediately with the concept, without need of any special cement. Object and
concept are fundamentally made for each other, and in subsumption we have their
fundamental union. (Frege 1906c: 178)
Here, Frege is talking about a particular kind of saturation: Subsumption. He seems
to be suggesting that subsumption as a kind of saturation is not a genuine relation:
Subsumption occurs just because concepts immediately engage with objects by their
own nature and hence no special cement or relation is necessary for that. It also seems
that Frege identifies this kind of saturation with the relation of an object o falling under
C. If so, Frege is here arguing that the relation of o falling under the concept C is not a
genuine relation. That is indeed how the NE-theory reading understands this passage.
Greimann, who suggests the NE-theory reading, writes:
The relation that Frege calls “subsumption” is a special case of saturation. Ac-
cording to the system in Begriffsschrift, this relation holds between an object and a
concept if the result of the concept’s saturation by the object is a fact [...]. (Greimann
2007: 130; italics are mine.)
The consequence of the concept prime’s saturation by the number 2 is 2’s being prime.
2’s being prime is a fact; 2 is prime. Therefore, what Greimann is arguing here is that
subsumption holds between 2 and the concept prime if 2 is prime. Subsumption as such
is naturally identified with the relation of o falling under C; ‘2 falls under the concept
prime’ is equivalent to ‘2 is prime’. What is crucial is that this kind of relation is found
in every sentence. For instance, say John loves Mary. We may say that John stands in
the relation love to Mary. This looks like an example of another type of saturation: the
relation of an object o1’s standing in the relation R to an object o2 (Greimann 2007: 137).
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If subsumption or the relation o falling under C is not a genuine relation, it seems, this
new type of saturation or the relation o1’s standing in R to an object o2 should not be a
genuine entity.
On these different relations, the NE-theory reading claims:
Note that because of the very special role that this relation plays in judgment it
cannot be substituted by ordinary relations. While the role of ordinary relations
is to form the predicative part of judgments, the role of saturation is to connect
this part with the non-predicative parts. Therefore, saturation, subsumption and
kindred relations like the standing of two objects in a relation [...] form a logical
category sui generis: they are, anachronistically speaking, not genuine relations,
but “non-relational ties” whose sole task is to tie the predicative and the non-
predicative parts of judgments together. Let us call these very special relations
“logical relations”. (Greimann 2007: 131)
The NE-theory reading continues arguing that logical relations themselves are ‘neither
saturated nor unsaturated’ (131). This has an ontological consequence, because Frege’s
ontology consists only of the category of saturated entities, i.e. objects, and that of
unsaturated, i.e. functions. Still, logical relations fall under none of those categories.
They are ‘no-thing’ (131). Accordingly, the NE-theory of truth has the following:
(A2) Logical relations are neither objects nor concepts.
Lastly, the NE-theory reading (Greimann 2007: 137–8) attributes the following
claim to Frege:
(A3) The truth-value of 〈p〉 is the True iffA the logical relation relevant
to 〈p〉 obtains.
The NE-theory reading supports (A3) by the following passage from Grundgesetze.
We say that an object Γ stands in the relation Ψ(ξ, ζ) to the object ∆ if Ψ(Γ,∆) is the
True. Likewise we say that the object ∆ falls under the concept Φ(ξ) if Φ(∆) is the
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True. (Frege 1893: 8)14
The logical relation relevant to 〈Φ(∆)〉 is subsumption. Frege seems to be saying that the
fact that the truth-value of 〈Φ(∆)〉 is the True consists in the fact that the subsumption
obtains between Φ(ξ) and ∆, and that the fact that the truth-value of 〈Ψ(Γ,∆)〉 is the
True consists in the obtaining of the logical relation relevant to it. For every thought,
there is always a logical relation relevant to it. Based on the above passage, the NE-
theory reading maintains that Frege would be willing to say that the truth-value of a
thought being the True consists in the obtaining of the relevant logical relation. Hence,
(A3).
By (A1) and (A3), 〈p〉 is true iffA the logical relation relevant to 〈p〉 obtains. By (A2),
we have the main thesis of the NE-theory—the claim that truth is neither a concept
nor an object (Greimann 2007: 147). Hence, there is no problem with attributing (A1)
to Frege. Given (A2) and (A3), (A1) does not entail that truth is a property.
The NE-theory reading seems to fit the textual evidence we have seen in the last
section. It can explain why Frege contends that truth is not a property by saying that
truth is the obtaining of a logical relation that is not even a genuine entity. Because truth
is not even an entity, it is indefinable as Frege argues. Finally, truth is still predicative
because it is a tie among different entities.
However, I argue, Frege is not an NE-theorist of truth.
4.2.2. Frege is not a ‘No Entity’ Theorist
In particular I argue that Frege accepts neither (A2) nor (A3):
14 Greimann claims that ‘Frege explains subsumption in terms of truth’ (2007: 138). It is not certain
that the passage really verifies Greimann’s reading. Nor is it certain that Greimann needs this point
for his main idea that, for Frege, deciding that a thought is true is just deciding that the logical relation
relevant to the thought obtains.
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(A2) Logical relations are neither objects nor concepts.
(A3) The truth-value of 〈p〉 is the True iffA the logical relation relevant
to 〈p〉 obtains.
Let us start with (A2)
Recall that the NE-theory reading ascribes (A2) to Frege by appealing to the follow-
ing passage from ‘On Schoenflies’:
In the sentence ‘Two is a prime’ we find a certain relation designated: that of sub-
sumption. We may also say the object falls under the concept prime [...]. This also
creates the impression that the relation of subsumption is a third element super-
venient upon the object and the concept. This isn’t the case: the unsaturatedness
of the concept brings it about that the object, in effecting the saturation, engages
immediately with the concept, without need of any special cement. Object and
concept are fundamentally made for each other, and in subsumption we have their
fundamental union. (Frege 1906c: 178)
The NE-theory reading, I believe, correctly points out that Frege argues that subsump-
tion qua a kind of saturation is not a genuine relation. On tope of that, the NE-theory
reading also assumes that ‘subsumption’ means ‘the relation of o falling under C’ and
concludes that the relation of o falling under C is not a genuine relation. I will contend
that the assumption leads to a misinterpretation of this passage. Before that, however,
I first flag a problem with the inference of the NE-theory reading.
I remind you of the point that saturating a function is merely providing an argument
for the function. In ‘[Comments on Sense and Reference]’, Frege writes:
Accordingly I call the function itself unsaturated, or in need of supplementation,
because its name has first to be completed with the sign of an argument if we are to
obtain a reference that is completed in itself. I call such a reference an object and, in
this case, the value of the function for the argument that effects the supplementing
or saturating. (Frege 1892a: 119)
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Frege’s point is evident: A function is saturated if it is provided with an argument for
its empty place. A saturated function yields an object as its value.15
The concept prime is saturated by the object 2, i.e., it takes 2 as argument and yields
the True as value. Let us call the saturation of a concept by an object ‘OC-saturation’.
OC-saturation diverges from the relation of o falling under C. The concept prime is also
saturated by 4; it also takes 4 as argument yielding the False as value in this case.
However, 4 does not fall under the concept prime. Of course, the NE-theory reading is
aware of this. That is why it says:
The relation that Frege calls “subsumption” is a special case of saturation. Ac-
cording to the system in Begriffsschrift, this relation holds between an object and a
concept if the result of the concept’s saturation by the object [(i.e., OC-saturation)]
is a fact [...] (Greimann 2007: 130; Italaics are mine.)
The NE-theory reading is taking a case of subsumption as that of OC-saturation where
the relation subsumption also obtains between an object and a concept, i.e., where the
object also falls under the concept.
In the second half of the passage from ‘On Schoenflies’, however, Frege appears to
maintain that OC-saturation in general is not a genuine relation.
· · · the unsaturatedness of the concept brings it about that the object, in effecting
the saturation, engages immediately with the concept, without need of any special
cement. (Frege 1906c: 178)
Say that Frege’s claim concerns OC-saturation in general. To directly proceed from it
to the conclusion that the relation of subsumption or o falling under C is not a genuine
relation, the NE-theory reading should make the following inference: ‘Since a case of
15Also see ‘Function and Concept’ (1891: 24–5) and Grundgesetze (1893: 8). Saturation can also be
explained in the level of sense. See Frege 1923. Here, saturating or completing is simply fulfilling the
empty space of the sense of a concept.
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OC-saturation where the relation of o falling under C also obtains is always a case of
OC-saturation and OC-saturation is a pseudo relation, the relation of o falling under C
is also a pseudo relation.’ This inference is invalid as the following inference is invalid:
‘Since purified water is always water and water is a natural kind, being purified is a
natural kind.’
An immediate response would be that ‘the saturation’ in the previous quotation
just means ‘subsumption’—‘OC-saturation where subsumption obtains between the
object and the concept or where the object falls under the concept’. This response relies
on the fundamental assumption of the NE-theory reading: What Frege refers to by
‘subsumption’ is the relation of o falling under C. Probably, the assumption would be
based on the first two statements of the passage:
In the sentence ‘Two is a prime’ we find a certain relation designated: that of
subsumption. We may also say the object falls under the concept prime [...]. (Frege
1906c: 178)
However, these statements must be read differently. A line-by-line examination of the
passage would help to see this.
Let me present Frege’s second statement altogether with the omitted part:
We may also say the object falls under the concept prime, but if we do so, we must
not forget the imprecision of linguistic expression we have just mentioned. (177)
Quoting this passage, I omitted the second half of this statement because the NE-theory
reading does not explain what Frege means by ‘the imprecision of linguistic expression
we have just mentioned’. However, it is extremely important to see what he means
by that. Frege is pointing out a problem with the locution ‘2 falls under the concept
prime’. The problem is explained in the previous passage.
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[W]e can scarcely avoid using such expressions as ‘the concept prime’. Here there
is no trace left of unsaturatedness, of the predicative nature. Rather the expression
is constructed in a way which precisely parallels ’the poet Schiller’. So language
brands a concept as an object [...]. (177)
The problem is that the phrase ‘the concept prime’ leaves no empty place and hence is
a proper name. Strictly speaking, the concept prime is an object. This is ‘the paradox of
the concept horse’ in ‘On Concept and Object’ (Frege 1892b): The concept horse is not a
concept. This must be what Frege refers to by ‘the imprecision of linguistic expression
we have just mentioned’. Given this problem, we can expect a further problem with
the locution ‘2 falls under the concept prime’. It leads to the contention that the relation
of subsumption is a relation between two objects: 2 and the concept prime. This is
exactly what Frege is saying:
This also creates the impression that the relation of subsumption is a third element
supervenient upon the object and the concept. (178)
However, Frege denies it:
This isn’t the case [...]. (178)
Subsumption is not such a relation. But the relation of o falling under C is. The number
2 surely falls under the concept prime. This is a relation between the two objects: 2 and
the concept prime. What Frege means by ‘the relation of subsumption’ cannot be ‘the
relation x falling under y’.
The problem Frege is dealing with, I believe, is a classical one. Say that the relation
of subsumption obtains between two objects. Say we express this relation by ‘x falls
under y’. In the sentence ‘2 falls under the concept prime’, we find a relation designated:
the relation among 2, the concept prime and the relation of subsumption. We may also
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say that the relation of subsumption obtains between 2 and the concept prime. Note
that the relation of subsumption is again an object. This leads to the claim that there
is the three-place relation of x obtaining between y and z that obtains between the
relation of subsumption, the concept prime and 2. Now, in the sentence ‘the relation of
subsumption obtains between 2 and the concept prime’, we find a relation designated:
the relation among 2, the concept prime, the relation of subsumption and of three-place
obtaining. This regress, an instance of what we often call ‘Bradley’s regress’ (Perovic
2017), is what Frege is getting at. His point is that if we take the relation we designate
in ‘2 is prime’, i.e., subsumption, as a relation that obtains between two items, this
regress is unstoppable. Subsumption must not be such a relation.
In the second half, Frege suggests an alternative understanding of subsumption:
This isn’t the case: the unsaturatedness of the concept brings it about that the
object, in effecting the saturation, engages immediately with the concept, without
need of any special cement. Object and concept are fundamentally made for each
other, and in subsumption we have their fundamental union. (178)
The alternative is that subsumption is a kind of saturation: OC-saturation. Although
Frege is just talking about OC-saturation, I believe that his point is perfectly general.
Functions are unsaturated. Due to its nature, a function immediately saturates itself
with an argument, yielding an object as the value for the argument. A function does
so with each and every possible argument—without any discrimination. No special
cement is hence necessary for saturation in general. Perhaps, this may be one reason
why Frege maintains that a function should always be totally defined (Frege 1891:
33).16 OC-saturation is the case of a single object saturating an one-place first level
concept, i.e., a concept that receives an object as an argument and yields a truth-value
16For the detailed discussion of this point, see Blanchette (2012) and Heck (2012).
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as the value for the argument. What Frege is arguing is that subsumption is just OC-
saturation, which is not a genuine relation. There are different kinds of saturation: The
saturation of a two-place first level function by two objects in order, · · · , the saturation
of an one-place second level function by a first level function, · · · . By the same token,
all of them are not genuine relations.
Now, let us return to the opening of the passage.
In the sentence ‘Two is a prime’ we find a certain relation designated: that of
subsumption. (Frege 1906c: 178)
Substituting ‘Two is a prime’ with ‘Four is a prime’ is fine; the same kind of relation
is designated by the latter. The relation of subsumption is thus introduced qua the
relation that is designated by the sentences of the form ‘n is prime’. Then, Frege says:
We may also say the object falls under the concept prime [...]. (Frege 1906c: 178)
What Frege is saying seems that the locution ‘n falls (or subsumes) under the concept
prime’ is our attempt to capture the relation that is designated by the sentences of
the form ‘n is prime’. Given this locution, it is comprehensible to call such a relation
‘subsumption’. Frege’s point is that subsumption, qua the relation designated by the
sentences of the form ‘n is prime’, must be sharply distinguished from the relation of
n’s falling under the concept prime. The former is just OC-saturation, while the latter is
a two-place relation designated by the misleading locution ‘n falls under the concept
prime’.
What Frege is doing seems to be clear. He is diagnosing that Bradley’s regress is
a pseudo problem that results from us failing to see the unsaturatedness of functions.
If we understand the unsaturatedness of functions, we can also understand that what
obtains between functions and their arguments is not a genuine relation. Therefore,
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the regress does not exist. We fail to see this because natural language names functions
in the way it names objects as it does in the locution ‘2 falls under the concept prime’.
Of course, we cannot avoid that kind of locution in natural language (Frege 1906c:
177). Nonetheless, we need to be careful because the locution misfires. To establish
that it misfires is the whole point of the passage.
Now, the ascription of (A2):
(A2) Logical relations are neither objects nor concepts
to Frege is unwarranted. That is not what he puts forward in the passage. What he is
saying is that saturation is not a genuine relation. In the end, Frege has never said that
‘logical relations’ are not genuine entities.17
Note that the ascription of (A3)
(A3) The truth-value of 〈p〉 is the True iffA the logical relation relevant
to 〈p〉 obtains,
to Frege depends on this passage in Grundgesetze:
We say that an object Γ stands in the relation Ψ(ξ, ζ) to the object ∆ if Ψ(Γ,∆) is the
True. Likewise we say that the object ∆ falls under the concept Φ(ξ) if Φ(∆) is the
True. (Frege 1893: 8)
The NE-theory reading takes it that Frege is providing a serious philosophical analysis—
as serious as (A3). This cannot be the case. It is not acceptable to analyze a precise
notion by a notion that is not just imprecise but also fundamentally problematic. Frege
would deny these claims if they were to be read as seriously as (A3).
What Frege is doing here is not to put forward an instance of (A3), but to provide
the natural language analogues of the Begriffsschrift expressions like ‘Ψ(ξ, ζ)’ or ‘Φ(∆)’ in
17Frege even never coins the term ‘logical relation’.
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order to elucidate the logical forms of the thoughts expressed by those expressions.
He needs these analogues to make his readers understand the meaning of these odd-
looking strings of symbols.18 In that restricted sense, we can say, Frege is explaining
the Begriffsschrift expressions. However, it cannot be the case that Frege is providing
instances of (A3), which is a philosophical analysis.
Thus, Frege accepts none of the main theses of the NE-theory of truth—because our
discussion in §2.3 shows that there is no reason to think that he accepts (A1). Therefore,
it seems implausible to say that Frege is an NE-theorist of truth.
4.2.3. Greimann’s Objections against the Object Reading
Frege is not an advocate of the NE-theory of truth. Therefore, the NE-theory reading
ought to be given up. Of course, Greimann’s criticisms against the object reading still
remain. In the remainder of this section, I show that his criticisms can be satisfactorily
responded to.
Criticism 1. Frege does not mention truth values at all in ‘Thought’.
I argue that this fact does not show that truth is not the True for Frege. He writes:
The Bedeutung of the word ‘true’ seems to be altogether sui generis. May we not
be dealing here with something which cannot be called a property in the ordinary
sense at all? In spite of this doubt I will begin by expressing myself in accordance with
ordinary usage, as if truth were property, until some appropriate ways of speaking
is found. (1918a: 328–9)
Frege is using the term ‘property’ instead of ‘concept’; he is complying with ordinary
terminology. This is because ‘Thought’ along with ‘Negation’ (1918b) and ‘Compound
Thought’ (1923) is Frege’s attempt to advertise his conception of logic to the people who
18There is a further reason why he is using this kind of locution, which is related to the previous
subject-predicate analysis of content. For this reason, see Frege 1892a.
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are not familiar with his formal system. Therefore, he is trying not to use any technical
term like ‘concept’ here. Given this context, Frege’s explicit declaration that he would
follow the ordinary usage of ‘true’ rather appears to show that he is uncomfortable
with the ordinary usage according to which truth looks like a property. Also, the fact
that he does not mention truth-values here seems to only mean that he does not have
to depend on truth being the True in order to make his points in this paper.
In ‘Thought’, the points directly relevant to the nature of truth are centered around
the first few pages (1918a: 325–9) of the paper. All the points in these passages seem
to boil down to Frege’s thesis that truth cannot be a property. The rhetorical question,
‘May we not be dealing here with something which cannot be called a property in the
ordinary sense at all?’, is found at the end of these passages. Furthermore, Frege here
repeats the indefinability argument he gives in ‘Logic’ (1897). As we have seen, the
main point of this argument is that truth is not a property. Now, if it is Frege’s aim
to convince people of the point that truth is not a property, then he must not depend
on truth being the True. If he were to maintain that truth is not a property because
it is the True, nobody would buy into it; for it is a sloppy argument that truth is not
a property because it is an object. Rather, Frege ought to establish that, whatever we
may mean by ‘true’ or ‘truth’, it cannot be a property. If that is what Frege is doing in
‘Thought’, the fact that he does not mention truth values in ‘Thought’ does not show
that he denies that truth is the True.
Criticism 2. Truth must be something that can be predicated.
This criticism is grounded in the following passage from ‘Thought’:
[...] [W]e cannot recognize a property of a thing without at the same time finding
the thought this thing has this property to be true. So with every property of a thing
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there is tied up a property of a thought, namely truth. (Frege 1918a: 328)
However, we should note that the fact that the truth-predication is ubiquitous is one
of the reasons why Frege rhetorically asks: ‘May we not be dealing with something
which cannot be called a property in the ordinary sense at all?’ (Frege 1918a: 328) If
so, we cannot comprehend Frege’s comment ‘with every property of a thing there is
tied up a property of a thought [i.e. the property of truth]’ at face-value. Moreover,
what Frege is pointing out by the ubiquity of truth-predication seems to be the identity
between 〈p〉 and 〈〈p〉 is true〉. We should recall that, from that point, Frege infers that
truth cannot be a property. It is hence not warranted to infer from the previous passage
that truth should be able to be predicated.
Criticism 3: Truth is indefinable while the True is definable.
Certainly, Frege stipulates that the True is the value range of the horizontal, i.e., –ε( ε).
However, it is not evident that Frege is really giving a definition of the True there. In
general, it is very difficult to understand what is going on in §10 of Grundgesetze (Heck
2012: 51). As Greimann points out, Frege is dealing with the referential indeterminacy
of value-range terms, which is left by Frege’s initial stipulation about value-range
terms that ‘–εΦ(ε) = –αΨ(α)’ is coreferential with ‘ a Φ(a) = Ψ(a)’. This stipulation gives
us Basic Law V: (–ε f (ε) = –αg(α)) = ( a f (a) = g(a)). The problem is that this stipulation
for Law V is not sufficient to decide whether an object, which is not given by a value-
range term, is identical with a value-range.19 But the True and the False are not given
by value-range terms. Hence,
[...] the question whether one of the truth-values is a value-range cannot possibly
19This question sounds similar to the Caesar problem from Grundlagen (Frege 1884). Indeed, Frege’s
discussion around §10 is deeply related to the Caesar problem. See Heck (2012: Ch.3).
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decided on the basis of ‘–εΦ(ε) = –αΨ(α)’ having the same reference as ‘ a Φ(a) =
Ψ(a)’. (Frege 1893: 17)
Based on this point, Frege establishes that ‘ironically enough’ (Heck 2012: 91),
without contradicting our equating ‘–εΦ(ε) = –αΨ(α)’ with ‘ a Φ(a) = Ψ(a)’, it is
always possible to determine that an arbitrary value-range be the True and another
arbitrary value-range be the False. (Frege 1893: 17)
Frege’s ‘definition’ of the True comes right after this:
Let us therefore stipulate that –ε( ε) be the True and that –ε(ε = ( a a = a) be the
False. (Frege 1893: 17)
Frege’s ‘definition’ of the True hence comes as a completely arbitrary stipulation. It is by
no means evident that this stipulation, coming out of nowhere, is really intended to be
a genuine definition of the True.20 It is possible that Frege makes this stipulation only
for the sake of his argument that all the expressions of Begriffsschrift are referential.
At the very least, it is controversial whether Frege takes this stipulation as a genuine
definition of the True constituting a part of Begriffsschrift.
It rather seems that Frege distinguishes truth values from value-ranges. He quickly
stops talking about value-ranges after he realizes that his attempted solution to Rus-
sell’s paradox is not successful. However, Frege still talks about truth values after that.
For instance, in ‘[Notes for Ludwig Darmstaedter]’, he writes:
All sentences that express a true thought have the same [reference] and all sentences
that express a false thought have the same [reference] (the True and the False) (Frege
1919: 255)
20 In Frege’s logicism, numbers are defined as value-ranges. To justify these definitions, Frege provides
a long discussion about traditional attempts to define numbers and a detailed analysis of number
statements. This can be one reason why it is hard to believe that this one-line stipulation is intended
to be a genuine, serious, definition of the True. According to Blanchette (2012), Frege did have quite
a sophisticated conception of conceptual analysis and this stipulation is far from Frege’s conception of
conceptual analysis.
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At this point, Frege stops talking about value-ranges. However, he is still talking about
truth-values. If so, it seems, Frege distinguishes truth-values from value-ranges.
Even if the stipulation in Grundgesetze is intended by Frege to be a definition of the
True, however, Greimann’s objection fails to threaten the object reading. Given the
exegesis of Frege’s indefinability argument, what he really argues when he says that
truth is indefinable is that truth cannot be a property and hence cannot be defined qua
a property. Saying that truth is indefinable qua a property is compatible with saying
that truth is definable qua an object. Therefore, Frege’s indefinability of truth does not
go against the object reading in any event.
One might object that, presenting the indefinability argument in ‘Thought’, Frege
does write:
Any other attempt to define truth also breaks down. (1918a: 327)
If this means that truth is not definable qua any kind of entity, the definability of the
True shows that, for Frege, truth is not the True. But the above statement is immediately
followed by this:
For in a definition certain characteristics would have to be specified. (1918a: 327)
Therefore, Frege is talking about definitions that ascribe characteristics to truth. As
we’ve already seen, it is only a property that can have characteristics.21 The character-
istic of a property P is the property constitutive of P that is specified in the definition
of P. Thus, Frege is arguing here that a definition that ascribes characteristics to truth,
i.e., a definition that takes truth as a property, must fail. In other words, he is arguing
that truth is indefinable qua a property.22
21Instead of ‘characteristic’, Künne uses ‘mark’.
22
§4.2 is a modified version of my paper ‘Frege’s Conception of Truth: Two Readings’ (Kim 2019)
published in Ergo, which is an open-access journal.
Chapter 5
Frege’s Conception of Judgment and Assertion
In the previous chapters we have reviewed Frege’s arguments that truth is an object
and responded to the previous readings that deny that truth is an object for him. Now
I turn to addressing various challenges my suggested reading ought to meet. The
first challenge is to explain how we can understand Frege’s conception of judgment as
acknowledgment of truth if truth is the True. I answer this question via dealing with
the puzzles that concern Begriffsschrift’s device for judgment/assertion, i.e., ‘ ’.
5.1. The Judgment-Stroke and the Horizontal
All the well-formed sentences of Frege’s Begriffsschrift (1879a, 1893) have the following
form:1
ξ
1To avoid too much use of italicization, I do not italicize ‘Begriffsschrift’ anymore in this chapter.
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As I’ve said, there are tensions related to the symbol ‘ ’, i.e., Begriffsschrift’s device for
asserting.2 Let us start with in what sense it is a device for asserting.
In ‘Function and Concept’ Frege remarks:
[In my logic] ‘5 > 4’ and ‘1 + 3 = 5’ just give us expressions for truth-values,
without making any assertion. This separation of the act from the subject-matter
of judgment seems to be indispensable; for otherwise we could not express a
mere supposition—the putting of a case without a simultaneous judgment as to its
arising or not. We thus need a special sign in order to be able to assert something.
To this end I make use of [‘ ’], so that, e.g., by writing
2 + 3 = 5
we assert that 2+3 equals 5. (1891: 34)
If we write down ‘2+3=5’, we do not yet perform the act of asserting in Begriffsschrift.
We only express the ‘subject-matter’ of the act ‘separated’ from the act. We assert that
2+3 is 5 only when we put ‘ ’ in front of ‘2+3=5’. In this sense ‘ ’ is a performative for
asserting.3
‘ ’ is constituted by two signs—the vertical and the horizontal stroke. The hori-
zontal stroke is called ‘the content-stroke’ in the early Begriffsschrift (Frege 1879a) and
‘the horizontal’ in the mature Begriffsschrift, i.e., the version in ‘Function and Concept’
(Frege 1891) and Grundgesetze (1893). The vertical stroke is called ‘the judgment-stroke’
in both versions. The judgment-stroke and the horizontal line play different roles. The
sign ‘ ’ is thus a compositional performative.
2The shape of the symbol in the early version of Begriffsschrift (Frege 1879a) is slightly different from
that in the mature version in Grundgesetze (1893). I follow the typesetting of the latter.
3Smith (2000, 2009) deepens the conception of performative that underlies ‘ ’. But I do not introduce
his view here because all I need is a performative in the sense Frege specifies in the above passage from
‘Function and Concept’. Smith completely dismisses the point that the assertion sign ‘ ’ embodies an
act of identification, namely, the act of identifying the True with the reference of a sentence. However,
as we will see, that is the most important point about the assertion sign.
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But the role of ‘ ’ qua a performative for asserting entirely depends on the judgment-
stroke. ‘ 2 + 3 = 5’ is a legitimate Begriffsschrift expression.4 However, we cannot
make any assertion by writing it down. The assertion that 2+3 equals 5 is made only
when we add the judgment-stroke to the left side of ‘ ’. It is because the judgment-
stroke is a performative that ‘ ’ is a performative:
· · · Only the judgment-stroke contains the assertion. (Frege 1893: §5)
However, the judgment-stroke cannot come alone. ‘ 2 + 3 = 5’ is not even a legitimate
expression. It ought to accompany the horizontal line to function as a performative for
the act of assertion. If ‘ ’ is a performative for asserting because the judgment-stroke is
such a performative, why should the judgment-stroke come with the other sign? Why
can’t we make the assertion that 2+3 equals 5 by writing down ‘ 2 + 3 = 5’?5
Here is how the early Begriffsschrift addresses this question. On the content-stroke,
Frege writes:
Not every content can become a judgment by placing before its symbol; for
example, the idea ‘house’ cannot. We therefore distinguish between judgeable
and unjudgeable contents.
The [content-stroke] [...] binds the symbols that follows it into a whole, and
assertion, which is expressed by the means of [the judgment-stroke] at the left
end of the [content-stroke], relates to this whole. [...] The content-stroke serves
generally to relate any symbol to the whole formed by the symbols that follow the
stroke. What follows the content stroke must always have a judgeable content.
(Frege 1879a: §2)
4In the mature Begriffsschrift, the horizontal should be longer when it comes alone (Frege 1893: 9).
5Heck and Lycan 1979 is a pioneering work that examines this question. They seek an answer by
focusing more on the logical/mathematical aspects of Frege’s philosophy. Here, I am seeking an answer
by focusing more on Frege’s philosophical insights. I believe that Heck and Lycan’s answer is compatible
with my answer in this paper.
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So the content-stroke plays two different roles. First, the content-stroke combines the
ideas, expressed by the symbols that follow it, into a judgeable whole. For example,
the content-stroke in ‘ 2 + 3 = 5’ combines the ideas expressed by ‘2’, ‘3’, ‘5’, ‘+’ and
‘=’ into a judgeable whole—the proposition that 2+3 equals 5. Frege writes:
In [the case of ‘ A’], we paraphrase using the words ‘the circumstance that’ or
‘the proposition that’. (Frege 1879a: §2)
Secondly, the content-stroke provides the judgeable whole as the content of a judgment
when we attach it to the judgment-stroke. If we write down the judgment-stroke at the
left end of ‘ 2+3 = 5’, we thereby perform the act of judgment with the proposition—
constructed by the content stroke—that 2+3 is equal to 5. The judgment-stroke ought
to be followed by the content-stroke because, were it not for the content-stroke, there
would be no judgeable whole with which we can make a judgment by writing down
the judgment-stroke.
However, this answer cannot be applied to the horizontal in the mature Begriffs-
schrift because the content-stroke and the horizontal are entirely different from each
other.6 After Grundlagen (Frege 1884) is published, Frege makes the distinction be-
tween the sense and the reference of a term. As we’ve already seen, the horizontal in
the mature Begriffsschrift is related to this distinction that is not introduced at the time
of the early Begriffsschrift. Specifically, the horizontal refers to a concept. The concept
referred to by it, or simply the ‘H-concept’, yields the True when the argument is the
6In Grundgesetze Frege writes: ‘Earlier I called [the horizontal] the content-stroke, when I combined
under the expression “judgeable content” that which I now have learnt to distinguish as truth-value
and thought.’ (1893: §5 fn.2). Thus, the change from the content-stroke to the horizontal is related to the
development of Frege’s understanding of content. Frege regards the change from the content-stroke to
the horizontal as one of the ‘consequences of a deep-reaching development of [his] logical views’ (1893:
X).
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True and the False otherwise. So the following refers to the True:
2 + 2 = 4
The following refers to the False:
2 + 3 = 4
The following also refers to the False:
2
Thus, the H-concept is the concept being (identical with) the True. Given the difference
between the content-stroke and the horizontal, the answer to the above question —‘If
‘ ’ is a performative for asserting because the judgment-stroke is such a performative,
why should the judgment-stroke come with the other sign?’—in the mature Begriffs-
schrift must be different from the answer concerning the content-stroke. The tension
I mentioned earlier concerns Frege’s answer to the question why the horizontal must
follow the judgment-stroke.
Now, let us turn to Frege’s explanation of why the horizontal ought to follow the
judgment-stroke. In Grundgesetze he writes:
Above it is already stated that within a mere equation no assertion is yet to be
found; with ‘2+3=5’ only a truth-value is designated, without its being said which
one of the two it is. (Frege 1893: §5)
Therefore, to write down ‘ 2 + 3 = 5’, i.e., to assert ‘2+3=5’, is to say which one of the
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two truth-values ‖2+3=5‖ is:7
To this end [of asserting] I make use of a vertical stroke at the left end of the
horizontal, so that, e.g., by writing
2 + 3 = 5
we assert that 2+3 equals 5. Thus here we are not just writing down a truth-value,
as in
2 + 3 = 5,
but also at the same time saying that it is the True. (Frege 1891: 34; italics mine)
To assert ‘2+3=5’ is to say that ‖2 + 3 = 5‖ is the True. Here Frege appears to provide a
general elucidation of assertion: asserting that p is constituted by identifying ‖p‖ with
the True. This elucidation suggests the following explanation of the judgment-stroke
and the horizontal:
(AI1) The horizontal is the identity predicate necessary for the act of
(verbally) identifying ‖p‖ with the True, i.e., asserting that ‖p‖ is
the True;
(AI2) The judgment-stroke is the marker of assertoric force so that we
assert that ‖p‖ is the True by attaching it to the horizontal.
I call this explanation ‘the AI (Assertive Identification) explanation’. Though the AI
explanation seems to be plausible, it conflicts with a number of other aspects of Frege’s
mature framework. First, if the AI explanation is along the right lines, Begriffsschrift
encounters a syntactic problem. Secondly, it goes against Frege’s central thesis about
7Since sentences are names of truth-values for Frege, they can take name position in other sentences.
‘Grass is green is the True’ or ‘Snow is purple is identical to there is a largest prime number’ is difficult
to parse, however, and arguably ungrammatical in ordinary English. I’m using the double bars to
aid parsing. They mark where names of truth-values start and end within a sentence, but have no
semantic significance. They are grouping devices, similar to parenthesis in arithmetic or formal logic.
In particular, they do not denote a function.
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assertion repeated in his mature works. Lastly, the AI explanation violates the lesson
from Frege’s indefinability argument—the lesson about how the vicious infinite regress
is produced. §5.2 explains these tensions.
These tensions lead us to serious doubts against the AI explanation. But can there
be an alternative if Frege takes an assertion to be such an identification? The aim of
this chapter is to show that there is indeed an alternative. This alternative is based on
a non-assertive conception of identification according to which an identification is not
an identity assertion but a non-assertive identification. If an assertion is a non-assertive
identification and ‘ ’ is a device for a non-assertive identification, then all the tensions
we will see in §5.2 are completely explained away. The chapter also aims to provide
the evidence that Frege endorses such a non-assertive conception of identification
when he elucidates an assertion as an identification. In our discussion we come to
see how Frege’s conception of judging as acknowledging the truth of a thought is
modified under his objectual conception of truth. In particular, judging that p as such
is equivalent to identifying the True with ‖p‖ non-judgmentally.
After explaining the tensions with ‘ ’ in §5.2, I respond in §5.3 to the objection—
grounded in a popular understanding of ‘ ’—that to take an assertion to be constituted
by an identification is only Frege’s provisional measure for a certain technical issue in
Begriffsschrift. I respond to this objection by establishing that Frege’s elucidation of
asserting as identifying is related to his conception of judging that is also elucidated
as identifying in ‘On Sense and Reference’. §5.4 presents my interpretation of ‘ ’ as a
performative for non-assertive identification.
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5.2. The Tensions
5.2.1. Syntactic Tension in Begriffsschrift
Typically, in logical systems, sentential well-formedness is preserved under the sub-
stitution of an expression included in a sentence with an expression of the same type.
Assume ‘Px’ and ‘Qx’ are predicates and ‘a’ a singular term in a logical system. Say its
syntactic rules imply that ‘Pa’ is a well-formed sentence. Then, the logical system dic-
tates that the result of substituting ‘Px’ with ‘Qx’ in ‘Pa’, i.e., ‘Qa’ is also a well-formed
sentence because ‘Qx’ is also a predicate. Let us call this feature of a logical system
‘syntactic substitutivity’.
According to Taschek (2008: 394), there is a reason why Begriffsschrift ought to have
syntactic substitutivity. For Frege, logic ought to display correct logical structures of
thoughts. This partly means that logic ought to display the correct inferential roles of
different terms clearly. Frege’s classification of expressions into names and different
types of functors is for exhibiting their inferential roles. Therefore, ‘[t]o assume that
two distinct expressions are of the same logical type is to assume that there is no
inferentially relevant difference between them [...]’ (Taschek 2008: 394), whatever their
specific references may be. Therefore, it is a reasonable expectation that Begriffsschrift
would have syntactic substitutivity. It satisfies this expectation in most cases.
However, the horizontal attached to the judgment-stroke is a plain exception to
syntactic substitutivity if the AI explanation of ‘ ’ is correct. According to the expla-
nation the horizontal in the sign is still a predicate, specifically a first-level one-place
concept term.8 Suppose that ‘Φ(ξ)’ is a first-level functor and ‘∆’ is a name of an object
8The horizontal is a first-level functor because the H-concept maps an object to an object. A second-
level functor maps a first-level functor to an object and a third-level functor maps a second-level functor
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that satisfies Φ(ξ). Then,
(1) Φ(∆)
is a well-formed sentence. If the horizontal in (1) is indeed a predicate and syntactic
substitutivity is a strict rule of Begriffsschrift, the substitution of the horizontal in (1)
with ‘Φ(ξ)’ is also supposed to yield a Begriffsschrift sentence. However,
Φ(Φ(∆))
is not well-formed. The horizontal in ‘ ’ is thus an exception to syntactic substitutivity
if the AI explanation is correct.
5.2.2. The Tension with Frege’s Conception of Assertion
One of the points Frege repeatedly makes about assertion is that we ought to dissociate
the act of assertion and assertoric force from predicates.9
Assertoric force which is often connected with the copula or else with the gram-
matical predicate, does not belong to the expressions of the thought · · · (1906c:
177).
In order to put something forward as true, we do not need a special predicate: we
only need the assertoric force with which the sentence is uttered. (1914: 233)
We can find similar claims in a number of Frege’s mature works—as we have seen in
Chapter 2.
According to the AI explanation, the judgment-stroke marks assertoric force and
the horizontal is the predicate to which assertoric force is attached. It is based on the
thought that identifying ‖p‖ with the True is attaching assertoric force to ‘· · · is the
to an object and so on.
9See p.184 of Frege 1979.
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True’ in ‘‖p‖ is the True’. Say Frege indeed believes that
(A-Id) Asserting that p is constituted by identifying ‖p‖with the True.
If Frege also endorses the AI explanation, ‘identifying ‖p‖with the True’ in (A-Id) must
refer to the act of adding assertoric force to ‘· · · is the True’ in ‘‖p‖ is the True’. If asserting
that p is constituted by such an act, we rather need the identity predicate in order to
assert. But that goes against Frege’s own claim that we do not need a special predicate
for asserting. Furthermore, if asserting is always adding assertoric force to ‘· · · is the
True’, assertoric force is monopolized by the identity predicate. Begriffsschrift makes
this implication very explicit if the judgment-stroke marks assertoric force as the AI
explanation states. Recall that ‘ Φ(Φ(∆))’ is not a Begriffsschrift sentence. Writing it
down is not asserting even though we have a predicate and the marker of assertoric
force. There rather seems to be a significant sense in which assertoric force belongs to
the horizontal. But again, that conflicts with Frege’s own claim about assertion.
5.2.3. The Tension with Frege’s Indefinability Argument
Arguably, the AI explanation of ‘ ’ conflicts with what Frege attempts to establish by his
indefinability argument. In my suggested interpretation the gist of the indefinability
argument is that if truth is a property of thoughts and Frege’s conception of judgment
is correct, a vicious infinite regress is produced. To recall how this infinite regress is
produced, consider the following three types of actions again:
(A1) Acknowledging the P-ness of o,
(A2) Judging that o is P, and
(A3) Acknowledging the truth of 〈o is P〉.
In the Fregean conception of judgment (A1) is equivalent to (A2) and we perform (A2)
by (A3). Now, if truth is a property of 〈p〉, judging that p, i.e., acknowledging the truth
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of 〈p〉 is a case of (A1). Thus, one can judge that p only by acknowledging the truth of
〈〈p〉 is true〉, i.e., judging that 〈p〉 is true. Now to judge that 〈p〉 is true, I need to judge
that 〈〈p〉 is true〉 is true. This infinite regress continues forever.
We can re-describe this lesson of the indefinability argument in terms of predication.
Although Frege only has the weak conception of predication under which to predicate
is to form or grasp a thought, we can define predication in the strong sense under his
framework: to strongly predicate a property P of an object o is to be committed to
the truth of 〈o is P〉, i.e., to acknowledge the truth of 〈o is P〉. Le us assume that we
judge that p by strongly predicating a property P of 〈p〉. Then, the latter is equivalent
to acknowledging the truth of 〈〈p〉 is P〉, i.e, judging that 〈p〉 is P. Thus the infinite
regress is produced; for judging that 〈p〉 is P is judging that 〈〈p〉 is P〉 is P. In this
reconstruction the lesson from the indefinability argument can be broken down into
two parts. First, if an act of judging is a committal act of predicating, an infinite regress
is produced. Secondly, if truth is a property of thoughts and Frege’s conception of
judgment is correct, an act of judging comes to be a committal act of predicating.
The regress reading seems to be at least an arguable exegetical position.10 The issue
is that the AI explanation has a result that can easily be expected given the first part of
the lesson from the indefinability argument. Recall: Frege seems to endorse that
(A-Id) Asserting that p is constituted by identifying ‖p‖with the True.
The AI reading basically considers the act of identifying ‖p‖ with the True to be the
committal act of predicating the property being identical with the True of ‖p‖—where
the horizontal stands for the relevant property and the judgment-stroke stands for a
10Whether or not the above infinite regress is the absurdity to which the indefinability argument appeals,
Frege’s conception of judgment produces this regress if truth is a property. Thus, in any event, this
infinite regress is a reason why Frege must avoid the AI explanation of ‘ ’ if he takes assertion to be
constituted by identification.
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commitment by marking assertoric force. That is why to write down ‘ p’ is to assert
that ‖p‖ is the True under the AI explanation. If identifying ‖p‖with the True in (A-Id)
is predicating being the True of ‖p‖, Frege is committed to the following: asserting that
p is constituted by asserting that ‖p‖ is the True. However, asserting that ‖p‖ is the True
is constituted by asserting that ‖‖p‖ is the True‖ is the True. The regress will continue
endlessly. In the indefinability argument, Frege warns us of the infinite regress that we
come to have by making the act of judgment constituted by that of (mental) committal
predication. Nevertheless, he is committed to the same kind of regress by endorsing
the AI explanation, i.e., by making the act of assertion constituted by that of (verbal)
committal predication.
Let me address two objections quickly. One might object that the regress from the
AI explanation is not vicious because ‘· · · is the True’ or the horizontal is a logical
analogue of ‘true’ in English. The point of this objection is that because 〈p〉 is identical
with 〈〈p〉 is true〉 for Frege, 〈‖p‖ is the True〉 is also identical with 〈p〉. As we have
seen, however, when Frege is claiming that ‘true’ is semantically inert, what he claims
is that ‘true’ does not refer to any property. In other words, if ‘true’ were to refer to
a property, it would not be semantically inert. But the horizontal or ‘· · · is the True’
refers to a legitimate property, i.e., the property being the True. There is further evidence
that these identity predicates are not semantically inert: identity predicates in general
cannot be semantically inert for Frege. His explanation of the difference in cognitive
value between ‘a = a’ and ‘a = b’ given in ‘On Sense and Reference’ (1892c) can be taken
to be grounded in the idea that 〈x = a〉 and 〈x = b〉 are different. This idea presupposes
that identity predicates such as the horizontal or ‘x is the True’ have substantive senses
that can be differentiated. So identity predicates are not semantically inert like ‘true’
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in English. Hence, 〈p〉 cannot be identical with 〈‖p‖ is the True〉.
It might be also objected that the infinite regress in this case is not vicious because
predicating the property being the True of ‖p‖ is identical with predicating it of ‖‖p‖ is
the True‖ because ‖p‖ is just ‖‖p‖is the True‖, i.e., the True. But avoiding the viciousness
of this infinite regress in this way is not plausible. This is because by the logic of this
objection we must accept that predicating the identity of ‖2=2‖ is predicating it of
‖2+3=5‖, i.e., that asserting that 2 is 2 is identical with asserting that 2+3 is 5. We
would rather consider ‘‖p‖’ in ‘predicating the property being the True of ‖p‖’ to be like
‘Bruce’ in ‘I believe Bruce is the Batman’. But then, the infinite regress is vicious.
The infinite regress we have from the AI explanation seems vicious. Or, at least,
Frege ought to take it to be vicious. If our interpretation of the indefinability argument
is correct and if Frege adopts both (A-Id) and the AI explanation, he is committing
himself to the very infinite regress which he warns us of in the indefinability argument.
5.3. Is (A-Id) Frege’s Elucidation of Assertion?
Let us take stock here. The AI explanation of ‘ ’ is problematic in various ways. First,
it makes the horizontal attached to the judgment-stroke a plain counterexample to
syntactic substitutivity of Begriffsschrift. Secondly, if (A-Id)
(A-Id) Asserting that p is constituted by identifying ‖p‖with the True.
is Frege’s elucidation of assertion, the AI explanation conflicts with his repeated com-
ments on the nature of assertion, and with the insight the indefinability argument is
arguably attempting to establish. As I have said, I consider these tensions to be the
evidence against the AI explanation.
However, there is an objection to the claim that we should give up the AI explana-
tion due to these tensions. According to this objection, (A-Id) is not Frege’s philosophical
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elucidation of assertion. It insists that the AI explanation is only a provisional measure
for a technical issue in Begriffsschrift and that (A-Id) is at most a ‘background story’
for this provisional measure. The technical issue is related to syntactic substitutivity.
See this well-formed sentence:
2 + 2 = 4
‘2+2=4’ is a singular term. If Begriffsschrift has syntactic substitutivity, the result of
substituting ‘2+2=4’ with any singular term should also be a sentence. The smooth-
breathing ‘–’ refers to a (second-level) function that maps a (first-level) function to its
value-range. The value-range of a function is an object. For instance, ‘–ε( ε)’ refers to
the value-range of the H-concept.11 If we substitute ‘2+2=4’ with ‘–ε( ε)’ in the above
sentence of Begriffsschrift, we have:
–ε( ε)
This is indeed a well-formed sentence in Begriffsschrift.
Say the following is a Begriffsschrift sentence:
2 + 2 = 4
It seems fine to say that, by writing this down, we assert that 2+2 is equal to 4. Now,
recall that sentences are singular terms for Frege. Given the syntactic substitutivity of
11In §11, Frege stipulates that –ε( ε) is the True after he establishes that it is possible to stipulate that a
truth-value is an arbitrary value-range. See Heck (2012: Ch.3) which provides an excellent explanation
about why Frege makes this stipulation. I here use this particular non-sentential name ‘–ε( ε)’ to
bypass the alleged factivity of judgment in Frege. The factivity of judgment does not matter for our
discussion.
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Begriffsschrift, the following would also have to be a well-formed sentence:
–ε( ε)
It is not clear what kind of assertion we make here. It does not seem to make any sense
to say ‘I assert that the value-range of the H-concept’. We can make an assertion only
with the sense of a sentence, i.e., a thought, but not with the sense of a non-sentential
name like ‘–ε( ε)’.
The horizontal attached to the judgment-stroke can prevent this difficulty. Writing
down the Begriffsschrift sentence
–ε( ε)
can be regarded as asserting that –ε( ε) is the True where the predicate ‘is the Truth’
given by the first horizontal. Because ‘ –ε( ε)’ is a sentence in an intuitive sense,
there seems to be no problem with saying that writing the above sentence of Begriffs-
schrift is asserting. According to scholars like Taschek (2008), the horizontal attached
to the judgment-stroke works as a sentence generator in that ‘ ξ’ is always a sentence of
the form ‘ξ is the True’ whatever may come into the place of ‘ξ’. Even if we substitute a
non-sentential name like ‘–ε( ε)’ with ‘ξ’ in ‘ ξ’, the horizontal ensures that what fol-
lows the judgment-stroke is a sentence. The horizontal attached to the judgment-stroke
solves the potential difficulty with taking sentences as singular terms.12
Recall (A-Id):
(A-Id) Asserting that p is constituted by identifying ‖p‖with the True.
Taking ‘identifying ‖p‖with the True’ to mean ‘asserting that ‖p‖ is the True’ as the AI
12Dummett (1993: 315) also writes that the horizontal ‘in effect turns any singular term into a sentence.’
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explanation implies, the objection under consideration argues that Frege endorses (A-
Id) merely to resolve the technical issue we have seen, i.e., to introduce the horizontal
as a sentence-generator. Then, (A-Id) ought to be regarded as a suggestion like this: ‘In
Begriffsschrift let us pretend that (A-Id) is true so that we can avoid the technical issue’.
The gist of this objection is that such a provisional measure does not have to be in tension
with Frege’s philosophical claims. Surely, the tension between the horizontal in ‘ ’ and
syntactic substitutivity remains unresolved. Still, allowing a few counterexamples to
syntactic substitutivity appears to be a small price to pay if, by doing so, Frege can
retain his conception of sentences as names and the undeniable fact that asserting is
always asserting a sentence.
I concede that the suggested reading is an open option. Nonetheless, I am reluctant
to accept it. One reason is that Frege never says that (A-Id) and the AI explanation are
provisional measures for logic although it is reasonable in this case to expect that he
would do so. For him the nature of assertion is important to understanding logic. That
is why Frege makes a number of comments on it. Now, the endorsement of (A-Id) is a
big decision on the nature of assertion; it makes assertion fall under the kind of activity
we can perform with a non-sentential name, i.e., identification. Given the importance
of assertion for Frege, if (A-Id) and the AI explanation were just provisional and did
not reflect his thoughts about its nature, he would flag it explicitly. But Frege never
does so.
More crucially, there is strong evidence that (A-Id) is his philosophical elucidation
of assertion. This evidence is found in the relation of asserting to judging in Frege. He
writes:
(2) The acknowledgement of the truth of a thought - the act of judgment
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(3) The manifestation of this judgment - assertion (1918a: 329; italics mine)
Frege also says that an assertion ‘communicates’ (1897: 139) or ‘gives an expression
to’ (1906a: 185) an act of judgment.13 I attempt to establish that this relation holds for
Frege because for him the act of judging that p is that of (mentally) identifying ‖p‖with
the True. If so, then there is a reason to believe that (A-Id) is not a mere provisional
measure for Begriffsschrift but Frege’s philosophical claim based on his understanding
of the relationship between asserting and judging.
In ‘On Sense and Reference’, Frege writes:
But so much should already be clear, that in every judgment, no matter how
trivial, the step from the level of thoughts to the level of reference (the objective)
has already been taken. (Frege 1892c: 64)
Judgments can be regarded as advances from a thought to [its] truth value. (65) 14
According to this elucidation, to judge that p is to take a step or advance from 〈p〉 to
its reference. This elucidation of judgment is metaphorical. One observation is that he
does not try to explain this metaphor further—as if he thinks that sufficient hints on it
are already provided. Indeed, I believe, he leaves hints on this metaphor in the earlier
parts of the paper.
The first hint is that we can take the same kind of step even with a non-sentential
name:
· · · it is doubtful whether the name ‘Odysseus’ · · · has reference · · · . · · · Whoever
does not admit the name has reference can neither apply nor withhold the predi-
13I acknowledge that in Frege the act of judging ought to be distinguished from the epistemic status we
assign to a thought by judging. The distinction is important to understanding Frege’s anti-psychologism
of logic. As ‘Thought’ clearly shows, what is manifested by an assertion is not a judgment as a special
epistemic status, but a judgment as an act. In the following discussion, ‘judgment’ uniquely means ‘the
act of judging’.
14Frege 1970 uses ‘a’ for the translation instead of ‘its’. The original word is ‘seinem’ that means ‘its’.
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cate. But in that case it would be superfluous to advance to the reference of the name.
(1892c: 62; italics mine)
It is the striving for truth that drives us always to advance from the sense to the
reference [of a name such as ‘Odysseus’]. (63; italics mine)
So Frege takes the act of judging to fall under the category of the act we can perform
with not only sentences but also non-sentential names. This observation already points
to the possibility that Frege considers the act of judgment to be that of identification
which we can also perform with non-sentential names.
Let us go further. Frege states that there is no point in taking a step from the sense
of a name to its reference if we believe that the name does not have a reference. This
statement is related to the second hint on the metaphor ‘taking a step’, which concerns
the epistemic gap between the sense of a name and its reference. After providing his
explanation of the difference in cognitive value between ‘a = a’ and ‘a = b’ based on
his sense-reference distinction, Frege writes:
Comprehensive knowledge of the reference would require us to be able to say
immediately whether any given sense belongs to it. To such knowledge we never
attain. (Frege 1892c: 58)
Frege is arguing that it is necessary for the comprehensive knowledge of an object to
have the ability to decide whether any sense given to us belongs to the object. He
appears to conclude that we never have such knowledge because this condition has
never been met. Then, this implies that the knowledge of the sense of a name does not
immediately lead to the knowledge of its reference. For, if the former directly led to
the latter, we could say if any sense given to us belongs to a certain object. The sense
of a name does not even inform whether the name has a reference:
In grasping a sense, one is not certainly assured of a reference. (58)
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We can comprehend 〈Odysseus〉 in ‘Odysseus fought in the Trojan war’; but we do not
know if the name has a reference. In these senses, there is an epistemic gap between
a name’s sense and its reference. Taking a step from a name’s sense to its reference is
related to this epistemic gap
Let us check what the gap between a name’s sense and its reference involves. Let
‘N’ be an arbitrary name whose sense is grasped by us. First, 〈N〉 alone does not tell
us whether
(Gap1) ‘N’ has a reference.
Let ‘Na’ be any name such that we already grasp its sense 〈Na〉 and recognize the
existence of its reference. Say 〈N〉 differs from 〈Na〉. 〈N〉 alone does not say whether
(Gap2) 〈N〉 belongs to Na.
Now, what does the act of ‘saying’ or deciding whether 〈N〉 belongs to Na amount to?
To answer, we ought to take it into account that Frege is putting forward the epistemic
gap between a name’s sense and its reference right after he puts forward the distinction
between sense and reference to explain why the cognitive value of ‘a = b’ is different
from that of ‘a = a’. The epistemic gap between sense and reference constitutes his
explanation of how the difference between 〈a〉 and 〈b〉 yields the cognitive difference
between ‘a = a’ and ‘a = b’. In the case of ‘a = a’, as soon as we grasp 〈a〉, we come to
know that ‘a = a’ is true if ‘a’ has a reference. We cannot do so in the case of ‘a = b’. Say
we grasp 〈b〉 and recognize the existence of b. Even if we grasp 〈a〉, we cannot know
whether ‘a = b’ is true if ‘a’ has a reference, because 〈a〉 does not tell us whether it
belongs to b. Only by additional investigations one can decide whether 〈a〉 belongs to
b and eventually whether a is b. Given this reading, we can say, deciding whether 〈a〉
belongs to b must be an act of producing the knowledge that ‘a = b’ is true (or false).
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In general, deciding whether (Gap2) is true amounts to deciding whether
(Gap2*) N is identical with Na.
Note that trying to decide if (Gap2*) is the case has no point if we deny (Gap1)—just as
taking a step from 〈Odysseus〉 to its reference is ‘superfluous’ if ‘we do not admit the
name “Odysseus” has reference’ (Frege 1892c: 62). Then, taking a step from the sense
of ‘N’ to its reference must be deciding whether (Gap2*) is the case for a certain ‘Na’.
Judging that p is constituted by taking a step from 〈p〉 to its truth-value. The latter is
deciding whether 〈p〉 belongs to a truth-value, specifically, the True. In particular, it is
deciding that 〈p〉 belongs to the True. To decide that 〈p〉 belongs to the True is to decide
that ‖p‖ is the True, i.e., identifying ‖p‖with the True. Judging that p is thus constituted
by identifying ‖p‖with the True. Given Frege’s endorsement of (A-Id)—the claim that
asserting that p is constituted by identifying ‖p‖ with the True—we can now explain
why Frege claims that an act of assertion to ‘communicate’, ‘give an expression to’, or
‘manifest’ an act of judgment. An assertion qua a verbal identification is a manifested,
expressed, and communicated form of the identification that we mentally perform in
our act of judgment. Now, ‘ ’ qua an assertion device makes this relationship explicit
by representing the act of judging that p qua that of identifying ‖p‖ with the True.15 If
so, (A-Id) does not look like a mere provisional measure for Begriffsschrift. It is rather
tightly connected to Frege’s conception of judging that is also tightly connected to his
distinction between sense and reference and his understanding of the cognitive value
of identity sentences.
15Frege takes ‘ ’ to be a ‘Begriffsschrift representation of a judgment’ (1893: §5). One might wonder
if ‘judgment’ here means a judgment qua an epistemic status. See Footnote 19. First, it is possible for
Frege to mean both the act of judging and the epistemic status. Hence, choosing one reading is not
necessarily rejecting the other reading. Secondly, Frege calls ‘ ’ a representation of a judgment right
after he says a judgment is the acknowledgment of the truth of a thought that is taken by him to be ‘the
act of judgment’ (1918a: 329).
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The suggested reading of the relationship between assertion and judgment in Frege
has an additional exegetical merit. Specifically it can explain away an apparent tension
between assertion, judgment, and lying.
In ‘A lied in saying he had seen B,’ the subordinate clause designates a thought
which is said (1) to have been asserted by A (2) while A was convinced of its falsity.
(Frege 1892c: 66fn)
If a liar assertively says ‘57+68 is 122’ to deceive a child who has not learned to do
addition with numbers larger than 5, what the liar is doing is asserting that 57+68 is
122. This seems to conflict with Frege’s claim that assertion manifests judgment. The
liar does not manifest the judgment that 57+68 is 122. It is precisely because the liar
never judges that 57+68 is 122 that the liar is a liar. But this tension can be explained
away now. Assertion is manifested identification one can perform in one’s judgment.
In that sense assertion manifests judgment. If it is in that sense that assertion manifests
judgment, the fact that one asserts that p does not entail that one judges that p.
If my reading of the relationship between judgment and assertion in Frege is along
the right lines, the tensions in §5.2 cannot be explained away by saying that (A-Id) is
not Frege’s genuine elucidation of assertion. The possibility we need to consider now
is that the AI explanation is not how Frege implements (A-Id) in Begriffsschrift.
5.4. Assertion as Non-Assertive Identification
The AI explanation leads to the tensions we have seen because it takes the act of iden-
tifying ‖p‖with the True to be that of asserting that ‖p‖ is the True, which is equivalent
to attaching assertoric force to ‘· · · is the True’ (the tension with Frege’s remarks on
assertion) or predicating being the True of ‖p‖ (the tension with the indefinability argu-
ment). What Frege needs in order to avoid these tensions is an alternative to assertive
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identification, i.e., non-assertive identification.
Consider the speaker-reference in the following circumstance. Say I am talking to
my friend Tom in front of my department building. Tom and I see a person walking
toward us. She is my other friend Maggie. But I misidentify her as Mary who is also
my friend and say to Tom ‘Mary is coming here’. I am speaker-referring to a person by
‘Mary’. But whom am I speaker-referring to? The person I am intending to talk about
by uttering this sentence is Maggie who is actually coming toward the department
building. If so, then it appears to be plausible that I am speaker-referring to Maggie by
‘Mary’. Nevertheless, saying only this fails to capture a crucial aspect of the situation:
Because I am using the sentence literally, my intention is, at least partially, to talk
about Mary. Therefore, I am intending to talk about Maggie qua Mary. The best way to
capture the situation seems to be saying this: (SI) I am speaker-referring to Maggie by
‘Mary’ and thereby (mistakenly) identifying Maggie with Mary. Then, I am intending
my assertion to concern both Mary and Maggie. If we buy into (SI), then we regard my
speaker-reference to Maggie by ‘Mary’ as a verbal identification of Mary with Maggie.
Nevertheless, it appears implausible that I am asserting that Maggie is Mary by making
this speaker-reference.16 By assertively uttering ‘Mary is coming here’, I make only
one assertion. My speaker-reference is only a proper part of it. My speaker-reference
seems to be a non-assertive identification if it is indeed an identification.
But do not get me wrong: I am not advocating a conception of speaker-reference,
but only exploring the possibility of non-assertive identification. This speculation does
have a predecessor: Ruth Millikan (1998, 2000, 2017). She suggests a non-judgmental
16Scholars like Heck (2012) and Textor (2010) even claim that, for Frege, to acknowledge the truth of
〈p〉 is to ‘refer to the True via 〈p〉’. Although they do not specify what kind of reference they mean by
‘refer’ there, it must be speaker-reference.
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conception of identification. According to Millikan, to identify an object is to use our
substance concept of the object, which is an ability or know-how to re-identify the object
(2000: 9). Specifically, the substance concept of an object is an ability to re-identify the
object by various media like perceptions or language. Detailing the notion of substance
concept goes beyond the scope of this chapter. The point is that re-identifying an object
by the substance concept of it is not making an identity judgment. Millikan writes:
· · · You don’t make claims when you stand up to walk just because it’s possible you
could trip and fall. Similarly, you don’t make claims when you develop substance
concepts or when you mark identities in thought. Erroneous identification is not
failure on the level of know-that but failure on the level of know-how. · · · There is
no such thing as an identity judgment. · · · Grasping an identity is not remotely like
harboring an intentional attitude [i.e., making a judgment]. Similarly, mistaking
an identity is not harboring a false belief [i.e., making a false judgment]. (2000:
§12.7)
In Millikan (2000: §1.7)’s framework, my speaker-reference to Maggie by ‘Mary’ can
be considered to be an attempt to re-identify Mary verbally, i.e., a verbal application of
my substance concept of Mary. My identification goes wrong because my substance
concepts of Mary and of Maggie are not strong enough to enable me to identify Mary in
the given situation. Therefore, my speaker-reference is a non-judgmental identification
performed verbally, which seems to amount to a non-assertive identification. Thus, in
this theory, we come to have the notion of a non-assertive identification qua a verbal use
of a substance concept of an object. It is not my intention to defend Millikan’s theory of
identification. However, her discussion shows that it is arguably possible to develop
the notions of non-judgmental identification and of non-assertive identification.
I take it to be defensible that we can develop the notion of non-assertive identifica-
tion. What is important is that if we apply the notion of non-assertive identification to
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‘ ’, we can develop an entirely different interpretation of it while retaining the thought
that it is a performative for identification. Consider the following:
(2) 2 + 3 = 5
The sense of (2) is an identity thought: 〈‖2+3=5‖ is the True〉 where the sense of the
horizontal constitutes a part of this identity thought. Now, the AI explanation takes
the judgment-stroke in
(3) 2 + 3 = 5
to attach assertoric force to the horizontal qua a predicate of the identity sentence (2).
This is how the AI explanation makes ‘ ’ a device for predicative identification that is
equivalent to assertive identification. Instead, let us say the judgment-stroke in (3)
(i) cancels the effect of the horizontal qua a predicate, i.e., constructing the identity
sentence (2)
and thereby (ii) turns the horizontal into a performative for identifying ‖2+3=5‖
with the True non-predicatively and thus non-assertively.
Call such a performative ‘T-identifier’. If ‘ ’ is the T-identifier, to write down (3) is to
identify ‖2+3=5‖ with the True without predicating the property being the True of ‖p‖
and thus without asserting that ‖2+3=5‖ is the True. The horizontal alone is just an
identity predicate, and hence it is not a performative. It is (a part of) the performative
only when it is attached to the judgment stroke. So the judgment-stroke constructs a
performative out of an identity predicate, of the form ‘x = O’, connected to it. The
act of assertion is contained only in the judgment-stroke because the judgment-stroke
is a performative-forming operator. The performative we acquire through combining
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the judgment-stroke and ‘x = O’ is an O-identifer. Logic requires the T-identifier; for
assertion is the logically fundamental activity and it is constituted by non-assertive
identification of the True.17 Hence, the judgment-stroke ought to be followed by the
identity predicate ‘x is the True’, i.e., the horizontal.
If this interpretation of ‘ ’ is correct, then the potential tensions which we have seen
in §2 entirely disappear. First, the horizontal attached to the judgment-stroke is not a
counterexample to syntactic substitutivity because it is not a functor at all. Through
the judgment-stroke attached to it, it is turned into the T-identifier, which is purely a
performative. Geach (Anscombe and Geach 1961) is almost correct in looking upon
‘ ’ as a primitive sign; for it is primitive qua a performative in that, without either
of the judgment-stroke and the horizontal, it cannot be a performative. What Geach
is missing is a rationale for its compositionality, which is provided by our reading.
Secondly, if the suggested reading is along the right lines, there is no tension between
‘ ’ and Frege’s conception of assertion. For the horizontal attached to the judgment-
stroke is not a part of identity sentences of the form ‘x is the True’. It is a part of
the performative ‘ ’. Therefore, although the judgment-stroke produces assertoric
force by turning the horizontal into the T-identifier, that does not imply that assertoric
force belongs to the horizontal qua an ‘expression of thoughts’. Because the horizontal
attached to the judgment-stroke is not a predicate, it does not make Frege committed
to the thought that we need a special predicate for assertion. Of course, we need the
horizontal to formulate the T-identifier. However, that does not entail that we need
the predicate for asserting. What we need for asserting is just the act we perform with
17This point only applies to Frege’s mature career. His early conception of judgment and assertion is
different. In the early Begriffsschrift Frege takes judgment and assertion to be predication of truth or
facthood (1879a: §2). The indefinability argument Frege develops in his mature career shows that his
conception of judgment/assertion has changed.
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the T-identifier, not the ingredients of the T-identifier. Lastly, (A-Id) does not produce
the kind of the vicious infinite regress Frege points to in his indefinability argument.
Accepting (A-Id) leads to the regress only when we are also committed to the idea
that identifying ‖p‖ with the True is predicating the property being the True to ‖p‖ that
is equivalent to asserting that ‖p‖ is the True. Reading as the T-identifier, we are not
committed to it anymore.
Is the suggested explanation of ‘ ’ what Frege has in mind? There is some evidence
that it is. Recall the passage from ‘Function and Concept’:
· · · By writing
2 + 3 = 5
we assert that 2+3 equals 5. Thus here we are · · · saying that it is the True. (1891:
34; italics mine)
Describing the act of identification of ‖2+3 = 5‖with the True, Frege uses ‘say’ (‘sagen’)
instead of ‘assert’ (‘behaupten’). This seems to show that Frege is reluctant to consider
this identification to be an identity assertion. One might claim that Frege is merely
hiding the circularity of his elucidation of assertion here. Maybe. But if Frege is trying
to hide the circularity, that only indicates that he is already aware of it and realizes that
the relevant act of identification must not be that of assertive identification.
Notice that for Frege, judging that p—like asserting that p—must be (mentally)
identifying ‖p‖ with the True non-judgmentally. If it were the act of judging that ‖p‖ is
the True—i.e., predicating the property being the True of ‖p‖—the vicious infinite regress
we see in the indefinability argument would be produced. Keeping this point in mind,
let us return to Frege’s elucidation in ‘On Sense and Reference’ that the act of producing
the knowledge that a is b is that of deciding that 〈a〉 belongs to b. If what Frege has in
mind were judgmental identification, he would be able to say simply that we produce
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the knowledge that a is b by judging that a is b. However, Frege instead elucidates our
cognitive activity for achieving the identity knowledge as the activity of relating one
name’s sense to the reference of the other name—even endorsing the cryptic metaphor
‘taking a step’. Frege seems to be trying hard to formulate the idea of non-judgmental
identification.18 He applies this metaphorical elucidation to the act of judgment, which
implies that he takes the act of judgment as that of non-judgmental identification, i.e.,
an identification that is not an identity predication. The sign ‘ ’ represents a judgment.
If a judgment is such a non-judgmental/non-predicative identification for Frege, that
provides a good reason to take the sign to be the T-identifier—the performative for an
identification that is not constituted by an identity predication.
Furthermore, ‘ ’ as it is given in Begriffsschrift can be considered as the T-identifier.
It is the official explanation of ‘ ’ that by writing down ‘ 2+3 = 5’ we identify ‖2+3=5‖
with the True. Hence, the sign is a performative for identification with the True. The
horizontal attached to the judgment-stroke cannot be replaced by a functor of the same
type, or of any other type, which implies that it is not a predicate anymore. Hence, the
sign ‘ ’ as it is precisely fits our description of it as the T-identifier.
Our discussion shows how Frege understands judging as acknowledging the truth
of 〈p〉. In a nutshell, we acknowledge the truth of 〈p〉 by non-judgmentally identifying
the True with ‖p‖, saying that 〈p〉 belongs to the True, or taking a step from 〈p〉 to the
True. Understanding judging in that way, Frege can happily combine his idea that
truth is an object and that judging is acknowledging the truth of 〈p〉. Furthermore, he
can avoid the vicious infinite regress he is pointing to in the indefinability argument.
18There is a similarity between Frege and Millikan relevant to this point. Millikan claims that when we
accept ‘o1 is o2’, what we do is not to make a identity judgment but to realize the ‘overlap’ (2000: 144) of
two contents on a single object. Realizing the overlap of contents, which Millikan calls ‘co-identifying’,
seems to be quite similar to Frege’s deciding whether a sense belongs to the reference of a known name.
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5.5. Appendix: Other Uses of the Horizontal
Closing this chapter I would like to deal with an important objection to my suggested
reading of the horizontal attached to the judgment-stroke. The objection is that my
reading must be rejected because it can’t explain other uses of the horizontal, e.g., why
the negation-stroke in ‘ ’ (the vertical line) must accompany horizontals (the lines on
the sides of the negation-stroke).
This objection assumes that there must be a single unified explanation that can
be applied to all the different uses of the horizontal in Begriffsschrift. However, I do
not share this assumption. The horizontal is just an identity predicate that can serve
different purposes. Then, it is at least equally plausible to assume that different uses
of the horizontal are underwritten by different rationales. I justify this assumption by
addressing the case of the negation-stroke and the horizontals attached to it.
First, we ought to note that the negation-stroke alone does not refer to a function.
Say it refers to a function. It must be one that can have an argument of the form ‘ ∆’,
i.e., a first-level function that maps an object to an object. For Frege a function must
always be totally defined:
It is essential that · · · ‘a + b’ should always have a reference whatever signs for
definite objects may be inserted in place of ‘a’ and ‘b’. This involves the requirement
as regards concepts that, for any argument, they shall have a truth-value as their
value · · · . · · · The requirement of the sharp delimitation of concepts thus carries
along with it this requirement for functions in general that they must have a value
for every argument. (Frege 1891: 33)19
If the negation-stroke itself refers to a function then the function must also be defined
for, say, 2. If the function denoted by the negation-stroke is defined for 2, then ‘ 2’
19There is a debate about whether the domain of Begriffsschrift is restricted. See Blanchette 2012 and
Heck 2012 for this debate.
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must be a legitimate expression of Begriffsschrift. But it is not a legitimate expression
at all. Thus, the negation-stroke alone does not refer to a function. It is a special sign
that constitutes a function-name only with horizontals attached.
Then what is it that the negation-stroke as such a special sign embodies? I think
it embodies what Frege (1918b: 357) calls ‘a negating word’. A negating word has
special features: it ‘may occur anywhere in a sentence’ (1918b: 353) and depending
on which part of a sentence it is attached to, a resulting thought varies. Therefore, a
negating word alone cannot denote a function. It can refer to a function only when it
is combined with a part of a sentence (e.g., ‘All cats are not dogs’ and ‘Not all cats are
dogs’). The negation-stroke qua a negative word is always attached to the horizontal
‘· · · is the True’ on its right side and thereby constitutes ‘· · · is not the True’. Thus ‘ ’
refers to ‘a concept under which all objects fall with the sole exception of the True’
(1893: §6). The fact that the negation-stroke can only have the horizontal on its right
side means just that ‘· · · is not the True’ is the only negation necessary for logic. Now,
the horizontal on the left side of the negation-stroke is related to the point that logic
does not need negative judgment (1918b: 355–7). Now if we write down
2 + 3 = 4
we judge that it is not the case that 2+3 is 4. In that case, can’t we consider ‘ ’ to be
a sign for negative judgment—denying that 2+3 is 4? The answer is ‘No’. ‘ ’ is not a
performative for negative judgment due to the left horizontal: ‘ ’ comes from ‘ ’ by
the fusion of horizontals that combines consecutive horizontals into one. The one and
only performative in Begriffsschrift is ‘ ’ that is for (positive) judgment.
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Thus Frege’s own elucidation of negation leads to the rationale for the horizontals
attached to the negation-stroke, which is different from the rationale that underlies the
horizontal attached to the judgment-stroke. This result supports my assumption that
different uses of the horizontal have different rationales. Of course, there are other
uses of the horizontal to be explained, i.e., the horizontals in the conditional-stroke or
in the universal quantifier. Here, the vertical stroke is the conditional-stroke and all
the short horizontal lines are horizontals. Although I do not pursue this explanation
here, I indicate the fact that the answer to the question why the horizontals must be
attached to the conditional-stroke can be retrieved in Frege’s conception of conditional
thought (cf. Frege 1923).
Chapter 6
Knowledge, Science, and Logic in Frege
It is not an easy task to decode Frege’s conception of logic. The first question concerning
it is whether Frege has the Tarskian semantic conception of logic. As we have seen,
Greimann (2008) insists that Frege has the Tarskian semantic conception of logic—
identifying ‘· · · is the True’ as Frege’s truth-predicate. Nevertheless, as we have seen,
Greimann’s argument that ‘· · · is the True’ is Frege’s truth-predicate is not satisfactory.
Commentators such as Goldfarb (2001), Ricketts (1996), and J. Weiner (2005) argue that
Frege does not have a truth-predicate. For instance, Ricketts writes:
[Frege’s] logical laws do not describe valid forms of argument; they are about
neither sentences nor thoughts sentences express; they do not use a truth-predicate.
(Ricketts 1996: 124)
The gist of Ricketts’s argument is that Frege does not have the Tarskian conception of
logic that requires a meta-linguistic truth-predicate:
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[Frege] has then no semantic conception of logical consequence, in the post-
Tarskian sense of ‘semantic’. (Ricketts 1996: 124)
I agree with these commentators. Frege cannot have a truth-predicate because truth
is not an entity that can be referred to by a predicate because it is an object. Hence, it
seems implausible to think that Frege has the Tarskian conception of logic.
Then what kind of conception of logic does Frege have? Here is one view.
More than this, Frege lacks any general conception of logical consequence, any
overarching conception of logic. Frege has only a retail conception of logic, not a
wholesale one. He tells us what logic is by identifying specific laws and inferences
as logical. · · · [Frege’s conception of logic] does not state a defining criterion of
the logical. (Ricketts 1996: 124)
Frege’s conception of logic is retail, not wholesale. He simply presents various
laws of logic and logical inference rules, and then demonstrates other logical laws
on the basis of these. He frames no overarching characteristic that demarcates the
logical laws from others. (Goldfarb 2001: 30)
According to Goldfarb and Ricketts Frege has the ‘universalist conception of logic’ that
provides only a single necessary condition for being a logical law: a purely logical law
is a ‘maximally general truth’ (Ricketts 1996: 124). Logical laws are topic-universal;
they are ‘the laws of truth for every object, concept, and relation’ (Ricketts 1996: 127).
Of course, not all maximally general truths are logical truths. Therefore, ‘maximally
general truth’ is not an exhaustive description of ‘logical truth’. Frege does not provide
a definition of logical truth because he does not have any ‘overarching’ conception of
logic. Or so argue the proponents of the universalist reading.
In the universalist exegesis of Frege’s conception of logic, truth does not seem to
play a substantive role. This exegesis does not appear to square well with the fact that
Frege takes logical laws to be the laws of truth. However, the universalist reading does
136 Chapter 6. Knowledge, Science, and Logic in Frege
not take this claim to establish that truth plays a substantive role in Frege’s conception
of logic. For instance, Goldfarb writes:
Now Frege does say, ‘Logic is the science of the most general laws of truth.’ But
he does not intend this as the demarcation of logic, only as a ‘rough indication of
the goal of logic’. (2001: 31)
Also, Ricketts writes:
The laws of geometry set forth generalizations concerning spatial concepts and
relations—they are, so to speak, the laws of truth concerning these concepts and
relations. Similarly, the fundamental laws of any special science set forth true
generalizations, laws of truth, for some range of concepts proprietary to that
science. By their topic-universality, the laws of logic are the laws of truth for every
object, concept, and relation—they are the laws of truth simpliciter. (1996: 127)
Thus, in the universalist reading, Frege’s claim that logical laws are the laws of truth
is explained in terms of the generality of those laws, but not in terms of truth.
I can accept that Frege does not have an overarching conception of logic. However, I
hesitate to accept that it is generality that plays all the substantive roles in his conception
of logic. Recall the passage from ‘Thought’:
All sciences have truth as their goal, but logic is also concerned with it in a quite
different way: logic has much the same relation to truth as physics has to weight
or heat. To discover truths is the task of all sciences; it falls to logic to discern the
laws of truth. (1918a: 325)
The point of his claim is not that there is no particular object or property logic takes as
its main subject. Frege’s point is that truth is the main subject of logic. Furthermore,
recall how Frege explains the laws of Begriffsschrift. His explanations—which appear
to be pretty similar to meta-linguistic justifications—heavily depend on the True (and
the False). Given that truth is the True for Frege, it rather seems reasonable to think
that truth plays a crucial role in his understanding of logic.
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The challenge we face here is to construct an interpretation of Frege’s conception of
logic in which he assigns to truth a substantive role in demarcating logic while we can
remain neutral about whether he has a semantic conception of truth like the Tarskian.1
We can construct such a reading by taking it into account that truth is an object for
Frege—specifically by answering the questions that pop up from the above passage
of ‘Thought’ when we take Frege’s truth to be the True. We’ve already raised these
questions in Chapter 1. Frege claims that all sciences aim at truth. Therefore, there is a
single object which all the sciences aim at. How should we make sense of this claim?
Furthermore, if truth is the aim of all sciences, in what sense is logic the sole science
that has truth as its main subject? The answers to these questions eventually lead to the
new reading of Frege’s conception of logic. To answer those questions we need to look
into Frege’s mature conception of objectual knowledge, propositional knowledge, and
the relationship between them. I start with his conception of objectual knowledge.
6.1. Frege’s Conception of Objectual Knowledge
Recall the following passage from ‘On Sense and Reference’.
The sense of a proper name is grasped by everybody who is sufficiently familiar
with the language or totality of designations to which it belongs; but this serves to
illuminate only a single aspect of the reference, supposing it to have one. Compre-
hensive knowledge of the reference would require us to be able to say immediately
whether any given sense belongs to it. To such knowledge we never attain. (1970:
57–8)
‘The reference’ in ‘comprehensive knowledge of the reference’ means ‘the reference of
a proper name’, i.e., ‘object’. Hence, Frege is talking about comprehensive knowledge
1In my thought Richard Kimberly Heck (2007, 2010, 2012) attempts to understand Frege’s conception
of logic in this way. That is, Heck seems to think that although Frege does not have the Tarskian
conception, he still assigns a crucial role to the semantic notions like truth in his logic. What I am trying
to in this section is to develop his idea further.
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of an object in this passage. If we have comprehensive knowledge of the reference of
a proper name ‘O’, i.e., the object O, we have the ability to say immediately whether
any given sense belongs to O. Let us analyze this claim.
First, let us consider the nature of the act of saying that the sense of a proper name
belongs to an object. A special case of this act is judging that p: saying that 〈p〉 belongs
to the True. Frege metaphorically elucidates judging as such to be taking a step from
a thought to its truth-value in order to stress the point that it is a non-judgmental act
of identifying. Hence, saying that 〈p〉 belongs to the True is taking a step from 〈p〉 to
its truth-value, i.e., identifying the True with ‖p‖ non-judgmentally. Recall that Frege
applies the metaphorical elucidation ‘taking a step’ to proper names in general, e.g.,
‘Odysseus’. Accordingly, to say that the name of a proper name ‘N’ belongs to O is to
take a step from 〈N〉 to its reference, i.e., to identify N with O non-judgmentally.
Given that saying that 〈N〉 belongs to O is identifying N with O, it is clearly the
act by which we come to know the identity between N and O. The second thing to be
considered is the nature of knowledge of identity produced by the act of saying 〈N〉
belongs to O. One might think that the knowledge produced is just the propositional
knowledge that N is O. However, that is false. To see this point we first need to check
the relationship between judging that p and knowing that p. In ‘Sources of Knowledge
of Mathematics and the mathematical natural Sciences’, Frege states that he counts
only ‘judgment proper’ (1924: 267) as knowledge. Given that knowledge is rather an
epistemic state while a judgment is an epistemic act, what Frege means seems to be the
following: the state of knowledge is produced by the act of judgment.2 Specifically,
we can say, one produces the knowledge that p by judging that p.
2For the relationship between knowledge and judgment in Frege, see Ricketts 1996 and Textor 2010.
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If so, it follows that the propositional knowledge that N is O is produced by judging
that N is O. The act of producing the knowledge of identity that N is O is that of saying
that 〈N〉 belongs to O. If the act of saying that 〈N〉 belongs to O is that of producing
the propositional knowledge that N is O, then the former must be the act of judging
that N is O, i.e., an act of judgmental identification. However, the act of saying that
〈N〉 belongs to O is not such a judgmental identification. Therefore, the former cannot
be the act of producing the propositional knowledge that N is O. Again, the act of
saying that 〈N〉 belongs to O produces our knowledge of the identity between N and
O. But the knowledge produced is non-propositional knowledge of identity. Now, I
will notate the non-propositional knowledge of the identity between O1 and O2 as ‘the
knowledgenp that O1 is O2’ where ‘np’ means ‘non-propositional’. Our discussion can
be summed up as the following proposition:
(NPKI) The act of saying that 〈N〉 belongs to O is that of producing the
knowledgenp that N is O.
Two clarificatory points. First, it is possible to produce the propositional knowledge
that O1 is O2. We can produce it by judging that O1 is O2. The point we’ve made is that
judging that O1 is O2 is not saying that 〈O1〉 belongs to O2 (or saying that 〈O2〉 belongs
to O1) and that we can perform the latter without performing the former. Second, we
ought to clarify the nature of the knowledge produced by the act of saying that 〈N〉
does not belong to O. Given that saying that 〈N〉 belongs to O is identifying N with
O non-judgmentally, it is tempting to claim that saying that 〈N〉 does not belong to
O is distinguishing N from O non-judgmentally. If so, then the knowledge produced
by saying that 〈N〉 does not belong to O is the knowledgenp that N is not O. As we
have non-propositional knowledge of identity, we have non-propositional knowledge
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of non-identity.3
One more point to be taken into account is that we cannot say whether 〈N〉 belongs
to O only by grasping 〈N〉. This follows from the epistemic gap between the sense of a
name and its reference. The epistemic gap includes the fact that 〈N〉 alone does not say
anything about whether N is identical with the references of names whose senses are
known to us. Therefore, one can say whether 〈N〉 belongs to O only when in addition
to grasping 〈N〉 one does something else that lets one fill the epistemic gap between
the sense and its reference.
Now return to Frege’s point under consideration: if one has comprehensive knowl-
edge of O, one has the ability to decide immediately whether any sense given to one
belongs to O. As we have said, one cannot decide whether 〈N〉 belongs to O only by
grasping the sense. Then it appears plausible to regard comprehensive knowledge of
O as what provides us with the ability to decide whether any sense belongs to O.
Frege says:
To such knowledge we never attain. (1970: 58)
Thus we only have non-comprehensive knowledge of objects. It seems as if to say that
one has non-comprehensive knowledge of O is to say that there are names such that one
cannot say whether the senses of those names belong to O. Here is how I unify Frege’s
points. In general, knowledge of an object is what provides us with the ability to say
3The act of distinguishing the True from, say, ‖2+3=4‖ non-judgmentally is not the act represented by
‘ 2 + 3 = 4’. The latter represents the act of identifying the True with ‖‖2+3=4‖ is not the True‖ non-
judgmentally. One might object that recognizing the act of (a) distinguishing the True from non-True’s
non-judgmentally goes against Frege’s denial that there is an act of (b) negative judgment. But (a) is
different from (b); the former is an act with the True while the latter seems to be an act with the False.
Logic does not need to have a performative for (b) because it is not clear whether (b) exists and even if
it exists, it is unnecessary for the sake of logic to take (b) into account (Frege 1918b). (a) does not seem
to be necessary in logic because logic only cares about judgment and in the level of judging what we do
when we distinguish the True from ‖2+3=4‖ is to identify the True with ‖‖2+3=4‖ is not the True‖.
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whether a given sense belongs to the object. If we have comprehensive knowledge of
O, we have the strongest ability to do so, i.e., the ability to say whether any sense given
to us belongs to O. Now we can introduce the degree or level of one’s knowledge of
an object and also about extending one’s objectual knowledge. Specifically, the more
extended one’s knowledge of O is, the more names one can correctly identify as the
names (or non-names) of O. We never have comprehensive knowledge of an object;
we never have the strongest ability to say whether a given sense belongs to an object.
Thus, for us, there are always names such that we cannot tell whether the senses of
those names belong to an object.
That much is, I believe, what we can retrieve about Frege’s conception of objectual
knowledge from the passage of ‘On Sense and Reference’. I understand that this way
of talking about objectual knowledge can sound implausible and even crazy. However,
Frege is not the only one who holds this seemingly peculiar conception; Millikan (1998,
2000, 2017) does as we’ve briefly mentioned. We will have a chance to talk about this
in §7.3 where we develop Frege’s conception of knowledge by combining Millikan’s
theory of identity. For now, all I am saying is just that Frege has such a conception of
objectual knowledge.
In the next section I turn to Frege’s conception of propositional knowledge. As we
will see propositional knowledge turns out to be grounded in our objectual knowledge
as such, specifically, our knowledge of the True.
6.2. Knowledge of the True and Knowledge-That
Since the truth-value True is an object, we can apply the previous points to the True.
In other words, we can talk about ‘knowledge of the True’. Given the epistemic gap
between the sense of a sentence ‘p’, i.e., 〈p〉 and its truth-value, one cannot say whether
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〈p〉 belongs to the True only through grasping 〈p〉. Our knowledge of the True is what
provides us with the ability to say whether a given thought belongs to the True. When
we use this ability and say that 〈p〉 belongs to the True, we judge that p. By judging that
p, we come to have the knowledge of the identity between ‖p‖ and the True. Therefore,
the act of judging that p is grounded in the ability to say that 〈p〉 belongs to the True.
Because this ability is provided by our knowledge of the True, the activity of judgment
is epistemically grounded in knowledge of the True.
Thus judging that p produces the knowledge of the identity between ‖p‖ and the
True. But this knowledge of identity is not propositional knowledge of identity. Recall
we produce the propositional knowledge that p by judging that p. Assume that judging
that p produces the propositional knowledge that ‖p‖ is the True. Then, judging that
p is judging that ‖p‖ is the True, i.e., identifying the True with ‖p‖ judgmentally. But
judging that p is identifying ‖p‖with the True non-judgmentally. Contradiction. Hence,
the knowledge of identity we produce by judging that p is the knowledgenp that ‖p‖ is
the True.
We produce the propositional knowledge that p by judging that p. But the cognitive
result we produce by judging that p is the knowledgenp that ‖p‖ is the True. Therefore,
the propositional knowledge that p is just the knowledgenp that ‖p‖ is the True. That
is why Frege elucidates propositional knowledge in terms of the relationship among
a thought, a truth-value, and judging.
We can never be concerned only with the reference of a sentence; but again the
mere thought alone yields no knowledge, but only the thought together with its
reference, i.e. its truth value. Judgments can be regarded as advances from a
thought to a truth value. (Frege 1892c: 65)
One might wonder if we should posit a process that turns the knowledgenp that ‖p‖ is
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the True into the propositional knowledge that p. However, Frege says nothing about
such a process. Here, the point that Frege directly regards judgment as knowledge
seems to have significance. Perhaps what he means by that is that there is nothing more
other than judgment we should perform in order to acquire propositional knowledge.
What we have by judging is just propositional knowledge. Hence, we can ascribe the
following to Frege:
(PKID) The propositional knowledge that p is the knowledgenp that ‖p‖ is
the True.4
The knowledgenp that ‖p‖ is the True is produced by the act of judging that p. Judging
is epistemically grounded in the ability to say whether 〈p〉 belongs to the True, which is
in turn provided by one’s knowledge of the True. By (PKID) propositional knowledge
is grounded in knowledge of the True, i.e., objectual knowledge. Hence, we have the
following chart.
4As I’ve said, we can still have propositional knowledge that O1 is O2. We can have it by judging
that p. The propositional knowledge that O1 is O2 is thus the knowledgenp that ‖O1 is O2‖ is the True.
Propositional knowledge of identity is still non-propositional knowledge of identity—of a different
object so to speak. Then, what is the relationship between the knowledgenp that O1 is O2 and the
knowledgenp that ‖O1 is O2‖ is the True? The answer, I think, is that if one has the latter, then one has
the former. By that, I am not pointing out the fact that 〈‖O1 is O2‖ is the True〉 entails 〈O1 is O2〉. The
entailment I put forward is a much stronger relationship we may perhaps call ‘epistemic entailment’.
But it still seems plausible to think that this epistemic entailment obtains between the two pieces of
identity knowledgenp.
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In conclusion, propositional knowledge is grounded in our knowledge of the True.
Based on this point we can explain in what sense all the sciences aim at the True and
in what sense logic is the only science whose main subject is the True.
6.3. Science, Logic, and the True
If we have comprehensive knowledge of the True, then we have the strongest ability
to say whether a thought belongs to the True—the ability to say whether any given
thought belongs to the True. Were infinite time provided, we would be able to have all
pieces of propositional knowledge—achieving omniscience. But we never have such
an ability; we only have non-comprehensive knowledge of the True. Hence, there are
always thoughts such that we cannot say whether they belong to the True. Someone’s
knowledge of the True is more extended than other people’s knowledge of the True.
As one’s knowledge of the True becomes more extended, one comes to be able to say
about more and more thoughts whether they belong to the True.
In the sciences, we come to produce new pieces of propositional knowledge, e.g.,
that the Earth goes around the Sun, that nothing can be faster than light, that Fermat’s
last theorem is true, etc. Therefore, the pursuit of the sciences strengthens our ability
to say whether a given thought belongs to the True. To put it differently, by way of the
sciences, we are extending our knowledge of the True. The sciences, including logic,
are eventually our intellectual activities to extend our knowledge of the True. Thus, in
Frege’s framework, there is a significant sense in which the sciences aim at the True.
They aim at extending our knowledge of the True.
So logic in the same sense aims at the True. However, that can’t be the reason why
logic is the science of the True. In what sense is logic the only science that undertakes
the True as its main subject? A short answer is: logic is the science of the True because
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it examines how far we can extend our knowledge of the True when we only have
knowledge of truth-values, i.e., the True and its counterpart the False. Here is a bit
longer answer. In logic we do not presuppose knowledge of objects other than truth-
values. We recognize objects other than truth-values if our knowledge of truth-values
is sufficient for allowing us to recognize them. In logic we extend our knowledge of the
True within the range which our knowledge of truth-values and of objects recognizable
by our knowledge of truth-values can cover. Let me explain further.
First, let us review the overall structure of Begriffsschrift. The laws of logic are the
thoughts whose truth cannot be rationally doubted. They obviously belong to the True,
i.e., the sentences that express logical laws (law-sentence) are the most obvious names
of the True.5 By writing down ‘ ’ in front of those law-sentences, i.e., by asserting that
those logical laws are true, we identify the references of law-sentences as the True non-
judgmentally. Inferential rules necessarily bring us from these obvious names of the
True to other names of the True. Hence, in logic, we basically extend our knowledge
of the True only via inferential rules and definitions.
The crux is that we do not need to recognize objects other than the True and the
False in order to recognize the truth of the logical laws. One might raise an objection
based on Law V:
(–ε f (ε) = –αg(α)) = a f (a) = g(a))
(Its natural language analogue would be: ‘The value-range of f (x) is identical with that
of g(x) iff for all x f (x) is identical with g(x)’). The objection is that, to recognize the truth
of Law V which introduces the condition for the identity of value-ranges, one ought to
5Say Law I is given by the following: ‘ L1’. What I mean by ‘Law I’ is the thought expressed by ‘L1’.
‘L1’ is a law-sentence that expresses Law I.
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antecedently recognize value-ranges and then have ‘intuitions’ or ‘observations’ about
them. However, see what Frege says about Law V:
· · · If one function (of first-level with one argument) and a second function are
so constituted that both always have the same value for the same argument, then
one may say instead: the value-range of the first function is the same as the value-
range of the second. We then recognise something in common both functions and
this we call the value-range both of the first function and of the second function.
That we have the right so to acknowledge what is common, and that, accordingly,
we can convert the generality of an equality into an equality (identity), must be
regarded as a basic law of logic. (1903a: §146)6
Frege is saying that if we recognize functions that always have the same value for a
given argument, we can recognize the value-ranges of those functions and their identity
conditions. Thus, what we need to antecedently recognize in order to recognize value-
ranges are only functions. Note that as soon as we recognize truth-values, we come
to be able to recognize functions. For instance, if we recognize truth-values, we are
already in the position where we can recognize the horizontal function x that yields
the True if the True is given as an argument and the False otherwise. If we recognize
functions, we are already in the position where we can recognize the truth of Law V.
Thus, our recognition of value-ranges can be grounded solely in our recognition of
truth-values.7 So even in the case of Law V, the only objects we need to antecedently
recognize for acknowledging the truth of Law V are truth-values.8 Then, by way of Law
V and individual functions, we come to acknowledge the existence of particular value-
6The same point is made in Frege 1891 and 1893.
7This can be a reason why truth-values are the ‘most fundamental’ logical objects (Shramko and
Wansing 2018: §1.3).
8In §147 of Grundgesetze II (1903a), Frege is complaining about ‘lawless creation of numbers by many
mathematicians’, contrasting it against his way of recognizing—not creating—value-ranges through
Law V. I believe that this point is closely related to our recognition of truth-values. For examining this
issue in Frege, see Ebert and Rossberg (2019).
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ranges. Logic hence concerns knowledge of value-ranges because our knowledge of
truth-values is sufficient to produce our knowledge of value-ranges. That is the sole
legitimate reason why objects other than truth-values can be introduced in our logical
investigation.
Let us synthesize what we have. In logic, we start with acknowledging that law-
sentences are obvious names of the True. They are the most obvious names of the True;
for we can recognize the identity between the True and the reference of law-sentences
solely through our recognition of the True and the False. From these obvious names of
the True, we proceed to other names of the True. When we do so, we never recognize
the existence of objects other than truth-values unless our recognition of those objects
can be solely grounded in our recognition of truth-values (e.g., value-ranges). Hence,
logic aims to extend our knowledge of the True as far as our recognition of truth-values
allows us to go.
Other sciences are different from logic. The laws introduced by other sciences surely
belong to the True if they are indeed true. However, we cannot recognize their truth
solely by our recognition of truth-values. To recognize the truth of other scientific laws,
we need to depend on our cognitive abilities such as sense perception or the Kantian
intuition (Frege 1924) where we can observe or intuit objects other than truth-values
and their properties. Sciences other than logic hence extend our knowledge of the True
beyond the range our recognition of truth-values can bring us to.
In conclusion, logic can be considered to be the science of the True because its aim
is to extend our knowledge of the True solely through our recognition of the True and
the False. Other sciences aim to extend our knowledge of the True beyond what our
recognition of truth-values tells us. Therefore, other sciences cannot be taken to be the
148 Chapter 6. Knowledge, Science, and Logic in Frege
science of the True in the sense that logic is the science of the True—although they still
aim at the True in a substantive sense.
Recall the universalist interpretation of Frege on logic according to which the notion
of truth does not play a substantive role in distinguishing logic from other sciences.
The reading says that the only distinctive feature of logical laws, provided by Frege
himself, is its utmost generality. That is not true. Logical laws are also the laws such
that the recognition of the truth of those laws does not require anything other than our
knowledge of truth-values. Thus, the notion of truth plays a significant role in setting
the boundary of logic. At the same time, however, that does not mean that Frege has a
meta-linguistic conception of logic like Tarski’s. Frege’s objectual conception of truth
does not require such a semantic conception of logic antecedently.
Our discussion shows that Frege is an advocate of what we may call ‘the scientism
of truth’. He does not attempt to provide any explicit definition of truth not because he
is a primitivist but because truth is what we ultimately investigate into in the sciences
for him. Our knowledge of truth or the True is constantly expanded in the sciences
and we come to know more and more about it. Logic plays an important role in our
effort to expand our knowledge of the True. It solely focuses on truth and thereby lets
us fix what we refers to by ‘truth’: truth is the object to which logical laws obviously
belongs to. One might ask why we can’t just take it as the definition of truth. We can
do so. But doing so does not do any work in our intellectual activities. What matters
is to expand our knowledge of truth constantly by way of the sciences. In this sense,
Frege is suggesting the scientism of truth.
Probably one of the crucial results of our discussion here is Frege’s epistemology. In
our discussion he turns out to have pretty a substantive conception of knowledge. This
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goes against the general consensus in Frege scholarship according to which Frege is
not interested in epistemology and epistemology does not play a significant role in his
philosophy.9 Moreover, his conception of knowledge is not only substantive but also
radically different from any contemporary theory of knowledge. In Frege’s conception
of knowledge propositional knowledge is reduced to non-propositional knowledge of
the identity of an abstract object—the True—and is also ultimately grounded in the
objectual knowledge of this abstract object. This idea deserves thorough examination.
In the next chapter (§7.3) I provide a sketch of a theory of knowledge based on Frege’s
conception of knowledge.
6.4. Appendix: The Aim of ‘On Sense and Reference’
A number of important points of my suggested reading—Frege’s conception of truth,
judgment, and knowledge—are retrieved from the paper ‘On Sense and Reference’. In
the suggested reading an aim of this seminal article, which has not been acknowledged
by commentators before, seems to be emerging. Before turning to the contributions of
Frege’s philosophy to contemporary problems, I would like to make this aim explicit.
The paper starts with the problem ‘Frege’s Puzzle’, i.e., the question as to how we
can explain the difference in cognitive value between ‘a = a’ and ‘a = b’. Frege writes:
· · · a = a and a = b are obviously statements of differing cognitive value; a = a
holds a priori and, according to Kant, is to be labelled analytic, while statements
of the form a = b often contain very valuable extensions of our knowledge and
cannot always be established a priori. (1892c: 57)
9This consensus seems to be caused partly by Dummettian reading of Frege, which has been dom-
inant in Frege scholarship. Dummett (1993: 669) compares Frege to Descartes—considering both of
them as initiating a philosophical revolution. While Descartes revolutionizes philosophy by putting
epistemology at its center, Frege does so by putting language at its center. Dummett holds that, because
Frege is mainly interested in language, he addresses epistemological issues ‘only in a limited fash-
ion’. The consensus that Frege does not have epistemology appears to be rooted partly in Dummett’s
interpretation.
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This cannot be his elucidation of the relevant cognitive difference. ‘2 = 1 + 1’ can be
established a priori. Frege also knows about this. He is saying that the truth of ‘a = b’
cannot always be established a priori, which means that sometimes the truth of such a
sentence can be established a priori. Frege here just appears to be pointing to a way to
initially realize the cognitive difference between ‘a = a’ and ‘a = b’.
Of course, Frege’s explanation of the cognitive difference between ‘a = a’ and ‘a = b’
depends on the sense-reference distinction. But how does this distinction explain the
cognitive difference? A tempting answer appears to be this: we can know that ‘a = a’
is true analytically, i.e., purely thanks to its sense, while we cannot do so in the case of






= [(–ε f (ε) = –αg(α)) = a f (a) = g(a))]
The left side expresses Law I and the right side expresses Law V. They express different
thoughts because Law I is different from Law V. Hence, it is a case of ‘a = b’. However,
it can still be established analytically. Hence, just as the apriority explanation above
does not work, the analyticity explanation based on sense does not work either.
However, obviously the distinction between the sense and the reference of a term
is an important part of Frege’s explanation of the cognitive difference. We’ve already
sketched how the distinction contributes to the explanation of the cognitive difference
in Chapter 5. But let us move slowly and look at the text. Right before suggesting the
sense-reference distinction Frege writes:
What is intended to be said by a = b seems to be that the signs or names ‘a’ and
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‘b’ designate the same thing, so that those signs themselves would be under dis-
cussion; a relation between them would be asserted. But this relation would hold
between the names or signs only in so far as they named or designate something.
It would be mediated by the connexion of each of these signs with the same des-
ignated thing. But this is arbitrary. Nobody can be forbidden to use any arbitrary
producible event or object as a sign for something. In that case that sentence a = b
does not refer to the subject matter, but only to its mode of designation; we would
express no proper knowledge by its means. (Frege 1892c: 56–7)
Frege is criticizing the claim—he once accepted—that by asserting ‘a = b’ we express
the relationship between ‘a’ and ‘b’ as signs with different shapes. His worry is that this
kind of relationship can be arbitrarily proliferated because we can arbitrarily introduce
a new sign so as to designate an object. Why is this worrisome? Notice that Frege is
claiming that when we assert that ‘a = b’ we express some knowledge. If by asserting
‘a = b’ we express the relationship between different signs as different shapes, the
knowledge we express is not proper knowledge because that kind of ‘knowledge’ is
something we can achieve by arbitrary manipulation. The knowledge we attempt to
express by ‘a = b’ should be genuine, non-arbitrary, knowledge that requires genuine
epistemic effort of us. This establishes that what Frege is concerned about here is not
just the cognitive difference between ‘a = a’ and ‘a = b’ but also the nature of the
knowledge of identity in general and the nature of the act of identification, i.e., the act
by which we achieve identity knowledge.
The notion of sense comes into the picture when Frege attempts to clarify the nature
of the act of identifying a with b. In a nutshell, to identify a with b is to say that 〈a〉 (〈b〉)
belongs to b (a). The issue of arbitrariness is solved here because the senses of names
cannot be arbitrarily manipulated by us—because the relationship between the sense
of a name and its reference is completely objective. The cognitive difference between
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‘a = a’ and ‘a = b’ is finally explained. Consider ‘a = a’ first. Suppose that we already
grasp the sense of ‘a’ and recognize the existence of its reference. We thereby say that
〈a〉 belongs to a. That is exactly all it takes for us to see the truth of ‘a = a’. However,
in the case of ‘a = b’, we must additionally grasp 〈b〉, recognize its reference, and try to
say whether 〈b〉 belongs to a.10 Therefore, we have the cognitive difference.
At this point, we ought to note that Frege never makes the following claim: because
〈a = a〉 and 〈a = b〉 are different thoughts, the judgment that a is a is different from
the judgment that a is b. This claim would lead us to a much simpler way to explain
the cognitive difference between ‘a = a’ and ‘a = b’. However, Frege does not go that
way. He never describes the act of identifying a with b as the act of judging that a is
b. Instead Frege is describing it as the act of saying that 〈a〉 (〈b〉) belongs to b (a) and
later as taking a step from the sense of a name to its reference. By that, as we have
seen, Frege is pointing to the idea that the act of identifying a with b, which he is trying
to capture, is not an act of judgmental identification. The knowledge of identity we
produce by such a non-judgmental identification is non-propositional knowledge of
identity. The question is why Frege appeals to non-judgmental identification and non-
propositional knowledge of identity—instead of appealing to the difference between
〈a = a〉 and 〈a = b〉 and the thought-sensitivity of judgment.
The answer concerns Frege’s considerations we’ve seen in Chapters 2–5. He realizes
10In my reading of ‘On Sense and reference’, it might be said, the identity relationship turns out to
be that of co-referentiality. But that is not the case. The identity relationship is completely objectual;
it obtains of the same object. May (2012) defends the same interpretative claim. However, I think,
his arguments are flawed. May’s argument heavily depends on the premise that Frege’s stipulation
of the True as the value-range of the horizontal concept is a genuine definition of the True. What our
discussion shows is that it cannot be; the True is the object whose nature must be revealed by our logical
investigation, not a stipulated object. Also, May takes it that relating identity to co-referentiality always
depends on meta-linguistic assumptions. Not necessarily. Frege relates identity to co-referentiality of
thoughts via the analysis of objectual knowledge, not via a meta-linguistic assumption.
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that truth cannot be a property and that the act of judging—the logically fundamental
activity—cannot be the act of predicating the property truth of a thought. Thus, Frege
needs an alternative conception of judgment where judging is not reduced down to
predicating the property truth of a thought. He finds this alternative in the notion of
non-judgmental identification: judging that p is saying that 〈p〉 belongs to the True,
i.e., taking a step from 〈p〉 to its truth-value. Judging that p produces the propositional
knowledge that p, which is the knowledgenp that ‖p‖ is the True. The vicious infinite
regress—pointed out in the indefinability argument—is blocked and truth is not a
property but an object. All these are exactly what Frege is pointing out in the middle
of ‘On Sense and Reference’ after he explains that the sense of a sentence is a thought
and its reference is a truth-value.
If our discussion is along the right lines, ‘On Sense and Reference’ ultimately aims
to clarify the nature of truth and that of judging via the nature of identity knowledge
and that of the act of identifying. That is the ultimate aim for which the sense-reference
distinction is designed. The article is not a side-job that is merely remotely related to
Frege’s logicist project. It is at the center of the logicist project insofar as judging is at
the center of his conception of logic.
One might object that if my suggested reading is along the right lines, we cannot
explain why Frege takes judgment to be ‘something quite peculiar and incomparable’
(Frege 1892c: 65). Of course, he elucidates judgment as non-judgmental identification.
But nothing more is said about judgment as such. So what we have in the paper comes
down to the two points: judgment as such is not predication and truth is not a property.
Frege does not have a language to explain the nature of identification and of judgment
any further. That is why he is using only metaphorical expressions like ‘taking a step
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from a sense to its reference’ or ‘a sense belongs to an object’. That is understandable.
All Frege cares about is judgment and truth insofar as logic requires us to clarify their
nature. He appears to think that he’ve said enough to clarify their nature for the sake
of logic—because what logic requires is to show that judgment is not predication and
that truth is not a property—and thus he does not go any deeper. That might be the
reason why Frege leaves the further nature of judgment ‘peculiar and incomparable’.
One might also object that if my reading of ‘On Sense and Reference’ is correct, then
we cannot explain why Frege is testing his sense-reference distinction with different
kinds of sentences. I disagree. The fact that he is doing rather supports my reading.
Frege writes:
The supposition that the truth-value of a sentence is its reference shall now be put
to further test. (Frege 1892c: 65)
Frege ought to test this particular hypothesis in order to confirm that his elucidation
of judging that p, i.e., taking a step from 〈p〉 to its reference or saying that 〈p〉 belongs
to the True, indeed works for all kinds of 〈p〉. Rather, this reading appears to provide
the paper with a more unified and consistent structure.
Chapter 7
A Fregean Picture Further Developed
We have developed an exegesis of Frege’s conception of truth as an object and looked
into how the notions related to truth—judgment, assertion, knowledge, logic, etc.—are
elucidated under this conception. In this last substantial chapter I turn to examining
how Frege’s philosophy we’ve retrieved can contribute to contemporary philosophy.
Of course, to provide full answers to that question will take multiple books. However,
I would like to provide a showcase for the potential of Frege’s philosophy here.
Specifically I deal with how Frege’s conceptions of judgment, assertion, and knowl-
edge can be further developed. In regards to judgment I address Peter Hanks’s recent
criticisms of the Fregean conception of judgment in general. I show that Frege’s own
version—unlike other versions of the Fregean conception—can cope with some crucial
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criticisms of Hanks. In regards to assertion I deal with the problem of the relationship
between assertion and truth. I argue that if we accept Frege’s conception of assertion,
we can explain why we have a pro tanto reason to try to assert only truths. Finally, I
develop the ‘Frege-Millikanian theory of knowledge’ by combining Frege’s conception
of knowledge with Millikan’s theory of objectual knowledge.
7.1. Judgment: Frege vs. Hanks
Hanks (2007, 2011, 2015, 2018) recently suggests a theory of propositions that arguably
goes against the Fregean conception of proposition in general. According to the latter,
propositions are abstract entities that represent the reality in certain ways and thereby
bear truth-conditions. Hanks’s theory of propositions regards (assertoric) propositions
as act-types—types of judgments. Hanks partly supports his theory by criticizing the
Fregean conception of judgment. Our discussion concentrates on Hanks’s criticisms. I
argue that Frege’s own conception provides satisfactory replies to Hanks’s criticisms.
7.1.1. The Truth-Condition of a Judgment
The Fregean conception in general considers propositions, i.e., thoughts in Frege, as
primary bearers of truth-conditions.1 Hanks insists that, under the Fregean conception,
judgments come to have truth-conditions only because they are related to thoughts in
a certain way. Therefore, Hanks (2015: 42) concludes, the Fregean conception ought
to answer the question of propositional unity, i.e., the question as to how an abstract
1Fregean propositions are force-free contents. According to the Fregean conception, content is sharply
distinguished from force. Hanks denies the content-force distinction. Hanks’s propositions include
force as their parts. See Hanks 2007, 2011, and 2015 (esp. Chapter 4).
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entity like a thought can have a truth-condition independently of any human activity.2, 3
Hanks ’s point is that the question of propositional unity is perhaps too difficult (2007:
§2; 2015: ch.2; 2018: §3); it has never been answered satisfactorily. According to him, it
is a fundamental mistake to explain the truth-condition of a judgment by appealing to
that of a thought; it is to put the cart before the horse. Hanks maintains that we ought
to explain the truth-condition of a thought by that of a judgment. The act of judging
is representing the world in a particular way, and so it has a correctness condition. Its
correctness is its truth. Therefore, judgments are primary and independent bearers of
truth-conditions (Hanks 2015: 66). Thoughts inherit their truth-conditions from the
truth-conditions of judgments.4
It is controversial whether Hanks’s criticisms against the attempted explanations of
propositional unity are fair. But the issue I would like to address is something different:
why can’t Fregeans accept that a judgment has its truth-condition by its own nature, i.e.,
independently of thoughts? For Fregeans, to judge that p is to acknowledge the truth
of 〈p〉. Say that to acknowledge the truth of 〈p〉 is to take 〈p〉 to be true. Then, judging
that p is correct iff 〈p〉 is true. It seems as though Fregeans can insist that, whether or
not 〈p〉 is actually a truth-bearer, judging that p has a correctness condition equivalent
to the truth-condition of 〈p〉 solely because it is acknowledging the truth of 〈p〉. Even if
2Frege’s answer to the question of propositional unity appeals to the metaphorical notion of saturation.
See, e.g., Frege 1891, 1892b, 1892a, 1906c. Hanks (2015: §2.1) criticizes it by saying that Frege’s answer
leaves propositional unity primitive and impenetrable and it does not help us to understand how we
represent the world in our mental acts. There are a number of recent papers on this issue. See, e.g.,
King 2013, King, Soames, and Speaks 2014, Pickel 2019, etc.
3According to Rojszczak and Smith (2003: 173), Frege attempts to objectify knowledge by detaching
thoughts from the mind. According to them Frege’s move belongs to ‘part of a larger historical process’
(2003: 173) in which a number of different philosophers and logicians at the time of Frege play crucial
roles.
4According to Hanks, (assertoric) propositions are not contents but act-types, namely, types of judg-
ments as mental acts. See Hanks 2011 and ch.3 of Hanks 2015.
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thoughts turn out not to be bearers of truth-conditions, that only means that 〈p〉 cannot
be true because it cannot be a truth-candidate, and so judging that p is incorrect. This
shows that even if Fregeans fail to explain propositional unity, they can still explain
why judgments have correctness conditions equivalent to truth-conditions.
According to Hanks, however, Fregeans cannot make this move. He writes:
Judgment, on the Fregean view, is an act of endorsing [or acknowledging] a propo-
sition. · · · We cannot say that to endorse a proposition is to accept is as true. To
accept a proposition p as true is either to judge that p is true or it is a neutral, non-
committal act of attributing truth to p. If accepting p as true is to judge that p is true
then we’ve analyzed one judgment, judging that p, in terms of another, judging
that p is true. This leads to a regress. · · · So, the act of endorsing a proposition
cannot be analyzed as accepting a proposition as true. · · · It looks as though the
Fregean is going to have to view judgment as a primitive attitude one can bear to
a proposition. (Hanks 2015: 45)
The second horn of the dilemma obviously cannot function as an analysis of judgment.
Therefore, the major reason why Hanks (2015: 16) believes that the Fregeans ought
to leave judgment qua acknowledgment of truth ‘peculiar and incomparable’—i.e.,
primitive—consists in the vicious infinite regress Frege is appealing to in the indefin-
ability argument.
But Hanks is not entirely correct in saying that Frege leaves judgment primitive.
Frege does provide an elucidation of judgment according to which it is non-judgmental
identification. Frege is saying that judgment is peculiar and incomparable not because
he has nothing to say about it, but because he considers non-judgmental identification
as a fundamental, unanalyzable, type of act. One might object that in the end what
it takes to stop the vicious infinite regress is to make the relationship between truth
and judgment non-analyzable and primitive. However, that is not the case. What it
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takes to block the vicious infinite regress is to provide the elucidation of judgment
under which it is not truth predication. That is because the vicious infinite regress is
produced only if judging that p is predicating the property truth of 〈p〉. Frege is well
aware of this point. What our discussion shows is that he attempts to clarify the nature
of identification to the extent that it becomes clear that what he has in mind is non-
judgmental identification. Taking judgment to be such non-judgmental identification
Frege could avoid turning judgment into truth predication. Of course, Frege does take
thoughts to be legitimate bearers of truth and truth-conditions—not because they have
the property truth but because sentences refer to the True by virtue of their thoughts.
Therefore, he still needs to answer the question of propositional unity in one way or
another. However, in any event, Frege does not need to be committed to the claim that
the truth-condition of judgment is derived only from that of thoughts.
Now, Frege can elucidate why judgments have truth-conditions as follows. Recall:
to judge that p is to identify ‖p‖with the True non-judgmentally. It is correct to identify
‖p‖ with the True non-judgmentally just in case p is the True. Therefore, judging that
p is correct just in case p is the True. Now, p is the True iff p. Accordingly, judging that
p is correct iff p. This inference shows that judging that p has its correctness condition
where correctness is just truth not because it derives its correctness condition from the
truth-condition of a thought but because it is an act of identification that has its own
correctness condition. In Frege’s conception, the independence of judgments’ truth-
conditions from thoughts’ truth-conditions is even clearer. The correctness condition
of identification obtains whether or not thoughts actually have truth-conditions. One
might object that p is the True iff 〈p〉 is true and hence that the correctness condition of
identification is merely a disguised truth-condition of 〈p〉. That objection presupposes
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that ‘· · · is the True’ is a metalinguistic truth-predicate and that ‘true’ is also such a
predicate in Frege. However, both assumptions are not warranted.
7.1.2. Grasping a thought and Judging
There is Hanks’s other important complaint against the Fregean conception that can be
answered by Frege. The Fregean conception requires there to be an act of grasping—or
entertaining—the thought the truth of which we are about to acknowledge. To grasp a
thought is to identify and single out a thought among many others. As such, grasping
a thought is not making a commitment to the truth of the thought. It is rather a neutral,
non-committal, mental act that is commonly found not just in the act of judging but
also in the act of asking, hypothesizing, etc. On the act of grasping a thought, Hanks
writes:
· · · Prior to judging that p, we do things like ask whether p, or hypothesize that
p, · · · . These are the kinds of actions that Frege points to when he wants to
illustrate entertainment. The error comes in making these actions preconditions
for judgments. In some cases acts of judgment are preceded by entertainment-like
preliminaries, but they do not have to be. Entertainment has some intuitive appeal,
but only because sometimes we do things that look like Fregean entertainment.
(2015: 35–6)5
His point is that although sometimes an entertainment-like stage precedes a judgment,
it is a mistake to posit that every judgment is necessarily preceded by such a stage.
We need to be a little cautious when we understand Hanks’s criticism. His criticism
is not that the Fregean conception entails that an entertainment temporally precedes
a judgment in each and every actual case, which appears to be implausible. Hanks
admits that the Fregean’s two-stage understanding of judgment, grasping a thought
5Indeed, in many previous readings, grasping a thought is described as Hanks here describes. For
instance, see Bouveresse (1982: §1)’s or Currie (1980)’s discussion.
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and acknowledging its truth, is based on ‘abstractions from the overall act of forming
a judgment · · · which we can distinguish as theorists’ (Hanks 2018: §2). Hanks’s point
is that in this theoretical framework, entertainment logically precedes judgment: we
cannot acknowledge the truth of a thought without antecedently grasping the thought.
He seems to take this implication to be an ‘error’.
I am not really sure that it is erroneous to say that entertainment of a thought is a
precondition for judgment. But let us concede for the sake of argument that it is indeed
an error. Also, it ought to be pointed out that Frege does seem to say that entertaining
〈p〉 is a precondition for judging that p:
Whenever anyone recognizes something to be true, he makes a judgment. What
he recognizes to be true is a thought. It is impossible to recognize a thought as
true before it has been grasped. (Frege 1915: 251)
What I want to argue is that given Frege’s conception of judgment, he does not have
to be committed to the claim that entertaining 〈p〉 is a precondition for judging that p.
Of course, the fact that one judges that p entails the fact that one grasps 〈p〉 while the
latter does not entail the former. But that does not necessarily entail that judging that
p is to be logically preceded by grasping 〈p〉. Under Frege’s conception of judgment,
judging that p can sometimes come to be a precondition for grasping 〈p〉.
Say I’ve read Olga Tokarczuk’s The Last Stories. I see my friend who studies Polish
literature having a conversation with her colleague. My friend utters ‘Olga Tokarczuk’s
Ostatnie historie explores death’. I gently intervene and ask ‘Just like The Last Stories?’
My friend asserts ‘Ostatnie historie is The Last Stories’. Because I trust her knowledge in
Polish literature, I accept her assertion as true. What do I accept here? By making the
assertion my friend is saying that 〈Ostatnie historie is The Last Stories〉 belongs to the
True. By accepting her assertion I am also saying that 〈Ostatnie historie is The Last Stories〉
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belongs to the True. Thus my acceptance of my friend’s assertion is my judgment that
Ostatnie historie is The Last Stories. In my judgment my grasping the relevant thought
occurs. However, is grasping it a precondition for my judgment? I do not think so. It
rather seems that before my judgment I could not grasp the thought. Before I hear my
friend’s assertion I do not even know whether ‘the sense of “Ostatnie Historie”’ refers
to anything. Hence at this stage I cannot grasp 〈Ostatnie Historie is The Last Stories〉.
Now I hear the assertion. But my hearing it does not yet let me grasp me the thought.
If I were to take what my friend utters to be gibberish I would not be able to recognize
the existence of the sense of ‘Ostatnie is The Last Stories’. My recognition of the sense is
made when I accept my friend’s assertion. By saying that 〈Ostatnie historie is The Last
Stories〉 belongs to the True I recognize the existence of the sense of ‘Ostatnie historie is
The Last Stories’, i.e., 〈Ostatnie historie is The Last Stories〉, and thereby recognize that of
‘Ostatnie historie’. Hence in this case my judgment is arguably a precondition for my
grasping the relevant thought.6 Of course, even in this case, grasping 〈p〉 must occur
with judging that p because the latter is saying that 〈p〉 belongs to the True. However,
that does not mean that grasping 〈p〉 is a precondition for judging that p.
One might object that this is just an exceptional case and in most of cases grasping
〈p〉 is a precondition for judging that p. I do not think that this is just an exceptional
case. What the previous case shows is that we can recognize other speakers’ acts of
6This point is related to a main thesis of neo-logicism in philosophy of mathematics. Neo-logicism that
inherits its main ideas from Frege holds the ‘syntactic priority’ thesis: the claim that ‘if we speak truly,
the structure of reality inevitably mirrors the contours of our speech’ (MacBride 2003: 108). For this
point, also see Wright 1983. If we accept this principle, the fact that we take a certain syntactic structure
with a singular term ‘s’ to be true provides a sufficient reason to think that there is an item in the world
that can be identified as s. What I am arguing here is that Frege can say the same thing about sense:
the fact that we take ‘a = b’ (where b’ is not a name known to use antecedently) to be true provides a
sufficient reason to think that ‘b’ has a sense. If so, we can backtrack the sense of ‘b’ after we take the
identity sentence to be true.
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non-judgmental identification and through these recognitions we can grasp the senses
of terms and sentences we’ve never heard of before. I believe that the use of this ability
occurs much more often than this objection assumes and plays an important role in
our language learning. A baby must learn who is ‘Mama’ by recognizing that people
refer to her mother by that sound. Also, we appear to learn new abstract or theoretical
terms by recognizing other speakers’ assertions of sentences that have those terms. In
such cases we grasp thoughts partly constituted by the senses of those terms through
recognizing the judgments expressed by those assertions—as we do in the above case.
One might object that the distinction between grasping a thought and judging is
still an artificial product of Frege’s conception of judgment that posits the existence of
thoughts. I disagree. The gap between a name’s sense and its reference has epistemic
reality. We know something about the name ‘Odysseus’. First of all we know that it
would be a name of a person if there were Odysseus. We can also use the name as such
in a number of sentences. What is the most important thing is that we understand that
the use of the term is not arbitrary—just as its sense is supposed not to be arbitrary.
Nevertheless, whatever we know about it does not let us decide whether the name has
a reference or whether Odysseus is identical with the reference of a name whose sense
and reference are known to us. If we call whatever it is that we understand about
‘Odysseus’ ‘the sense of “Odysseus”’, we are in a position where we grasp 〈Odysseus〉
but fail to seal the sense-reference gap. In this way, Frege’s notion of grasping a name’s
sense is grounded in the epistemic reality concerning our knowledge of names. Now,
exactly the same elucidation of grasping can be applied to the act of grasping a thought
if we accept that sentences are names. The act of asking, hypothesizing, etc. can be
taken to show that there can be a gap between a thought and its truth-value just like
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the gap between 〈Odysseus〉 and Odysseus.7
A due question is then what are the reasons to take sentences to be names. As we’ve
seen Frege provides a number of arguments that sentences are proper names of truth.
On top of that, based on this new conception of truth and sentence, Frege develops
quite new conceptions of related notions like judgment, assertion, knowledge, logic,
etc. These new conceptions, which appear to deserve thorough examination, provide
more reasons to take the possibility seriously that sentences are names of truth.
7.2. Assertion: Truth Norm and Performative Flaw
Say that, for any false assertion, we have a pro tanto reason to take it to be flawed.8 A
popular way to explain this is to depend on the notion of constitutive norm.9 A number
of theorists (M. Weiner 2005; Whiting 2013, 2015; Williamson 1996, 2000) maintain that
assertion is normatively constituted activity and that the constitutive norm of assertion
is—or implies—that one must assert that p only if 〈p〉 is true.10 If we accommodate this
normative conception of assertion, any false assertion violates the norm constitutive
7If so, those acts are not presented as preliminary stages for judgments.
8Williamson (2000) uses the terms like ‘entitled to feel resentment’ instead of ‘taking it as flawed’.
However, using this kind of term seems to be misleading. Whether we feel resentment or not is not
necessarily connected to whether an assertion is flawed or not. Some of the criticisms against the
constitutive norm approach seem to be caused by this misleading term. For instance, see Johnson
(2015a: §2.2).
9The intuition that a false assertion is flawed is taken as supporting the thought that it is a constitutive
norm of assertion that one must assert that p only if the proposition that p or 〈p〉 is true. See M. Weiner
(2005) or Whiting (2013, 2015). It is more often argued that assertion is flawed when the asserter does
not know that the asserted proposition is true; and this is taken as supporting that it is a constitutive
norm of assertion that one must assert that p only if one knows that p (Littlejohn 2014; Williamson 1996,
2000). There is a debate about the truth norm and the knowledge norm of assertion. However, this
debate does not influence the discussion in this paper. Even if we take the knowledge norm as the
constitutive norm of assertion, a false assertion will still be taken as flawed.
10M. Weiner (2005) and Whiting (2013, 2015) argue that the constitutive norm of assertion is truth, while
Williamson (1996, 2000) and Littlejohn (2014), who argue that knowledge is the constitutive norm of
assertion, would say that the constitutive norm of assertion implies that truth is the constitutive norm of
assertion. For the former, truth is the ‘basic’ (Montminy 2013: 40) constitutive norm of assertion while
it is not for the latter.
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of assertion and thus there is a pro tanto reason to consider it to be flawed.
However, this would certainly not be the only possible way of explaining that we
have a pro tanto reason to take a false assertion as flawed. Another way would be to
endorse the following type of explanation:
(Performative Explanation: PE) Assertion is essentially related to truth in a partic-
ular descriptive manner. Given this way assertion relates itself to truth, asserting
a false proposition is always a flawed performance of assertion.
Let us assume that for any false assertion we have a pro tanto reason to consider it to
be flawed.11 The task I undertake here is to construct a descriptive elucidation of the
relationship between assertion and truth on which we can build up a plausible PE for
the pro tanto flaw of a false assertion. ‘Descriptive elucidation’ means an elucidation
that relates truth to assertion, but does not entail that truth is the constitutive norm
governing assertion. For instance, Wright (1992) explain that
(1) To assert that p is to present 〈p〉 as true.12
(1) does not entail that truth is the constitutive norm of assertion. (1) falls under what
I call ‘descriptive elucidation’.
One might wonder why we should bother to develop a PE based on a descriptive
elucidation of the relationship between assertion and truth. Think of a person who
shares the intuition that we have a pro tanto reason to consider a false assertion to be
flawed, but does not share the thought that an assertion is an essentially norm-laden
action. For such a theorist, to develop a version of PE would be a viable option for
11A similar idea has been suggested and defended with respect to the state of belief. Theorists like Shah
(2003) and Velleman (2000) argue that a belief in a false proposition is a flawed state. Lynch (2009a,
2009b) claims that it is correct to believe 〈p〉 just in case 〈p〉 is true.
12Ascribing (1) to Frege, Bar-On and Simmons (2007) provides an extensive and helpful discussion
about the conception of asserting as presenting-as-true.
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explaining the pro tanto flaw of a false assertion. A PE, of course, can have a normative
implication, which is that if one desires to assert in a flawless manner, one must assert a
truth. This implication seems relatively less controversial than the claim that assertion
is essentially norm-laden.
Even for theorists who happily embrace that an assertion is essentially norm-laden,
there are some reasons to be interested in developing a PE. Timothy Williamson writes:
Given a speech act A, one can ask ‘What are the rules [i.e. the constitutive norms] of
A?’. Given an answer, one can ask ‘what are non-circular necessary and sufficient
conditions for a population to perform a speech act with those rules?’. (2000:
p239-40)
Circular conditions for performing a speech act A with the constitutive norm φwould
look like this: One performs A if and only if one performs a speech act the constitutive
norm of which is φ. Williamson says that finding non-circular conditions for perform-
ing a given speech act is a ‘more ambitious’ (Williamson 2000: 239) and philosophical
project. I understand the idea underlying Williamson’s comments as follows. Suppose
that one asks why a false assertion is flawed. It appears better to answer this question
by saying ‘Assertion is related to truth in such and such a way and because of this
relationship truth is the norm governing an assertion’ than by saying ‘A false assertion
is flawed’ or ‘We should assert truth’—as it seems better to answer why stealing is
immoral by saying ‘Stealing can be described as such and such an act and our general
moral principles imply that such an act is impermissible’ than by simply saying ‘It is
just immoral’ or ‘It is a given moral norm not to steal’.13 To search for such a better
13It seems that in the literature on moral issues, it is a common project to develop the former kind of
answer to why a certain type of action is impermissible. For instance, Dougherty (2013) tries to answer
why rape is impermissible in the above way. He explains rape as having sex without the other’s consent
and that is what makes rape impermissible. This kind of project is often found in the literature on moral
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looking answer certainly seems like a more ambitious and philosophical project.14 If
Williamson’s idea thusly understood is plausible, then one who thinks of assertion as
norm-laden still has a reason to be interested in developing a PE because a plausible PE
can be a source for the more satisfying way to answer why a false assertion is flawed
or why truth is a constitutive norm of assertion.15
Therefore, as far as we hold that there is a pro tanto reason to take a false assertion
as flawed, there are reasons for attempting to develop a PE. My aim in this section is to
establish that Frege’s conception of assertion as non-assertive identification of the True
provides us with a plausible PE. I first review the previous descriptive explanations
of assertion and show why those explanations fail to provide a PE. This process will
provide us with a better idea about what a successful PE would look like. Then I turn
to constructing a PE from Frege’s conception of assertion.
7.2.1. A Review of the Previous Descriptive Explanations
Let us start with Wright’s elucidation:
(1) To assert that p is to present 〈p〉 as true. (Wright 1992)
issues. To the question as to why killing a person is impermissible, Marquis (1989) responds by saying
that killing a person is destroying a future-like-ours, which is impermissible.
14MacFarlane (2011) is motivating this kind of project in a similar way. McFarlane points out that the
constitutive norm of assertion, if any, does not tell us anything about what it is to make an assertion or
how to make an assertion MacFarlane (2011: 86). However, we can independently pursue the goal of
answering these unanswered questions. Given the list of the conditions when assertion is incorrectly
performed, we can duly expect these independently developed descriptions of assertion to explain why
assertion is incorrectly performed under those conditions MacFarlane (2011: 93–4).
15Recently, theorists argue that assertion does not have any constitutive norm. For instance, see
Cappelen (2011) or Casey Johnson (2015a: Chs.1 and 2; 2015b). These criticisms against the constitutive
norm approach to assertion attack the data for this approach. Those data mostly come from individual
intuitions about assertions made in certain contexts, e.g. assertions about lottery tickets. A plausible PE
of the pro tanto flaw of a false proposition can provide a brand-new support for the constitutive norm
approach. Such a PE is based on the essential relationship between assertion and truth and hence can
be used to show that any false assertion is flawed. This seems to constitute a reason to think that truth
is a constitutive norm of assertion. This support from a PE for the constitutive norm approach is not
influenced by the criticisms of the above-mentioned theorists.
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This platitudinous elucidation seems to fail to show that a false assertion is a flawed
performance of assertion.16 I can present my colleague Tom as running now by draw-
ing a perfect picture of him running although he is not running right now. However,
the fact that Tom is not running right now does not make my presentation of him as
running a flawed performance of presentation. Then, it is not evident why we should
think that the fact that the proposition presented as true is not true makes it a flawed
performance of presentation to present it as true. Hence, (1) fails to provide a plausible
PE (performative explanation) for the pro tanto flaw of a false proposition. Hence, it is
not the kind of elucidation we are looking for.
One might object that presenting-as-true, unlike presenting-as-running, produces
the assertoric force and hence amounts to assertion. If so, we may be able to say that
presenting 〈Obama is the current president of the United States〉 as true is flawed as
asserting that Obama is the current president of the United States is flawed. However,
this does not help because the question we are dealing with is why a false assertion
is flawed. Furthermore, it is unclear that presenting-as-true necessarily produces the
assertoric force. The sentence ‘The thought that Obama is the current president of the
United States is true’ seems to present 〈Obama is the current president of the United
States〉 as true, ‘even if the sentence is not uttered assertorically’ (Pagin 2016: §5.1).
A more promising elucidation seems to be this:
(2) To assert that p is to make a commitment to the truth of 〈p〉 (Wright 1992).17
One might contend that (2) is what we are looking for, saying that to make a commit-
ment to the truth of a false proposition is indeed flawed. I can agree that a subject’s
16(1) is taken by Wright (1992) as a platitude about truth. These platitudes work as ingredients for a
network analysis of the concept truth in truth pluralism.
17MacFarlane (2011: §.4) provides a helpful discussion of this idea.
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making a commitment to the truth of a false proposition supports that the subject is
flawed epistemically and/or often morally. Nonetheless, it is not evident that making
a commitment to the truth of a false proposition is a flawed performance of making
a commitment. Even if a subject makes a false assertion for certain reasons, e.g. due
to misleading evidence she has, the subject makes a commitment to the truth of the
proposition issued in a flawless manner. That is why her assertion is taken seriously. It
is in that the commitment is flawed that we say that it is flawed to make a commitment
to the truth of a false proposition. The commitment usually comes along with a variety
of responsibilities, and perhaps the falsity of the asserted proposition makes some of
those responsibilities unfulfilled. The unfulfilled responsibilities provide reasons to
think that the commitment, and hence the subject, are flawed. However, this does not
necessarily mean that the subject makes a commitment to the truth of a false proposi-
tion in a flawed manner. If so, (2) cannot be what we are looking for. What we need
is a description of assertion that explains why asserting a false proposition is a flawed
performance of assertion.
Note (2) describes assertion in terms of the effects of assertion; a commitment to the
truth of 〈p〉 is an effect of asserting that p (MacFarlane 2011: 91). How do we produce
such an effect then? Truth is usually regarded as a property of propositions, and thus
a tempting answer seems to be that we make such a commitment by predicating the
property truth of 〈p〉.18 This provides another way to describe assertion in terms of
truth:
(3) To assert that p is to predicate truth of 〈p〉.
There are two different conceptions of predication.19 In the first, to predicate a property
18Below, ‘truth’ means ‘the property truth’.
19These two different conceptions of predication are now familiar to us thanks to the debates between
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P of an object o is to compose the proposition that o is P. If we conceive predication
in this way, however, we cannot explain why asserting a false proposition is flawed
performance of assertion. Even though Dostoevsky is not an American writer, predi-
cating American writer of him in this sense can be flawlessly performed. In the second,
to predicate P of o is to assert that o is P. To predicate truth of a false proposition in
this sense might be regarded as a flawed predication—if we already accept that a false
assertion is flawed. But what we need is the explanation about why asserting a false
proposition is flawed.
Thus none of (1), (2), and (3) is the elucidation of assertion we are looking for; they
do not provide a PE for the pro tanto flaw of a false assertion. We can retrieve such a
PE from Frege’s conception of assertion.
7.2.2. A Fregean Performative Explanation
In Frege’s conception, to assert that p is to identify the True with ‖p‖ non-assertively—
without asserting that ‖p‖ is the True. An assertion as such is expressive of a judgment
as a non-judgmental identification of the True. Recall that the act of judging is grounded
in our ability to identify the True. Thus judging is using the ability to identify the True.
Specifically it is a mental use of the ability. Then, we can regard the act of asserting
as a verbal use of the ability to identify the True insofar as asserting is an attempt to
express a judgment. If we describe assertion as such, then we describe it in terms of
its process. Then, what is the result of this process? Again in the case of judging qua
a mental use of the ability to identify the True, what we achieve by judging that p if it
is correctly performed, i.e., if ‖p‖ is indeed the True, is the knowledgenp that ‖p‖ is the
Scott Soames and Peter Hanks (APA Session on New Thinking about Propositions, St. Louis, Missouri,
February 21, 2015).
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True. In the case of asserting qua a verbal use of the ability to identify the True, what
we achieve by asserting that p if ‖p‖ is the True is the expression of the knowledgenp
that ‖p‖ is the True.
Thus in Frege’s conception assertion is regarded as a process of identifying the True
and assertion as such has a correctness condition in terms of the result of the process
constitutive of assertion. If the process P, which has C as the condition for the process’s
being correctly performed, fails to meet C in a certain case, that constitutes a reason to
take P to be performed incorrectly—in a flawed manner—in the case. Then we have
the following result: if one asserts that p and ‖p‖ is not the True, one’s asserting that p
is performed in a flawed manner. Let us see whether this claim obtains case-by-case.
Say that S asserts that p and ‖p‖ is not the True. Now, we can think of two cases. In
one case S would not assert that p if S knew that it is not the case that p. In the other
case S would assert even if S knew that it is not true that p. In the first case S asserts
that p because S does not know that it is not true that p. In other words, S’s ability to
identify the True is not sufficiently strong to say that 〈p〉 does not belong to the True.
In other words S’s ability to identify the True is flawed. A flawed ability to carry out
a process results in a flawed execution of the process. In this case S’s assertion that p
is grounded in a verbal use of S’s flawed ability that is relevant to the assertion. Thus,
S’s assertion is a flawed performance of assertion qua identification of the True when
S does not know that the relevant thought is false.
In the other case S might already know that it is not true that p or does not know
whether p. In this case, S is using her ability to identify the True in an improper way.
In particular S uses her ability in order to identify the True with ‖p‖ although S knows
that her proper use of the ability would yield a different result or leaves the possibility
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open that her proper use of the ability might turn out to lead to a different result. A
crooked use of an ability to carry a process yields a crooked performance of the process.
S’s assertion is grounded in S’s crooked use of the relevant ability. Thus it is a flawed
performance of assertion.
One might object that in the second case S’s assertion does not use the ability to
identify the True. If this objection is correct, then we cannot explain why S’s assertion is
a flawed performance of assertion by appealing to S’s use of the ability. But I disagree.
The ability to identify the True is the ability to single out the True and label it with a
certain expression. Even in the second case S’s utterance of ‘p’ singles out the True and
labels it with ‘p’. That is why S’s utterance is S’s assertion. Hence, S’s assertion even in
this case is grounded in the use—though crooked—of S’s ability to identify the True.
Such a crooked use of the ability is still a use of it.
Hence we come to have a PE for the pro tanto flaw of a false assertion by accepting
Frege’s conception of assertion. Under the conception to assert is to identify the True.
Assertion as such is grounded in our verbal use of the ability to identify the True. We
make a false assertion because our ability to identify the True is flawed or we use the
ability in a crooked way. In any case our act of identifying the True is performed in a
flawed manner. Therefore a false assertion is always performatively flawed.
7.3. Knowledge: the Frege-Millikanian Theory
Lastly, I sketch what I call ‘the Frege-Millikanian theory of knowledge’. Even though
the theory is grounded in Frege’s conception of knowledge, it is not solely his theory.
Frege never attempts to build up a theory of knowledge, and hence his conception of
knowledge has explanatory gaps. I believe that we can seal off these gaps by consulting
Millikan’s theory of objectual knowledge and identity knowledge that is pretty similar
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to Frege’s conception of them. Thus, the theory of knowledge we come to have in the
end can rightly be called ‘the Frege-Millikanian theory’.
7.3.1. The Basic Components of the Theory
Let us start with the objectual-knowledge (o-knowledge) of the True. We’ve said that
the o-knowledge of the True gives us the ability to identify the True non-judgmentally.
What is this o-knowledge of the True? Frege does not provide a specific answer to
this question. At this point it is beneficial to point out the parallel between Millikan’s
theory of o-knowledge and Frege’s conception. In the latter, we’ve just said, the
o-knowledge of an object O provides the ability to identify O. Millikan’s theory also
connects the o-knowledge of O to the ability to identify O. But she puts a more
immediate relationship between them; for her the o-knowledge of O is just the ability
to identify O. As we’ve said, Millikan calls this ability ‘the substance concept of O’
(Millikan 2000). The substance concept of O is the ability to identify O via a variety
of media including perceptions and language. Here ‘identification’ always means non-
judgmental identification.
So Millikan leads us to a simple way to fix the nature of o-knowledge. The following
is one of the theses of the Frege-Millikanian theory of knowledge:
(FMK1) The o-knowledge of O is the ability to non-judgmentally identify
O via a variety of media.
Let ‘identificationnj’ and ‘identifynj’ refer to the act of non-judgmental identification.
‘The ability to say that 〈t〉 belongs to O’ in Frege’s terminology is ‘the ability to identifynj
O via the medium of ‘t’ (or its sense 〈t〉) in this theory. By (FMK1) the o-knowledge of
the True is the ability to identifynj the True via various media.
As we’ve said (FMK1) might sound extremely implausible. Isn’t the o-knowledge
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of O just a collection of the ‘propositional knowledge (p-knowledge) that O has such-
and-such a property’? It cannot be denied that there are pieces of p-knowledge about
an object. Millikan, nonetheless, points out that if we cannot identify the object O and
reliably re-identify it in various circumstances, we cannot pile up such p-knowledge
about O. Our ability to identify O is a precondition for our acquiring such p-knowledge
about O. What Millikan is doing is to define this ability as the o-knowledge of O. This
ability is distinctively objectual knowledge in the sense that it cannot be reduced down to
p-knowledge about O. Frege, I believe, is also looking for such distinctively objectual
knowledge via a different route. He appears to believe that the identity knowledge we
attempt to express by the claims of the form ‘a = b’ has a distinctively non-propositional
character because it is not produced by the act of judging that a is b. Frege takes this
identity knowledge to spring from our ability to identify an object and labels what
provides this ability with ‘o-knowledge’.
The parallel between Millikan and Frege goes through and through. Both of them
attempt to provide a case for the existence of non-judgmental identification. Moreover,
they both attempt to put our knowledge of identity at the center of our cognitive life. It
is an ironic fact that Millikan identifies her main antagonist as the ‘Fregean’ for whom
identification is always judgmental identification. Certainly in many readings Frege is
a Fregean in this sense. However, Frege is not a Fregean under my suggested reading.
He is rather a Millikanian.
Although Frege is a Millikanian in many aspects, there are also differences between
these two philosophers. In a certain sense Frege’s conception of knowledge of identity
is less radical than Millikan’s theory. Her point is not just that our act of identifying is
non-judgmental. Her point is that there is nothing like an identity thought of the form
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〈a = b〉 or that there is no identity relationship that holds of the same object. All there
is concerning what we have called ‘identity’ is the relationship between an object and
the representational content that represents the object. Hence, there is nothing like the
p-knowledge that a is b. Frege would not accept it. For him there are identity thoughts
〈a = b〉 and there is the relationship of identity that holds of the same object. Thus we
can make a judgmental identification, i.e., a judgment that a is identical with b and can
have the p-knowledge that a is b.
Still, Frege is more radical than Millikan in a different aspect. This is because unlike
Millikan, Frege makes our p-knowledge grounded in our o-knowledge—specifically
our o-knowledge of the True. First, following Frege, the Frege-Millikanian theory of
knowledge puts forward the following:
(FMK2) If the identificationnj of O via a proper name ‘OP’ is successful, it
produces the knowledgenp that Op is O.
Judging that p is identifyingnj the True via ‘p’. Thus, we have this:
(FMK2J) If the act of judging that p is successful, it produces the knowledgenp
that ‖p‖ is the True.
The knowledge we produce by judging that p is the p-knowledge that p. Thus we have
the following:
(FMK3) The p-knowledge that p is the knowledgenp that ‖p‖ is the True.
The Frege-Millikanian theory permits the p-knowledge that a is b. However, that does
not entail that there is p-knowledge of identity distinguished from non-propoaitional
knowledge of identity. The p-knowledge that a is b is merely the knowledgenp that ‖a is
b‖ is the True. The p-knowledge that a is b is the non-propositional identity knowledge
of the True while the knowledgenp that a is b is that of the object denoted by ‘a’ and ‘b’.
Finally,
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(FMK4) To identifynj O via a proper name ‘OP’ is to use the o-knowledge
of O, i.e., the ability to identifynj O.
By (FMK4), to judge is to use our o-knowledge of the True. Hence, our p-knowledge
is epistemically grounded in our o-knowledge of the True.
Two points must be clarified: the ability to identifynj an object and the knowledgenp
that O1 is O2. First, in what does the ability to identifynj an object consist? We recognize
and identify objects by our cognitive abilities such as perceptual abilities. Accordingly,
it seems natural to think that the ability to identifynj an object consists in these cognitive
abilities. Thus the Frege-Millikanian theory puts forward the following:
(FMK5) The ability to identifynj O via a medium M is epistemically grounded
in the cognitive ability by which we can identifynj O via M.
Say that I identifynj my wife, who is approaching me, through my visual perception.
In this case, I am using the ability to identifynj my wife via a visual perception and this
ability is epistemically grounded in my perceptual ability that is one of my cognitive
abilities. I say: I am using the perceptual ability to identifynj my wife. The perceptual
ability to identifynj my wife constitutes a sub-ability of the general ability to identifynj
my wife. There can be different sub-abilities of this general ability that are grounded in
various cognitive abilities. For instance, my ability to identifynj my wife via linguistic
expressions like ‘Mary’ or ‘the wife of Junyeol’ is my linguistic—or conceptual—ability
to identifynj her that depends on my linguistic ability. My linguistic ability to identifynj
my wife is also a sub-ability of the general ability to do so.
It goes along with Frege’s own view to regard the ability to identifynj an object as
constituted by such sub-abilities grounded in cognitive abilities. Frege himself thinks
that objects are in the end given to us through our cognitive abilities. He writes:
Stars are objects of sense perception. (1925: 279)
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He considers sense perception to be one of the sources of knowledge (Frege 1924)—the
faculties (Anlage) for knowledge.20 What Frege is asserting is that stars as astronomical
objects can be identified by our perceptual ability. He also states that we can identify
objects—like what he calls ‘the base plane’ (1925: 279)—by our geometrical ability that
we may take to be similar to the Kantian intuition. Hence, it goes along with Frege’s
intention to think of the ability to identifynj an object as grounded in our cognitive
abilities to do so.
Let us turn to the knowledgenp that O1 is O2. This knowledgenp is produced by the
act of identifyingnj O1 with O2. We perform this act when the object O, which is the
reference of both ‘O1’ and ‘O2’, is given to us as the reference of ‘O1’ (‘O2’) and then we
realize that O is also the reference of ‘O2’ (‘O1’). This act of identificationnj is grounded
in our ability to identifynj O. That is, we identifynj O1 with O2 by exerting the ability. If
we successfully perform the act and achieve the knowledgenp that O1 is O2, then our
ability to identifynj O is already sufficiently strong to let us produce that knowledgenp.
What I mean by ‘strong’ here is a property of an ability—how developed an ability
is. Say my wife can drive a car better in an area with high mountains than I can; then
my wife’s ability to drive a car is stronger than my ability to drive a car. For a task T the
completion of which requires a certain ability A, whether a subject can complete T of
course primarily depends on whether the subject has A. However, it is also dependent
on whether the subject’s A has a strength sufficient to carry out the task. For instance, I
might not be able to drive all the way up to the peak of Mount Washington not because
I lack the ability to drive, but because my ability to drive is not sufficiently strong to
20Here, ‘faculty’ is a translation of ‘Anlage’. In the translation of ‘Sources of Knowledge’ (Frege 1979:
267–274), ‘Anlage’ is translated into ‘disposition’. But ‘Anlage’ means an innate property of an entity
that can be developed into its ability. Thus ‘faculty’ also works as its translation.
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let me do so.
If our ability to identifynj O is already sufficiently strong to enable us to identifynj
O1 with O2, shouldn’t we rather say that we already have the knowledgenp that O1 is
O2? Is there any theoretical space for making sense of this knowledgenp supposed to
be added by our identificationnj? I think that there is—if we consider the difference
between merely possessing an ability and having actual experience of using the ability
successfully. Think of a pitcher who tries to learn to throw a curveball. She learns
the grip and the throw from her coach. One day the pitcher finally comes to throw
curveballs successfully. At one point before that, she would already form and improve
the ability to throw a curveball. However at the point when she throws successful
curveballs that fall down beautifully, she experiences the successful use of her ability
and that experience in turn would strengthen her ability further. Actually experiencing
the successful use of an ability is even often a huge progress in one’s effort to improve
the ability. Taking this point into account, I say:
(FMK6) The knowledgenp that O1 is O2 is the experience of the successful
use of the ability to identifynj the object by means of ‘O1’ (or O2).
Therefore, the knowledgenp that O1 is O2 contributes to strengthening one’s ability to
identifynj the relevant object. By (FMK6) we can explain what our p-knowledge adds
to our cognitive repertoire. The p-knowledge that p is the knowledgenp that ‖p‖ is the
True, which is the experience of the successful use of our ability to identifynj the True
by way of ‘p’. Hence, it helps to strengthen our ability to do so and thereby strengthen
our o-knowledge of the True.
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7.3.2. The Frege-Millikanian Theory and the JTB analysis
Now I would like to examine how the Frege-Millikanian theory of p-knowledge can
accommodate the insights of a traditional analysis of it, i.e., the JTB analysis according
to which the p-knowledge that p is the justified true belief that p. This step would help
us to familiarize ourselves with this new framework of knowledge.
As we’ve seen the Frege-Millikanian theory entails:
(FMK6P) The p-knowledge that p is the experience of the successful use of
one’s ability to identifynj the True by way of ‘p’.
Given (FMK6P), how can we accommodate the insight that underlies the belief con-
dition of the JTB analysis? The idea that underlies the belief condition appears to be
that p-knowledge is an attitude toward the relevant thought that can be stored in our
cognitive repertoire and to which the property truth and the property being justified can
be attributed. In (FMK6P) what plays the role of belief is the experience of the use of the
ability to identifynj the True. Though this experience itself is not an attitude toward a
thought, it is what produces something like an attitude toward a thought. Specifically,
the experience of the use of the ability to identifynj the True by way of ‘p’ produces and
strengthens one’s disposition to re-identify the True via ‘p’ and thereby via ‘〈p〉’ over
and over again. Moreover, this experience can be restored in our cognitive repertoire.
Finally, as I will explain shortly, the truth condition and the judgment condition are
captured by the point that p-knowledge is the experience of the successful use of our
ability to identifynj the True. Hence, the experience of the use of the ability, which con-
stitutes p-knowledge, is tightly connected to the other condition of p-knowledge—the
successful use condition.
Now, when is the use of one’s ability to identifynj the True by way of ‘p’ successful?
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One obvious condition is the correctness condition of the act of identification, i.e., the
following:
(FMK7) One’s use of the ability to identifynj O by way of ‘T’ is successful
only if T is O.
Thus, it follows that
(FMK7P) One has the p-knowledge that p only if ‖p‖ is the True.
(FMK7P) corresponds to the truth condition of the JTB analysis of p-knowledge. How-
ever, this cannot be called ‘truth condition’ if we follow Frege’s objectual conception of
truth according to which truth is the True. Thus, we would rather call it ‘the identity
condition’. In any event, the identity condition preserves the insight that underlies the
truth condition of the JTB analysis: the factivity of p-knowledge.
The identity condition, however, is not sufficient. A successful use of the ability to
identifynj an object is possible only when the ability is strong enough. Specifically,
(FMK8) One’s use of the ability to identifynj O by way of ‘OP’ is successful
only if the ability is strong enough to let us identify OP with O.
Thus, we have the following:
(FMK8P) One has the p-knowledge that p only if one’s ability to identifynj
the True is sufficiently strong to enable us to identifynj the True
with ‖p‖.
Let us call (FMK8P) ‘the strength condition’. The strength condition seizes the insight
that underlies the justification of the JTB analysis: p-knowledge must be supported by
truth-conducive elements. The strength of our ability to identifynj the True is certainly
a truth-conducive element under Frege’s objectual conception of truth. Moreover, the
strength condition also seems to capture the lesson from the Gettier Problem (Gettier
1963). Since the Problem, it has been widely agreed that justification is insufficient—or
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even unnecessary—for p-knowledge. P-knowledge also requires a subject to have the
ability to track truth.21 Given (FMK8P), p-knowledge in the Frege-Millikanian theory
requires a subject to have an ability to track the True. In quite a direct sense the ability
condition also preserves the insights from the Gettier Problem.
To recap, the Frege-Millikanian theory of knowledge accommodates the insights of
the JTB analysis of p-knowledge. I turn to clarifying a little bit more about our ability
to identifynj the True.
7.3.3. The Ability to Identifynj the True
That we have the ability to identifynj the True implies that we have an access to the
True. But how do we acquire the initial access to this abstract object?22 Frege’s answer
to this question is related to what he calls ‘logical object’ (Frege 1903b: §147). Logical
objects are the objects we can access solely through our ‘logical faculty’ (1903b: §147).
Truth-values are supposed to be logical objects (Shramko and Wansing 2018: §1.3). If
so, they are what we can access only through our logical faculty. However, Frege does
not say much about ‘logical faculty’ although he definitely takes our inferential ability
to constitute a part of our logical faculty (Frege 1925: 279).
To say we can access the True solely by our logical faculty is, however, not to say we
do or must initially access the True by our logical faculty. Hence, Frege-Millikanians
can accept the possibility that a subject accesses the True via other routes. One possible
route is via people’s use of language. As we’ve said an assertion is a verbal counterpart
of a judgment. An assertion as such can be taken to be a verbal identificationnj of the
21The idea of reliabilism has been suggested by a number of theorists in a number of different forms.
Some classical works include Armstrong 1973, Dretske 1971, Goldman 1976, 1986, Nozick 1981, etc.
22Frege never says that the True is an abstract object. However, given that it is not an object we can
access by our perceptual abilities, it is mostly likely an abstract object.
182 Chapter 7. A Fregean Picture Further Developed
True. Frege-Millikanians can say that a subject can acquire the initial access to the True
via a competent speaker’s (correct) assertion, just like we can acquire the initial access
to Caesar by a competent speaker’s (correct) use of the proper name ‘Caesar’. This is
basically Millikan’s idea: She (2000: §1.10) believes that language enables its speakers
to access things in the world. If we accept this idea, we can say that one route through
which we acquire the initial access to an object is our ability to recognize the reference
of a term via other people’s use of the term. That is our linguistic ability to identifynj an
object. So we can access the True by our ability to recognize the reference of a sentence
via other people’s use of the sentence, i.e., our linguistic ability to identifynj the True.
As we’ve said in §7.1 on judgment, it is thanks to this ability that Frege’s conception
of judgment does not take grasping 〈p〉 to be a precondition for judging that p.
The ability to identifynj the True thus includes the linguistic ability to identifynj
the True. This ability can also be labeled ‘the conceptual ability to identifynj the True’
because it is the ability to identifynj the True when it is given by a thought that can be
considered as conceptual contents. Now, the conceptual ability to identifynj the True is
essentially related to our inferential faculty. Frege writes:
To make a judgment because we are cognizant of other truths as providing a
justification for it is known as inferring. (Frege 1879a: 3)23
Thus our inferential faculty enables us to proceed from previous judgments to a new
judgment. So we can say: we have the inferential ability to identifynj the True, i.e., the
ability to identifynj ‖q‖ with the True by virtue of identifyingnj ‖p1‖, ‖p2‖, ‖p3‖, · · · , ‖pn‖
with the True.
We’ve identified two sub-abilities to identifynj the True: the linguistic/conceptual
23This is Frege’s early manuscript ‘Logic’ written in 1879. The mature Frege retains the same conception
of inference as ‘transition to a new judgment’ (Frege 1893: 1) from a previous one.
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ability and the inferential ability. Can there be other ways to identifynj the True? For
instance, can we identifynj the True by perceptual experience? The True is an abstract
object, and hence the answer appears to be ‘No’. The ability to identifynj the True is
essentially to identifynj the True linguistically/conceptually. But our perceptual ability
is a cognitive ability, which is closely related to p-knowledge. Hence, it is reasonable
to require a theory of p-knowledge to make sense of ‘perceptual knowledge’. Frege
appears to be aware of this requirement because he considers sense perception as one
of the sources of knowledge. He writes:
A sense impression is not in itself a judgment, but becomes important in that it is
the occasion for our making a judgment. (Frege 1924: 267)
But perceptual ability does more than merely providing an occasion for our making a
judgment to the extent that the defects of perceptual ability lead to errors.
[T]here are at our disposal a diversity of means for correcting the judgment gained
from the [illusive vision]. (Frege 1924: 268)
We need to note that Frege is saying that a judgment is gained from a visual perception.
From his remarks, we can read off at least three different theses regrading the relation-
ship between our perceptual ability and our ability to identitynj the True conceptually.
(PC1) The perceptual ability is not directly related to the ability to identifynj
the True conceptually. It merely enables us to perceive objects in
the world and their properties, and thereby provides chances for
making judgments.
(PC2) The perceptual ability can directly guide us to use our ability to
identifynj the True conceptually for making judgments concerning
perceptible things.
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(PC3) One of the sub-abilities of the perceptual ability constitutes a sub-
ability of the ability to identifynj the True conceptually. Our judg-
ments about perceptible things are results of using this per/conceptual
ability.
None of these theses, which can be developed in a number of different ways, appears
to be incompatible with the Frege-Millikanian theory. If so, Frege-Millikanians have a
variety of options for the relationship between the perceptual ability and the ability to
identifynj the True conceptually.
Here I’ve attempted to give a sketch of the Frege-Millikanian theory of knowledge.
Although we should clarify much more—e.g., the notion of ability—to develop it into
a full theory, it goes beyond the scope of this dissertation to do so. But its potential
already seems to be emerging. For one it seems to be able to explain our cognitive life
in general by putting objectual knowledge at its center. Also, while doing so, it seems
to recognize the insights of the traditional analysis of knowledge and to be compatible
with lots of current theories of knowledge.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
When I first started this research project, my aim was to construct a neo-Fregean theory
of truth based on Frege’s comments on truth. However, in the middle of the project, I
had to change my aim. For I realized that Frege’s insights into the nature of truth were
left unexplained or even unrevealed. That is why my dissertation ended up focusing
mostly on the exegesis of Frege’s conception of truth and related notions.
Above all, Frege is an objectualist of truth who considers truth to be an object—
the True qua the reference of true sentences. Even though he is widely known as a
truth deflationist and he definitely makes deflationist claims, he is not a deflationist.
As we have seen Frege’s deflationist comments are his arguments that truth is not a
property but an object. Likewise, even though Frege is widely known as a primitivist
of truth and he does argue that truth is indefinable, he is not a truth primitivist. In the
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literal reading we’ve developed, the gist of Frege’s indefinability argument turns out
to be that truth cannot be defined as a property because it is not a property. Hence,
Frege’s primitivist argument is also his argument for objectualism. Arguing that Frege
is an objectualist of truth, I explained the problems with the previous readings that
do not recognize Frege as an objectualist. These readings, despite their insightful
observations, have fundamental limits because they do not fully appreciate what is at
the center of Frege’s conception of truth—his objectualism.
One might retort that my reading reads too much into Frege’s works. Frege is only
concerned about his logicist project—at least until he realizes that Russell’s paradox
cannot be solved by the way he suggests—and about logic insofar as it is related to
his logicist project. The point of this objection is that Frege has no reason to go deep
into the nature of truth to the extent that I believe he goes. The discussion in Chapter
5 can be considered to be a response to this objection. For Frege judging and its verbal
counterpart asserting are the basic units of logical inferences. What he realizes in
his mature career is that judging and asserting must not be predicating the property
truth. Frege finds an alternative in the view that takes truth to be an object. By taking
truth to be an object he can say that judging and asserting that p are identifyingnj the
True with ‖p‖. Moreover the discussion in Chapter 6 provides a crucial logical role of
truth-values as objects. Accepting that truth-values are objects, Frege can make sense
of value-ranges qua logical objects. Specifically, by recognizing truth-values, we can
also recognize functions and eventually value-ranges as objects.1 In Chapter 7, I show
that Frege’s conception of judgment and assertion also has philosophical benefits.
Because judging is producing propositional knowledge for Frege, his unique con-
1Although we don’t discuss them here, there are further logical benefits of taking truth-values to be
objects. See Burge 1986 and Ricketts 2003.
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ception of judging naturally leads to a unique conception of propositional knowledge.
Chapter 6 has explored Frege’s conception of propositional knowledge. As we’ve seen
he puts objectual knowledge at the center of his conception of knowledge. Objectual
knowledge of an object O provides us with the ability to identifynj O, which we use
when we identify O with the reference of a given term. The identity knowledge we
produce by the use of this ability is non-propositional. Judging is using our ability to
identifynj the True. The non-propositional identity knowledge of the True we produce
by judging is propositional knowledge in Frege. This interpretation of his conception
of knowledge leads to the answers to the questions as to in what sense the sciences aim
at the object of truth and as to in what sense logic is the unique science for which truth
is the main subject-matter. In Chapter 7 we develop Frege’s conception of knowledge
into the Frege-Millikanian theory of knowledge.
Closing the dissertation I need to point out that we’ve not answered the question
as to what the True is. Of course, we now have a number of different ways to describe
it. The True is the reference of true sentences. Also, it is a logical, abstract, object. But
what is more important is that the True is ‖If 2 is an even number then it is an even
number‖, ‖2 + 3 is equal to 5‖, ‖Nothing is faster than light‖, ‖Kim is a PhD candidate
at UConn‖, etc. It is an object our knowledge of which is getting stronger and more
expanded continuously. If the True is such an object, it may not be possible to define
it and provide an exhaustive theory about its nature. The True is the ultimate aim our
cognitive activities strive for, not what we already fully grasp.
What is also important is that the debates in the current literature on truth are still
meaningful and must go on even under the objectualist conception of truth. What we
are looking for in our theory of truth is whether there is a substantive property owned
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by truth-bearers we take to be true. Deflationists say “No”. Substantive theorists like
correspondence theorists or coherence theorists claim that there is a single substantive
property owned by true truth-bearers. Pluralists state that there are multiple different
properties owned by different true truth-bearers.2 We can ask a similar question here:
Is there a substantive property shared by thoughts which we say that belong to the
True or from which we take a step to the True? We ought to notice that this question
does not concern a substantive property constitutive of the property truth; for there is
nothing like the property truth. Then what is the question about? I believe that there
can be a number of different answers. Here I introduce two answers. One is as follows:
Philosophico-Psychological Understanding
Through the above question we are backtracking the tendencies we have when we
attempt to say that thoughts belong to the True—whether we tend to identify the
True with ‖p‖when 〈p〉 has a particular property. This backtracking can show how
we actually tend to think about the True.
The other is as follows:
Epistemological Understanding
Through the above question we are trying to figure out how our cognitive abilities,
which let us identifynj the True, function. In particular we are asking whether there
are properties of thoughts our cognitive abilities distinctively track down in their
pursuit of the True. This inquiry is an epistemological inquiry into the nature of the
True itself because what we are trying to find out is which properties of thoughts
count as the epistemic marks of the True. That would in the end partly show what
kind of object the True is—just as the fact that visual perceptions can count as the
evidence for Venus shows what kind of object Venus is.
2I intend this statement to be neutral between Wright (1992, 2013)-Lynch 2000, 2009b, 2013 style
moderate pluralism and strong pluralism (Kim and Pedersen 2018). Both of them accept that there are
multiple properties. But moderate pluralism says that there is a single property shared by all different
truth-bearers—what we may call ‘minimal truth’. However, strong pluralism denies the existence of
such a single property.
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I think that there can be other answers to why we would attempt to figure out what we
used to call ‘truth properties’ in Frege’s objectualist conception of truth. But it already
seems clear that our debates about the so-called truth properties are still meaningful
in a new guise under Frege’s objectualism and objectualism itself does not provide us
with an answer. Hence, those debates must still go on under Frege’s objectualism of
truth.
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